

Annexes

Annex I

Risoluzioni delle Nazioni Unite

A) Risoluzione 194 dell'Assemblea Generale

December 11, 1948

Having considered further the situation in Palestine,

1. Expresses its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of the late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life; and Extends its thanks to the Acting Mediator and his staff for their continued efforts and devotion to duty in Palestine;
2. Establishes a Conciliation Commission consisting of three States members of the United Nations which shall have the following functions:
 - (a) To assume, in so far as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by resolution 186 (S-2) of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948;
 - (b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by the present resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council;
 - (c) To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions, the office of the Mediator shall be terminated;
3. Decides that a Committee of the Assembly, consisting of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, shall present,

before the end of the first part of the present session of the General Assembly, for the approval of the Assembly, a proposal concerning the names of the three States which will constitute the Conciliation Commission;

4. Requests the Commission to begin its functions at once, with a view to the establishment of contact between the parties themselves and the Commission at the earliest possible date;

5. Calls upon the Governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the Security Council's resolution of 16 November 1948 1/ and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

6. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

7. Resolves that the Holy Places - including Nazareth - religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and free access to them assured, in accordance with existing rights and historical practice; that arrangements to this end should be under effective United Nations supervision; that the United Nations Conciliation Commission, in presenting to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly its detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem, should include recommendations concerning the Holy Places in that territory; that with regard to the Holy Places in the rest of Palestine the Commission should call upon the political authorities of the areas concerned to give appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of the Holy Places and access to them; and that these undertakings should be presented to the General Assembly for approval;

8. Resolves that, in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area, including the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern, Shu'fat, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control; Requests the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the demilitarization of Jerusalem at the earliest possible date; Instructs the Conciliation Commission to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which will provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area; The Conciliation Commission is authorized to appoint a United Nations representative, who shall co-operate with the local authorities with respect to the interim administration of the Jerusalem area;

9. Resolves that, pending agreement on more detailed arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned, the freest possible access to Jerusalem by road, rail or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine; Instructs the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council, for appropriate action by that organ, any attempt by any party to impede such access;

10. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to seek arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic development of the area, including arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the use of transportation and communication facilities;

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their

neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;

12. Authorizes the Conciliation Commission to appoint such subsidiary bodies and to employ such technical experts, acting under its authority, as it may find necessary for the effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under the present resolution; The Conciliation Commission will have its official headquarters at Jerusalem. The authorities responsible for maintaining order in Jerusalem will be responsible for taking all measures necessary to ensure the security of the Commission. The Secretary-General will provide a limited number of guards to the protection of the staff and premises of the Commission;

13. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations;

14. Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to co-operate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the present resolution;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the terms of the present resolution.

(Fonte: UNISPAL, <http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/vGARes!OpenView&Start=1&Count=150&Expand=56#56>)

B) Risoluzione 242 del Consiglio di Sicurezza

November 22, 1967
The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

- (a) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- (b) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

- (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
- (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
- (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

C) Risoluzione 338 del Consiglio di Sicurezza

October 22, 1973
The Security Council

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

D) Risoluzione 1397 del Consiglio di Sicurezza

March 12, 2002
The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973),

Affirming a vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders,
Expressing its grave concern at the continuation of the tragic and violent events that have taken place since September 2000, especially the recent attacks and the increased number of casualties,

Stressing the need for all concerned to ensure the safety of civilians, Stressing also the need to respect the universally accepted norms of international humanitarian law,

Welcoming and encouraging the diplomatic efforts of special envoys from the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the European Union and the United Nations Special Coordinator and others to bring about a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

Welcoming the contribution of Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah,

1. Demands immediate cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction;
2. Calls upon the Israeli and Palestinian sides and their leaders to cooperate in the implementation of the Tenet work plan and Mitchell Report recommendations with the aim of resuming negotiations on a political settlement;
3. Expresses support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and others to assist the parties to halt the violence and to resume the peace process;
4. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

(fonte: UNISPAL, <http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/vCouncilRes>)

Annex II

Dichiarazione finale della conferenza del dodicesimo vertice arabo (Final Declaration of the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference)

Adopted at Fez on 9 September 1982

The Twelfth Arab Summit Conference was convened in the city of Fez on 27 Muharram 1402 A.H., corresponding to 25 November 1981 A.D.

After suspension, it resumed for the period from 17 to 20 Zu'lga'dah 1402 A.H., corresponding to 6 to 9 September 1982 A.D., under the presidency of His Majesty King Hassan II, King of the Kingdom of Morocco.

All the Arab States participated in the work of the Conference, with the exception of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

In view of the grave and delicate circumstances through which the Arab nation is passing and inspired by awareness of historic national responsibility, Their Majesties, Their Excellencies and Their Highnesses, the Kings, Presidents and Amirs of the Arab States examined the important questions before the Conference and took the following decisions.

The Arab-Israeli conflict

The Conference paid a tribute to the resistance of the forces of the Palestinian revolution, the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples and the Syrian Arab armed forces, and declared its support for the Palestinian people in their struggle for the restoration of their inalienable national rights.

Convinced of the ability of the Arab nation to achieve its legitimate objectives and to put an end to the aggression, on the basis of the fundamental principles laid down by the Arab Sum-

mit Conferences, in view of the desire of the Arab States to continue to strive by every means for the achievement of peace based on justice in the Middle East region, taking account of the plan of His Excellency President Habib Bourguiba, which holds international legality to be the basis for the solution of the Palestinian question, and of the plan of His Majesty King Fahd Ibn Abdul Aziz for peace in the Middle East and in the light of the discussions and observations of Their Majesties, Their Excellencies and Their Highnesses, the Kings, Presidents and Amirs, the Conference adopted the following principles:

1. The withdrawal of Israel from all the Arab territories occupied by it in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem;
2. The dismantling of the settlements established by Israel in the Arab territories since 1967;
3. The guaranteeing of freedom of worship and performance of religious rites for all religions in the Holy Places;
4. The reaffirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to the exercise of their inalienable and imprescriptible national rights, under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, their sole and legitimate representative, and the indemnification of those who do not desire to return;
5. The placing of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the supervision of the United Nations for a transitional period not exceeding a few months;
6. The establishment of an independent Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital;
7. The establishment by the United Nations Security Council of guarantees of peace between all States of the region, including the independent Palestinian State;
8. The guaranteeing by the Security Council of the implementation of these principles.

The Israeli aggression against Lebanon

1. The Conference declares its strong condemnation of the Israeli aggression against the people and territory of Lebanon and against the Palestinian people and draws the attention of international public opinion to the seriousness of this aggression and its consequences for the stability and security of the region.
2. The Conference decides to support Lebanon in everything that will lead to the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council, particularly resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), which demand the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanese territory back to the internationally recognized frontiers.

3. The Conference reaffirms the solidarity of the Arab States with Lebanon in its tragedy and its readiness to provide any assistance requested by Lebanon for dealing with this tragedy and putting an end to it.

The Conference has been informed of the decision of the Lebanese Government to terminate the functions of the Arab deterrent forces in Lebanon, on the condition that negotiations are to be conducted between the Lebanese Government and the Syrian Government for the adoption of measures in the light of Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

The Gulf war and the Arab position thereon

The Conference, having studied the situation in the Gulf and having noted with great affliction and regret the continuation of the Iraq-Iran war, despite repeated attempts to reach a cease-fire and despite offers of mediation and good offices on the part of international organizations, appreciating Iraq's positive initiative of withdrawing its military forces back to the international frontiers;

On the basis of the principle of solidarity and the unity of Arab ranks and out of concern to see an atmosphere of serenity, harmony and good-neighbourliness prevail between the Arab countries and their neighbours, has decided to proclaim its commitment to the defence of all Arab territories and to consider any aggression against any Arab country as being aggression against all Arab countries;

To call upon the two parties to the conflict to comply fully with Security Council resolutions 479 (1980) and 514 (1982) and to endeavour to implement them;

To ask all States to refrain from taking any measure likely to encourage directly or indirectly the continuation of the war.

The Horn of Africa

The Conference took note of the submission of the Somali Democratic Republic concerning the incursion of Ethiopia into Somali territory and decided:

1. To support the Somali Democratic Republic in facing the exigencies of safeguarding its sovereignty over its territory and expelling the Ethiopian force from Somali territory;
2. That the two countries, Ethiopia and the Somali Democratic Republic, respect the sover-

eignty of each over its territory and the independence of each after the withdrawal of Ethiopia from Somali territory;

3. To support peaceful efforts to resolve the problems between the two parties on these bases.

The Conference decided to establish, a committee to undertake contacts with the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in order to follow up the decisions of the Conference relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to become informed of their positions and of the recently stated position of the United States of America concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict. The committee is to submit the results of its contacts and efforts to the Kings and Heads of State on a regular basis.

(fonte: United Nations-UNISPAL:

<http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/be65b75f931fa995052567270057d45e/a65756251b75f6ad852562810074e5f4!OpenDocument>)

Annex III

I “parametri” del presidente Clinton per un accordo complessivo tra israeliani e palestinesi (President Clinton’s “parameters” for a comprehensive agreement between Israelis and Palestinians)

7 January 2001

Speaking to the Israeli Policy Forum in New York on 7 January, President Clinton outlined the “parametres” he had put forward to the two sides as “a guide toward a comprehensive agreement”, and which had been accepted, albeit with reservations, by Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat as the basis for further peace efforts; as reported by Reuters and The Jerusalem Post - Internet Edition

1. The establishment of a “sovereign, viable Palestinian State that would accommodate Israel’s security requirements and the demographic realities”. It would include the Gaza Strip and “the vast majority of the West Bank”, while settlement blocks would be incorporated into Israel “with the goal of maximizing the number of settlers in Israel while minimizing the land annex, for Palestine to be viable must be a geographically contiguous State”; some territorial swaps and other arrangements would be needed to make the agreement “durable”.

2. A solution for the Palestinian refugees that would allow them to return to a Palestinian State, those who so wished, or find new homes in their current locations or in third countries, including Israel, “consistent with those countries’ sovereign decisions”. All refugees should receive compensation from the international community for their losses and assistance in building their new lives; the US would take a lead in raising the money necessary to relocate them in the most appropriate manner. One should not expect Israel to acknowledge an unlimited right of return to present-day Israel, as that “would undermine the very foundations of the Israeli State or the whole reason for creating the Palestinian State”.

3. An “international presence in Palestine to provide border security along the Jordan Valley and to monitor implementation of the final agreement” as well as “a non-militarized Palestine, a phased Israeli withdrawal, to address Israeli security needs in the Jordan Valley, and other essential arrangements to ensure Israel’s ability to defend itself.

4. Four “fair and logical propositions” regarding Jerusalem: (a) It should be an open and un-

divided city, with assured freedom of access and worship for all, encompassing the internationally recognized capitals of two States, Israel and Palestine, (b) “[W]hat is Arab should be Palestinian” and (c) “what is Jewish should be Israeli”, while (d) “what is holy to both requires a special care to meet the needs of all”, with “mutual respect for the religious beliefs and holy shrines of Jews, Muslims and Christians”.

5. “[A]ny agreement would have to mark the decision to end the conflict, for neither side can afford to make these painful compromises, only to be subjected to further demands”.

President Clinton said he was using his remaining time in office “to narrow the differences between the parties to the greatest degree possible” and to that end he was sending his envoy Dennis Ross to the region in the coming days.

(fonte: United Nations website:

<http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/d57afcdd6eb1445585256e37006655e4?OpenDocument>)

Annex IV

Negoziati di Taba (Taba Talks)

A) EU description of the outcome of permanent status talks at Taba

Introduction

This EU non-paper has been prepared by the EU Special Representative to the Middle East Process, Ambassador Moratinos, and his team after consultations with the Israeli and Palestinian sides, present at Taba in January 2001. Although the paper has no official status, it has been acknowledged by the parties as being a relatively fair description of the outcome of the negotiations on the permanent status issues at Taba. It draws attention to the extensive work which has been undertaken on all permanent status issues like territory, Jerusalem, refugees and security in order to find ways to come to joint positions. At the same time it shows that there are serious gaps and differences between the two sides, which will have to be overcome in future negotiations. From that point of view, the paper reveals the challenging task ahead in terms of policy determination and legal work, but it also shows that both sides have traveled a long way to accommodate the views of the other side and that solutions are possible.

1.1 West Bank

For the first time both sides presented their own maps over the West Bank. The maps served as a basis for the discussion on territory and settlements. The Israeli side presented two maps, and the Palestinian side engaged on this basis. The Palestinian side presented some illustrative maps detailing its understanding of Israeli interests in the West Bank.

The negotiations tackled the various aspects of territory, which could include some of the settlements and how the needs of each party could be accommodated. The Clinton parameters served as a loose basis for the discussion, but differences of interpretations regarding the scope and meaning of the parameters emerged. The Palestinian side stated that it had accepted the Clinton proposals but with reservations.

The Israeli side stated that the Clinton proposals provide for annexation of settlement blocs. The Palestinian side did not agree that the parameters included blocs, and did not accept proposals to annex blocs. The Palestinian side stated that blocs would cause significant harm to the Palestinian interests and rights, particularly to the Palestinians residing in areas Israel seeks to annex.

The Israeli side maintained that it is entitled to contiguity between and among their settlements. The Palestinian side stated that Palestinian needs take priority over settlements. The Israeli maps included plans for future development of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The Palestinian side did not agree to the principle of allowing further development of settlements in the West Bank. Any growth must occur inside Israel.

The Palestinian side maintained that since Israel has needs in Palestinian territory, it is responsible for proposing the necessary border modifications. The Palestinian side reiterated that such proposals must not adversely affect the Palestinian needs and interests.

The Israeli side stated that it did not need to maintain settlements in the Jordan Valley for security purposes, and its proposed maps reflected this position.

The Israeli maps were principally based on a demographic concept of settlements blocs that would incorporate approximately 80 percent on the settlers. The Israeli side sketched a map presenting a 6 percent annexation, the outer limit of the Clinton proposal. The Palestinian illustrative map presented 3.1 percent in the context of a land swap.

Both sides accepted the principle of land swap but the proportionality of the swap remained under discussion. Both sides agreed that Israeli and Palestinian sovereign areas will have respective sovereign contiguity. The Israeli side wished to count “assets” such as Israelis “safe passage/corridor” proposal as being part of the land swap, even though the proposal would not give Palestine sovereignty over these “assets”. The Israeli side adhered to a maximum 3 percent land swap as per Clinton proposal.

The Palestinian maps had a similar conceptual point of reference stressing the importance of a non-annexation of any Palestinian villages and the contiguity of the West Bank and Jerusalem. They were predicated on the principle of a land swap that would be equitable in size and value and in areas adjacent to the border with Palestine, and in the same vicinity as the annexed by Israel. The Palestinian side further maintained that land not under Palestinian sovereignty such as the Israeli proposal regarding a “safe passage/corridor” as well as economic interests are not included in the calculation of the swap.

The Palestinian side maintained that the “No-Man’s-Land” (Latrun area) is part of the West Bank. The Israelis did not agree.

The Israeli side requested an additional 2 percent of land under a lease arrangement to which the Palestinians responded that the subject of lease can only be discussed after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the transfer of land to Palestinian sovereignty.

1.2 Gaza Strip

Neither side presented any maps over the Gaza Strip. It was implied that the Gaza Strip will be under total Palestinian sovereignty, but details have still to be worked out. All settlements will be evacuated. The Palestinian side claimed it could be arranged in 6 months, a timetable not agreed by the Israeli side.

1.3 Safe passage/corridor from Gaza to the West Bank

Both sides agreed that there is going to be a safe passage from the north of Gaza (Beit Hanun) to the Hebron district, and that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip must be territorially linked. The nature of the regime governing the territorial link and sovereignty over it was not agreed.

2. Jerusalem

2.1 Sovereignty

Both sides accepted in principle the Clinton suggestion of having a Palestinian sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods and an Israeli sovereignty over Jewish neighborhoods. The Palestinian side affirmed that it was ready to discuss Israeli request to have sovereignty over those Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem that were constructed after 1967, but not Jebel Abu Ghneim and Ras al-Amud.

The Palestinian side rejected Israeli sovereignty over settlements in the Jerusalem Metropolitan Area, namely of Ma’ale Adumim and Givat Ze’ev.

The Palestinian side understood that Israel was ready to accept Palestinian sovereignty over the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, including part of Jerusalem’s Old City. The Israeli side understood that the Palestinians were ready to accept Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish Quarter of the Old City and part of the American Quarter.

The Palestinian side understood that the Israeli side accepted to discuss Palestinian property claims in West Jerusalem.

2.2 Open City

Both sides favored the idea of an Open City. The Israeli side suggested the establishment of an open city whose geographical scope encompasses the Old City of Jerusalem plus an area defined as the Holy Basin or Historical Basin.

The Palestinian side was in favor of an open city provided that continuity and contiguity were preserved. The Palestinians rejected the Israeli proposal regarding the geographic scope of an open city and asserted that the open city is only acceptable if its geographical scope encompasses the full municipal borders of both East and West Jerusalem.

The Israeli side raised the idea of establishing a mechanism of daily coordination and different models were suggested for municipal coordination and cooperation (dealing with infrastructure, roads, electricity, sewage, waste removal etc). Such arrangements could be formulated in a future detailed agreement. It proposed a “soft border regime” within Jerusalem between Al-Quds and Yerushalaim that affords them “soft border” privileges. Furthermore the Israeli side proposed a number of special arrangements for Palestinian and Israeli residents of the Open City to guarantee that the Open City arrangement neither adversely affect their daily lives nor compromise each party sovereignty over its section of the Open City.

2.3 Capital for two states

The Israeli side accepted that the City of Jerusalem would be the capital of the two states: Yerushalaim, capital of Israel and Al-Quds, capital of the state of Palestine. The Palestinian side expressed its only concern, namely that East Jerusalem is the capital of the state of Palestine.

2.4 Holy/Historical Basin and the Old City

There was an attempt to develop an alternative concept that would relate to the Old City and its surroundings, and the Israeli side put forward several alternative models for discussion, for example, setting up a mechanism for close coordination and cooperation in the Old City. The idea of a special police force regime was discussed but not agreed upon.

The Israeli side expressed its interest and raised its concern regarding the area conceptualized as the Holy Basin (which includes the Jewish Cemetery on the Mount of Olives, the City of David and Kivron Valley). The Palestinian side confirmed that it was willing to take into account Israeli interests and concerns provided that these places remain under Palestinian sovereignty. Another option for the Holy Basin, suggested informally by the Israeli side, was to create a special regime or to suggest some form of internationalization for the entire area or a joint regime with special cooperation and coordination.

The Palestinian side did not agree to pursue any of these ideas, although the discussion could continue.

2.5 Holy Sites: Western Wall and the Wailing Wall

Both parties have accepted the principle of respective control over each side’s respective holy sites (religious control and management). According to this principle, Israel’s sovereignty over the Western Wall would be recognized although there remained a dispute regarding the delineation of the area covered by the Western Wall and especially the link to what is referred to in Clinton’s ideas as the space sacred to Judaism of which it is part.

The Palestinian side acknowledged that Israel has requested to establish an affiliation to the holy parts of the Western Wall, but maintained that the question of the Wailing Wall and/or

Western Wall has not been resolved. It maintained the importance of distinguishing between the Western Wall and the Wailing Wall segment thereof, recognized in the Islamic faith as the Buraq Wall.

2.6 Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount

Both sides agreed that the question of Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount has not been resolved. However, both sides were close to accepting Clinton's ideas regarding Palestinian sovereignty over Haram al-Sharif notwithstanding Palestinian and Israeli reservations.

Both sides noted progress on practical arrangements regarding evacuations, building and public order in the area of the compound. An informal suggestion was raised that for an agreed period such as three years, Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount would be under international sovereignty of the P5 plus Morocco (or other Islamic presence), whereby the Palestinians would be the "Guardian/Custodians" during this period. At the end of this period, either the parties would agree on a new solution or agree to extend the existing arrangement. In the absence of an agreement, the parties would return to implement the Clinton formulation. Neither party accepted or rejected the suggestion.

3. Refugees

Non-papers were exchanged, which were regarded as a good basis for the talks. Both sides stated that the issue of the Palestinian refugees is central to the Israeli-Palestinian relations and that a comprehensive and just solution is essential to creating a lasting and morally scrupulous peace.

Both sides agreed to adopt the principles and references which could facilitate the adoption of an agreement.

Both sides suggested, as a basis, that the parties should agree that a just settlement of the refugee problem in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 242 must lead to the implementation of UN General Assembly Resolution 194.

3.1 Narrative

The Israeli side put forward a suggested joint narrative for the tragedy of the Palestinian refugees. The Palestinian side discussed the proposed narrative and there was much progress, although no agreement was reached in an attempt to develop a historical narrative in the general text.

3.2 Return, repatriation and relocation and rehabilitation

Both sides engaged in a discussion of the practicalities of resolving the refugee issue. The Palestinian side reiterated that the Palestinian refugees should have the right of return to their homes in accordance with the interpretation of UNGAR 194. The Israeli side expressed its understanding that the wish to return as per wording of UNGAR 194 shall be implemented within the framework of one of the following programs:

A. Return and repatriation

1. to Israel
2. to Israel swapped territory
3. to the Palestine state.

B. Rehabilitation and relocation

1. Rehabilitation in host country.
2. Relocation to third country.

Preference in all these programs shall be accorded to the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon. The Palestinian side stressed that the above shall be subject to the individual free choice of the refugees, and shall not prejudice their right to their homes in accordance with its interpretation of UNGAR 194.

The Israeli side, informally, suggested a three-track 15-year absorption program, which was discussed but not agreed upon. The first track referred to the absorption to Israel. No numbers were agreed upon, but with a non-paper referring to 25,000 in the first three years of this program (40,000 in the first five years of this program did not appear in the non-paper but was raised verbally). The second track referred to the absorption of Palestinian refugees into the Israeli territory, that shall be transferred to Palestinian sovereignty, and the third track referring to the absorption of refugees in the context of family reunification scheme.

The Palestinian side did not present a number, but stated that the negotiations could not start without an Israeli opening position. It maintained that Israel's acceptance of the return of refugees should not prejudice existing programs within Israel such as family reunification.

3.3 Compensation

Both sides agreed to the establishment of an International Commission and an International Fund as a mechanism for dealing with compensation in all its aspects. Both sides agreed that "small-sum" compensation shall be paid to the refugees in the "fast-track" procedure, claims of compensation for property losses below certain amount shall be subject to "fast-track" procedures.

There was also progress on Israeli compensation for material losses, land and assets expropriated, including agreement on a payment from an Israeli lump sum or proper amount to be agreed upon that would feed into the International Fund. According to the Israeli side the calculation of this payment would be based on a macro-economic survey to evaluate the assets in order to reach a fair value. The Palestinian side, however, said that this sum would be calculated on the records of the UNCCP, the Custodian for Absentee Property and other relevant data with a multiplier to reach a fair value.

3.4 UNRWA

Both sides agreed that UNRWA should be phased out in accordance with an agreed timetable of five years, as a targeted period. The Palestinian side added a possible adjustment of that

period to make sure that this will be subject to the implementation of the other aspects of the agreement dealing with refugees, and with termination of Palestinian refugee status in the various locations.

3.5 Former Jewish refugees

The Israeli side requested that the issue of compensation to former Jewish refugees from Arab countries be recognized, while accepting that it was not a Palestinian responsibility or a bilateral issue. The Palestinian side maintained that this is not a subject for a bilateral Palestinian-Israeli agreement.

3.6 Restitution

The Palestinian side raised the issue of restitution of refugee property. The Israeli side rejected this.

3.7 End of claims

The issue of the end of claims was discussed, and it was suggested that the implementation of the agreement shall constitute a complete and final implementation of UNGAR 194 and therefore ends all claims.

4. Security

4.1 Early warning stations

The Israeli side requested to have 3 early warning stations on Palestinian territory. The Palestinian side was prepared to accept the continued operations of early warning stations but subject to certain conditions. The exact mechanism has therefore to be detailed in further negotiations.

4.2 Military capability of the state of Palestine

The Israeli side maintained that the state of Palestine would be non-militarized as per the Clinton proposals. The Palestinian side was prepared to accept limitation on its acquisition of arms, and be defined as a state with limited arms. The two sides have not yet agreed on the scope of arms limitations, but have begun exploring different options. Both sides agree that this issue has not been concluded.

4.3 Air space control

The two sides recognized that the state of Palestine would have sovereignty over its airspace. The Israeli side agreed to accept and honor all of Palestine civil aviation rights according to international regulations, but sought a unified air control system under overriding Israel control. In addition, Israel requested access to Palestinian airspace for military operations and training.

The Palestinian side was interested in exploring models for broad cooperation and coordina-

tion in the civil aviation sphere, but unwilling to cede overriding control to Israel. As for Israeli military operations and training in Palestinian airspace, the Palestinian side rejected this request as inconsistent with the neutrality of the state of Palestine, saying that it cannot grant Israel these privileges while denying them to its Arab neighbors.

4.4 Time table for withdrawal from the West Bank and Jordan Valley

Based on the Clinton proposal, the Israeli side agreed to a withdrawal from the West Bank over a 36-month period with an additional 36 months for the Jordan Valley in conjunction with an international force, maintaining that a distinction should be made between withdrawal in the Jordan Valley and elsewhere. The Palestinian side rejected a 36-month withdrawal process from the West Bank expressing concern that a lengthy process would exacerbate Palestinian-Israeli tensions. The Palestinian side proposed an 18 months withdrawal under the supervision of international forces. As to the Jordan Valley the Palestinian side was prepared to consider the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces for an additional 10-month period. Although the Palestinian side was ready to consider the presence of international forces in the West Bank for a longer period, it refused to accept the ongoing presence of Israeli forces.

4.5 Emergency deployment (or emergency locations)

The Israeli side requested to maintain and operate five emergency locations on Palestinian territory (in the Jordan Valley) with the Palestinian response allowing for maximum of two emergency locations conditional on a time limit for the dismantling. In addition, the Palestinian side considered that these two emergency locations be run by international presence and not by the Israelis. Informally, the Israeli side expressed willingness to explore ways that a multinational presence could provide a vehicle for addressing the parties' respective concerns. The Palestinian side declined to agree to the deployment of Israeli armed forces on Palestinian territory during emergency situations, but was prepared to consider ways in which international forces might be used in that capacity, particularly within the context of regional security cooperation efforts.

4.6 Security cooperation and fighting terror

Both sides were prepared to commit themselves to promoting security cooperation and fighting terror.

4.7 Borders and international crossings

The Palestinian side was confident that Palestinian sovereignty over borders and international crossing points would be recognized in the agreement. The two sides had, however, not yet resolved this issue including the question of monitoring and verification at Palestine's international borders (Israeli or international presence).

4.8 Electromagnetic sphere

The Israeli side recognized that the state of Palestine would have sovereignty over the electromagnetic sphere, and acknowledged that it would not seek to constrain Palestinian commercial use of the sphere, but sought control over it for security purposes. The Palestinian side sought

full sovereign rights over the electromagnetic sphere, but was prepared to accommodate reasonable Israeli needs within a cooperative framework in accordance with international rules and regulations.

(fonte: sito web di Haaretz, <http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=130196&contrassID=2&subContrassID=5&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y>)

B) Palestinian paper on refugees

22 January 2001

The Significance of Resolving the Resolving Problem.

1. The Parties recognize that a just resolution of the refugee problem is necessary for achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace.

Moral Responsibility

2. Israel recognizes its moral and legal responsibility for the forced displacement and dispossession of the Palestinian civilian population during the 1948 war and for preventing the refugees from returning to their homes in accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194.

3. Israel shall bear responsibility for the resolution of the refugee problem.

The Basis for a Settlement of the Refugee Problem

4. A just settlement of the refugee problem, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, must lead to the implementation of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194.

Right of Return

5. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), all refugees who wish to return to their homes in Israel and live at peace with their neighbours have the right to do so. The right of every refugee to return shall be exercised in accordance with the modalities set out in the Agreement.

6.1 A Palestinian refugee is any Palestinian who was prevented from returning to his or her home after November 29, 1947.

6.2 Without limiting the generality of the term “refugee”, a “refugee” in this Agreement shall include a refugee’s descendants and spouse.

6.3 Without limiting the generality of the term “refugee”, all registered persons with UNRWA shall be considered refugees in accordance with this Article.

Repatriation Commission

7. A Repatriation Commission shall be established in order to guarantee and manage the implementation of the right to return in accordance with this Article.

8. The Commission, inter alia, shall:

- a. Verify refugee status as defined in this Article.
- b. Determine priorities for certain categories of refugees and certain areas.
- c. Determine procedures for repatriation.
- d. Process applications.
- e. Repatriate the refugees.
- f. Provide assistance to returning refugees.
- g. Ensure the protection of returning refugees.

9. The Commission shall be composed of representatives from the United Nations, the United States, the Parties, UNRWA, the Arab host countries, the EU, and Canada. The Commission shall consult the governments of the Arab host countries as it may deem it necessary.

10. The Parties should implement the decisions of the Commission and should take appropriate actions to facilitate the execution of the Commission’s decisions.

11. The Commission shall define its structure and work procedures.

12. The Commission shall have its headquarters in XX and may have offices at other locations, as it deems appropriate.

13. The Commission shall establish a mechanism for resolution of disputes arising from the interpretation, application or performance of this Article.

14. Refugees shall have the right to appeal decisions rendered by the Commission pursuant to this Article. The Commission shall establish a mechanism for appeals.

Modalities of Return

15. All refugees who currently reside in Lebanon and choose to exercise the right of return in accordance with this Article shall be enabled to return to Israel within two years of the signing of this Agreement.

16. Without prejudice to the right of every refugee to return to Israel, and in addition to refugees returning pursuant to Paragraph 15 above, a minimum of XX refugees will be allowed to return to Israel annually.

17. The refugees who wish to return should declare their to the Commission, in accordance with procedures to be set out by the Commission, within 5 years of the date the Commission starts receiving these declarations.

The exercise of the right of return subsequent to such declaration shall not be limited in time.

18. The Commission shall determine, according to transparent criteria, who will be allowed to return in any given year in accordance with Paragraph 16 of this Article.

19. Repatriation should be based on individual voluntary decision, and should be carried out in a way that maintains family unit.

20. The refugees should be provided with information necessary for them to make an informed decision with regard to all aspects of repatriation.

21. The refugees should not be compelled to remain in or move to situations of danger or insecurity, or to areas lacking in the basic infrastructure necessary to resume a normal life.

22. The refugees shall be permitted to return safety, without risk of harassment, intimidation, persecution, or discrimination, particularly on account of their national origin, religious belief, or political opinion.

23. The Parties shall make such modifications to their internal laws as are necessary to facilitate the implementation of the right of return.

24. The Parties shall call upon states that currently host refugees to facilitate the early return of refugees in a manner consistent with human rights and international law.

Legal Status of Returning Refugees

25. Returning refugees should enjoy full civil and social rights and should be protected against discrimination, particularly in employment, education and the right to own property.

26. The returning refugees shall assume Israeli citizenship. This shall end his or her status as a refugee.

Restitution of refugees' Real Property

27. Real property owned by a returning refugee at the time of his or her displacement shall be restored to the refugee or his or her lawful successors.

28. In case where, according to criteria determined by the Repatriation Commission, it is impossible, impracticable or inequitable to restore the property to its refugee owner, or where the property within Israel, equal in size and/or value to the land and other property that they lost.

UNRWA

29. UNRWA should be maintained until this Article is fully implemented and UNRWA' s services are no longer needed. The scope of UNRWA' s services should change appropriately as the implementation of this Article proceeds.

Compensation

30. The State of Israel shall compensate refugees for the property from which they were deprived as a result of their displacement, including, but not limited to, destroyed property and placed under the custodianship of the "Custodian for Absentees' Property". Compensation should cover loss of property and loss of us and profit the date of dispossession to the current day expressed in today' s value.

31. The State of Israel shall also compensate refugees to for suffering and losses incurred as a result of the refugee' s physical displacement.

32. Refugees shall, as the case may be, receive repatriation assistance, in order to help them resettle in their places of origin, or rehabilitation assistance, in order to be rehabilitated in the place of their future residence. Funds for Repatriation Assistance and Rehabilitation Assistance should come from the International Fund described below.

33. The rights of return and compensation are independent and cumulative. A refugee' s exercise of his or her right of return to Israel shall not prejudice his or her right to receive compensation pursuant to Paragraph 30, nor shall a refugee' s receipt of compensation prejudice his or her right of return in accordance with this Article.

34. Unless property is collectively owned, material (and non-material) compensation should be awarded on an individual basis.

35. Pursuant to its responsibility for the compensation to the refugees, set forth in Article 30, Israel shall provide the funds needed for such compensation. These funds should be transferred to the International Funds described below and disbursed by the Fund and the Compensation Commission with this Article.

36. In particular, and without limiting in anyway Israel's responsibility in accordance with Paragraph 35 above, resources available to the "Custodian for Absentees' Property" should be

used to compensate the refugees for losses emanating from the dissipation of assets put under its trust. Furthermore, all the records of the “Custodian for Absentees’ Property pertaining to refugees’ property shall be transferred to Compensation Commission.

37. Additional funds from the International Fund referenced below may be used to supplement Israeli funds for compensation purposes.

Compensation for Communal Property

38. The State of Israeli shall pay compensation to the state of Palestine for the Palestinian communal property existing within the internationally recognized borders of the State of Israel.

39. The communal property referenced in Paragraph 36 of this Article shall include real property as well as financial and other movable property.

40. Claims for compensation under Paragraph 36 should be administrated and adjudicated by the Compensation Commission.

Compensation for Host Countries

41. The refugees host countries (i.e., Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and the Palestinian Authority) shall receive compensation for the significant costs they bore in hosting the refugees.

Compensation Commission

42. A Compensation Commission shall be established to evaluate the Palestinian material and non-material losses, to administer the implementation of the provisions of this Article on compensation, and to administer and adjudicate claims of real property by refugees made pursuant to Paragraphs 27-28.

43. The Commission shall set out the modalities and procedures for submission and adjudication of claims for compensation, and disbursement of payments.

44. The Commission shall be composed of representatives from the Parties, the United States, the EU, the United Nations, the World Bank and donor countries.

45. The Commission shall accept the records of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, as well as the records of the “Custodian for Absentees property” made available to the Commission pursuant to Paragraph 36 above, as prima facie evidence of the losses of the refugees.

The Commission may also use UNRWA’s records and any other relevant records.

46. The Commission shall send a specialized technical team to evaluate the current value of the property for which compensation is due.

47. The parties should implement the decisions of the Commission and should take appropriate actions to facilitate the execution of the Commission's decisions. In addition, the state of Israel shall pass, within six months of the date of this Agreement, internal legislation that guarantees access by the individual compensation claimants or their authorized representative to the relevant Israeli state archives in order to facilitate the development of their claims.

48. The Commission shall have its headquarters in____ and may be have offices at other locations, as it deems appropriate.

49. The Commission shall establish a mechanism for resolution of disputes arising from the interpretation, application or performance of this Article.

50. Refugees shall have the right to appeal decisions rendered by the Commission pursuant to the Agreement. The Commission shall establish a mechanism for appeals.

International Fund

51. An International Fund shall be established to support and finance the implementation of the provisions in this Agreement related to the resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue.

52. The Fund shall have a Steering Committee responsible for setting priorities and policies for the use of international assistance consistent with the provisions of this Agreement on refugees.

53. The Steering Committee shall be composed of Palestine, the United States, the World Bank, EU, donor countries, ____ . The Steering Committee will be supplemented by the participation of affected or interested regional parties as might be necessary. The Steering Committee will be responsible for mobilizing, coordinating and managing international financial and other assistance provided to enable implementation of the various aspects and dimensions of this Agreement related to refugees.

54. The World Bank and the United Nations shall be Joint-secretariat for the Fund. The secretariat shall be based at the World Bank.

55. The Steering Committee shall ask the World Bank to establish multilateral funding instruments to ensure that each aspect of this Agreement on refugees requiring financial assistance has corresponding instruments available to donors wishing to make use of multilateral mechanisms.

56. The World Bank shall have overall responsibility for ensuring that these funds are managed

according to international standards of accounting and transparency. The secretariat shall be responsible for monitoring the overall level of donor contributions and disbursements (both via multilateral and bilateral channels) to support the implementation of the refugee agreement.

57. Assistance from the Fund shall include inter alia support for: return, compensation, repatriation assistance, rehabilitation assistance, transitional costs and related socio-economic assistance. Assistance for compensation shall be disbursed through the Compensation Commission.

58. Recipients of funds channeled through the Fund shall include inter alia: refugees, relevant Palestinian Ministries and public bodies, host Government Ministries and public bodies, and international public or private bodies selected to implement project assistance or provide technical or transitional support.

General

59. The Parties should make appropriate modifications to their internal laws to facilitate the execution of this Article.

End of Claims

60. The full implementation of this Article shall constitute a complete resolution of the refugee problem and shall end all claims emanating from that problem.

61. The right of each refugee in accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 shall not be prejudiced until the refugee has exercised his right of return and received compensation under this Article or until the refugee has, based on his voluntary choice, received compensation and settled somewhere else.

(fonte: Le Monde Diplomatique on line, <http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a3276>)

C) Israeli private response on Palestinian refugees

23 January 2001

Non-Paper

Private response to Palestinian refugee paper of January 22, 2001:

The significance of resolving the refugee problem

1. The issue of the Palestinian refugees is central to Israeli-Palestinian relations. Its comprehensive and just resolution is essential to creating a lasting and morally scrupulous peace.

Narrative

2. The State of Israel solemnly expresses its sorrow for the tragedy of the Palestinian refugees, their suffering and losses, and will be an active partner in ending this terrible chapter that was opened 53 years ago, contributing its part to the attainment of a comprehensive and fair solution to the Palestinian refugee problem.

3. For all those parties directly or indirectly responsible for the creation of the status of Palestinian refugees, as well as those for whom a just and stable peace in the region is an imperative, it is incumbent to take upon themselves responsibility to assist in resolving the Palestinian refugee problem of 1948.

4. Despite accepting the UNGAR 181 of November 1947, the emergent State of Israel became embroiled in the war and bloodshed of 1948-49, that led to victims and suffering on both sides, including the displacement and dispossession of the Palestinian civilian population who became refugees. These refugees spent decades without dignity, citizenship and property ever since.

5. Consequently, the solution to the refugee issue must address the needs and aspirations of the refugees, while accounting for the realities since the 1948-49 war. Thus, the wish to return shall be implemented in a manner consistent with the existence of the State of Israel as the homeland for Jewish people, and the establishment of the State of Palestine as the homeland of the Palestinian people. Basis.

6. A just settlement of the refugee problem in accordance with UNSCR 242 must lead to the implementation of UNGAR 194 (P Position).

7. Since 1948, the Palestinian yearning has been enshrined in the twin principles of the "Right of Return" and the establishment of an independent Palestinian State deriving the basis from

International Law. The realization of the aspirations of the Palestinian people, as recognized in this agreement, includes the exercise of their right to self-determination and a comprehensive and just solution for the Palestinian refugees, based on UNGAR 194, providing for their return and guaranteeing the future welfare and wellbeing of the refugees, thereby addressing the refugee problem in all its aspects.

8. Regarding return, repatriation and relocation, each refugee may apply to one of the following programs, thus fulfilling the relevant clause of UNGAR 194:

- a. To Israel - capped to an agreed limit of XX refugees, and with priority being accorded to those Palestinian refugees currently resident in Lebanon. The State of Israel notes its moral commitment to the swift resolution of the plight of the refugee population of the Sabra and Shatila camps.
- b. To Israeli swapped territory. For this purpose, the infrastructure shall be prepared for the absorption of refugees in the sovereign areas of the State of Israel that shall be turned over to Palestinian sovereignty in the context of an overall development program.
- c. To the State of Palestine: the Palestinian refugees may exercise their return in an unrestricted manner to the State of Palestine, as the homeland of the Palestinian people, in accordance with its sovereign laws and legislation.
- d. Rehabilitation within existing Host Countries. Where this option is exercised the rehabilitation shall be immediate and extensive.
- e. Relocation to third countries: voluntary relocation to third countries expressing the willingness and capacity to absorb Palestinian refugees.

Definition of a Refugee

9. See Article 6 of Palestinian paper as a P Position

Compensation and Rehabilitation

10. Each refugee may apply for compensation programs and rehabilitation assistance as shall be detailed in Articles XX. For this purpose an International Commission and an International Fund shall be established (Articles XX below) that shall have full and exclusive responsibility for the implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem in all its aspects, including the gathering and verification of claims, and allocation and disbursement of resources, to be conducted in accordance with the following principles:

- a. These programs shall address financial and in-kind compensation for displacement (moral suffering - P based position) and material loss, as well as the economic growth of the relevant communities. The dual objectives of individual historic justice and communal economic development shall guide the elaboration of these programs.
- b. Programs of a compensatory nature shall be devised on both per-capital and claims based criteria, the former being of a fast-track nature (as detailed in Article XX below), and shall be managed according to a definitive and complete register of property claims to be com-

piled by an appropriate arm of the International Commission and Fund.

c. The Rehabilitation Assistance and Compensation Programs shall form an integral part of efforts to promote economic development and social regeneration of both the individuals concerned and the communities and societies in which they live or resettle, thus incorporating options or baskets of assistance (to be detailed).

d. Compensation for Host Countries will be in accordance with Article XX below

e. The international community and the State of Israel shall be the principal contributors to the International Fund up to an agreed ceiling respectively. Israeli fixed assets that will remain in the State of Palestine following the Israeli withdrawal will be transferred to become assets of the International Fund in lieu of an amount of \$XX, constituting an integral part of the overall lump-sum of \$XX.

Host Countries

11. The refugees host countries shall receive compensation for the significant costs they bore in hosting the refugees. Future rehabilitation costs and investments shall be addressed according to the details of this agreement, via bilateral arrangements between the host countries and the International Commission.

International Commission

12. The International Commission shall consist of the Palestinian State, Host Countries, Israel and members of the international community, including the United Nations, the World Bank, The European Union and the G8, as well as other relevant international institutions. The International Commission shall have full and exclusive responsibility for implementing the resolution of the refugee issue in all its aspects. The mandate, structure and mode of operation of the International Commission shall be detailed in this agreement.

UNRWA

13. The phased termination of UNRWA shall be in accordance with a timetable to be agreed upon between the parties, and shall not exceed five years. The scope of UNRWA's services should change appropriately as the implementation of this agreement proceeds (whereby the first phase shall include the transfer of the service and administrative functions of UNRWA to host governments and modalities for the transfer of relevant functions to the International Commission, as well as the discontinuation of the status of Palestinian refugee camp - new P text to be suggested).

Priority to Lebanese refugees

14. Preference in all the above programs shall be accorded to the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon.

Former Jewish refugees

15. Although the issue of compensation to former Jewish refugees from Arab countries is not part of the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian agreement, in recognition of their suffering and losses, the Parties pledge to cooperate in pursuing an equitable and just resolution to the issue.

End of claims

16. The Parties agree that the above constitutes a complete and final implementation of Article 11 of UNGAR 194 of 11th December 1948, and consider the implementation of the agreed programs and measures as detailed above constitute a full, final and irrevocable settlement of the Palestinian refugee issue in all its dimensions. No additional claims or demands arising from this issue shall be made by either Party. With the implementation of these articles there shall be no individuals qualified for the status of a Palestinian Refugee.

(fonte: Le Monde Diplomatique on line, <http://MondeDiplo.com/focus/mideast/a3277>)

Annex V

L'iniziativa saudita

A) Intervista con il principe saudita Sua Maestà Abdallah Bin Abdulaziz

(Interview with HRH Crown Prince Abdallah Bin Abdulaziz)

Testo integrale dell'articolo pubblicato dal New York Times a firma di Thomas Friedman, 17 febbraio 2002

Earlier this week, I wrote a column suggesting that the 22 members of the Arab League, at their Summit in Beirut on March 27 and 28, make a simple, clear-cut proposal to Israel to break the Israeli-Palestinian impasse: in return for a total withdrawal by Israel to the June 4, 1967, lines, and the establishment of a Palestinian state, the 22 members of the Arab League would offer Israel full diplomatic relations, normalized trade and security guarantees. Full withdrawal, in accordance with UN Resolution 242, for full peace between Israel and the entire Arab world: why not?

I am currently in Saudi Arabia on a visit - part of the Saudi opening to try to explain themselves better to the world in light of the fact that 15 Saudis were involved in the September 11 attacks. So I took the opportunity of a dinner with Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince, and de facto ruler, Abdallah Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, to try out the idea of this Arab League proposal. I knew that Jordan, Morocco and some key Arab League officials had been talking about this idea in private but had not dared to broach it publicly until one of the big parties - Saudi Arabia or Egypt - took the lead.

After I laid out this idea, the Crown Prince looked at me with astonishment and said: "Have you broken into my desk?" "No," I said, wondering what he was talking about. "The reason I ask", he said, "is that this is exactly the idea I had in mind - full withdrawal from all the occupied territories, in accordance with UN resolutions, including from Al-Quds, for full normalization of relations. I drafted a speech along those lines. My thinking was to deliver it before the Arab Summit and try to mobilize the entire Arab world behind it. The speech is written, and it is in my desk. But I changed my mind about delivering it when Sharon took the violence, and the oppression, to an unprecedented level."

"But I tell you," the Crown Prince added, "if I were to pick up the phone now and ask someone to read you the speech, you will find it virtually identical to what you are talking about. I wanted to find a way to make clear to the Israeli people that the Arabs don't reject or despise them. But the Arab people do reject what their leadership is now doing to the Palestinians, which is inhumane and oppressive. And I thought of this as a possible signal to the Israeli people."

"Well," I said, "I'm glad to know that Saudi Arabia was thinking along these lines, but so many times in the past we've heard from Arab leaders that they had just been about to do this or that but that Ariel Sharon or some other Israeli leader had gotten in the way. After a while, it's hard to take seriously."

So I asked, what if Mr. Sharon and the Palestinians agreed to a cease-fire before the Arab Summit?

"Let me say to you that the speech is written, and it is still in my drawer," the Crown Prince said. "I pass all of this on as straightforwardly as I can, without hype or unrealistic hopes."

What was intriguing to me about the Crown Prince's remarks was not just his ideas - which, if delivered, would be quite an advance on anything the Arab League has proposed before - but the fact that they came up in the middle of a long, off-the-record conversation. I suggested to the Crown Prince that if he felt so strongly about this idea, even in a draft form, why not put it on the record - only then would anyone take it seriously. He said he would think about it. The next day his office called, reviewed the Crown Prince's quotations and said: go ahead, put them on record. So here they are.

Crown Prince Abdallah is known as a staunch Arab nationalist. He has a strong Arab following inside and outside the Kingdom, and if he ever gave such a speech, it would have a real impact on Arab and Israeli public opinions. Crown Prince Abdallah seemed to be signalling that if President Bush took a new initiative for Middle East peace, he and other Arab leaders would be prepared to do so as well.

I also used the interview with the Saudi leader to ask why his country had never really apologized to America for the fact that 15 Saudis were involved in 9/11. "We have been close friends for so long, and we never expected Americans to doubt us," he said. "We saw this attack by bin Ladin and his men as an attack on us, too, and an attempt to damage the U.S.-Saudi relation-

ship. We were deeply saddened by it and we never expected it to lead to tensions between us. But we've now learned that we respond to events differently. . . . it is never too late to express our regrets.”

As for the ‘axis of evil’ and reports of a possible U.S. military strike against Iraq, the Saudi leader said: “Any attack on Iraq or Iran should not be contemplated at all because it would not serve the interests of America, the region or the world, as there is no current evidence. Iraq is contemplating the return of the inspectors, and the U.S. should pursue this because inspectors can determine if Iraq is complying with the UN resolutions.”

(fonte: sito dell’Ambasciata saudita negli USA, <http://www.saudiembassy.net/2002News/Statements/StateDetail.asp?cIndex=136>)

B) Dichiarazione di Beirut sull’iniziativa di pace saudita *(Beirut Declaration on Saudi Peace Initiative)*

28 marzo 2002

Traduzione ufficiale del testo integrale del piano di pace che si ispira alla proposta saudita adottato dal summit arabo a Beirut giovedì 28 marzo 2002:

The Council of the League of Arab States at the Summit Level, at its 14th Ordinary Session:

- Reaffirming the resolution taken in June 1996 at the Cairo extraordinary Arab Summit that a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is the strategic option of the Arab countries, to be achieved in accordance with international legality, and which would require a comparable commitment on the part of the Israeli Government;
- Having listened to the statement made by His Royal Highness Prince Abdallah Bin Abdulaziz, the Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in which His Highness presented his initiative, calling for full Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967, in implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, reaffirmed by the Madrid Conference of 1991 and the land for peace principle; and for Israel’s acceptance of an independent Palestinian State, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in return for the establishment of normal relations in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel;

- Emanating from the conviction of the Arab countries that a military solution to the conflict will not achieve peace or provide security for the parties, the Council:
 1. Requests Israel to reconsider its policies and declare that a just peace is its strategic option as well.
 2. Further calls upon Israel to affirm:
 - (a) Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights to the lines of June 4, 1967, as well as the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon.
 - (b) Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194.
 - (c) The acceptance of the establishment of a Sovereign Independent Palestinian State on the Palestinian territories occupied since the 4th of June 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital.
 3. Consequently, the Arab Countries affirm the following:
 - (a) Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region.
 - (b) Establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace.
 4. Assures the rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation which conflict with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries.
 5. Calls upon the Government of Israel and all Israelis to accept this initiative in order to safeguard the prospects for peace and stop the further shedding of blood, enabling the Arab countries and Israel to live in peace and good neighborliness and provide future generations with security, stability, and prosperity.
 6. Invites the international community and all countries and organizations to support this initiative.

Requests the Chairman of the Summit to form a special committee composed of some of its concerned member states and the Secretary General of the League of Arab States to pursue the necessary contacts to gain support for this initiative at all levels, particularly from the United Nations, the Security Council, the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the Muslim States and the European Union.

(fonte: sito dell'Ambasciata saudita negli USA, www.saudiembassy.net/2002News/Statements/StateDetail.asp?cIndex=142)

Annex VI

Testo integrale del discorso del presidente americano George Bush su Israele e uno Stato palestinese (Full text of George Bush's speech on Israel and a Palestinian state)

June, 2002

For too long, the citizens of the Middle East have lived in the midst of death and fear. The hatred of a few holds the hopes of many hostage. The forces of extremism and terror are attempting to kill progress and peace by killing the innocent. And this casts a dark shadow over an entire region. For the sake of all humanity, things must change in the Middle East.

It is untenable for Israeli citizens to live in terror. It is untenable for Palestinians to live in squalor and occupation. And the current situation offers no prospect that life will improve. Israeli citizens will continue to be victimised by terrorists, and so Israel will continue to defend herself.

In the situation the Palestinian people will grow more and more miserable. My vision is two states, living side by side in peace and security. There is simply no way to achieve that peace until all parties fight terror. Yet, at this critical moment, if all parties will break with the past and set out on a new path, we can overcome the darkness with the light of hope. Peace requires a new and different Palestinian leadership, so that a Palestinian state can be born.

I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror. I call upon them to build a practising democracy, based on tolerance and liberty. If the Palestinian people actively pursue these goals, America and the world will actively support their efforts. If the Palestinian people meet these goals, they will be able to reach agreement with Israel and Egypt and Jordan on security and other arrangements for independence. And when the Palestinian people have new leaders, new institutions and new security arrangements with their neighbours, the United States of America will support the creation of a Palestinian state whose borders and certain aspects of its sovereignty will be provisional until resolved as part of a final settlement in the Middle East.

In the work ahead, we all have responsibilities. The Palestinian people are gifted and capable, and I am confident they can achieve a new birth for their nation. A Palestinian state will never

be created by terror - it will be built through reform. And reform must be more than cosmetic change, or veiled attempt to preserve the status quo. True reform will require entirely new political and economic institutions, based on democracy, market economics and action against terrorism.

Today, the elected Palestinian legislature has no authority, and power is concentrated in the hands of an unaccountable few. A Palestinian state can only serve its citizens with a new constitution which separates the powers of government. The Palestinian parliament should have the full authority of a legislative body. Local officials and government ministers need authority of their own and the independence to govern effectively.

The United States, along with the European Union and Arab states, will work with Palestinian leaders to create a new constitutional framework, and a working democracy for the Palestinian people. And the United States, along with others in the international community will help the Palestinians organise and monitor fair, multi-party local elections by the end of the year, with national elections to follow.

Today, the Palestinian people live in economic stagnation, made worse by official corruption. A Palestinian state will require a vibrant economy, where honest enterprise is encouraged by honest government. The United States, the international donor community and the World Bank stand ready to work with Palestinians on a major project of economic reform and development. The United States, the EU, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund are willing to oversee reforms in Palestinian finances, encouraging transparency and independent auditing.

And the United States, along with our partners in the developed world, will increase our humanitarian assistance to relieve Palestinian suffering. Today, the Palestinian people lack effective courts of law and have no means to defend and vindicate their rights. A Palestinian state will require a system of reliable justice to punish those who prey on the innocent. The United States and members of the international community stand ready to work with Palestinian leaders to establish finance - establish finance and monitor a truly independent judiciary.

Today, Palestinian authorities are encouraging, not opposing, terrorism. This is unacceptable. And the United States will not support the establishment of a Palestinian state until its leaders engage in a sustained fight against the terrorists and dismantle their infrastructure. This will require an externally supervised effort to rebuild and reform the Palestinian security services. The security system must have clear lines of authority and accountability and a unified chain of command.

America is pursuing this reform along with key regional states. The world is prepared to help, yet ultimately these steps toward statehood depend on the Palestinian people and their leaders. If they energetically take the path of reform, the rewards can come quickly. If Palestinians embrace democracy, confront corruption and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a provisional state of Palestine.

With a dedicated effort, this state could rise rapidly, as it comes to terms with Israel, Egypt and Jordan on practical issues, such as security. The final borders, the capital and other aspects of this state's sovereignty will be negotiated between the parties, as part of a final settlement. Arab states have offered their help in this process, and their help is needed.

I've said in the past that nations are either with us or against us in the war on terror. To be counted on the side of peace, nations must act. Every leader actually committed to peace

will end incitement to violence in official media, and publicly denounce homicide bombings. Every nation actually committed to peace will stop the flow of money, equipment and recruits to terrorist groups seeking the destruction of Israel - including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hizbullah. Every nation actually committed to peace must block the shipment of Iranian supplies to these groups, and oppose regimes that promote terror, like Iraq. And Syria must choose the right side in the war on terror by closing terrorist camps and expelling terrorist organisations. Leaders who want to be included in the peace process must show by their deeds an undivided support for peace. And as we move toward a peaceful solution, Arab states will be expected to build closer ties of diplomacy and commerce with Israel, leading to full normalisation of relations between Israel and the entire Arab world.

Israel also has a large stake in the success of a democratic Palestine. Permanent occupation threatens Israel's identity and democracy. A stable, peaceful Palestinian state is necessary to achieve the security that Israel longs for. So I challenge Israel to take concrete steps to support the emergence of a viable, credible Palestinian state.

As we make progress towards security, Israel forces need to withdraw fully to positions they held prior to September 28, 2000. And consistent with the recommendations of the Mitchell Committee, Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories must stop.

The Palestinian economy must be allowed to develop. As violence subsides, freedom of movement should be restored, permitting innocent Palestinians to resume work and normal life. Palestinian legislators and officials, humanitarian and international workers, must be allowed to go about the business of building a better future. And Israel should release frozen Palestinian revenues into honest, accountable hands.

I've asked Secretary Powell to work intensively with Middle Eastern and international leaders to realize the vision of a Palestinian state, focusing them on a comprehensive plan to support Palestinian reform and institution-building.

Ultimately, Israelis and Palestinians must address the core issues that divide them if there is to be a real peace, resolving all claims and ending the conflict between them. This means that the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 will be ended through a settlement negotiated between the parties, based on UN resolutions 242 and 338, with Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognize borders.

We must also resolve questions concerning Jerusalem, the plight and future of Palestinian refugees, and a final peace between Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and a Syria that supports peace and fights terror.

All who are familiar with the history of the Middle East realise that there may be setbacks in this process. Trained and determined killers, as we have seen, want to stop it. Yet the Egyptian and Jordanian peace treaties with Israel remind us that with determined and responsible leadership progress can come quickly.

As new Palestinian institutions and new leaders emerge, demonstrating real performance on security and reform, I expect Israel to respond and work toward a final status agreement. With intensive effort by all, this agreement could be reached within three years from now. And I and my country will actively lead toward that goal.

I can understand the deep anger and anguish of the Israeli people. You've lived too long with fear and funerals, having to avoid markets and public transportation, and forced to put armed guards in kindergarten classrooms. The Palestinian Authority has rejected your offer at hand,

and trafficked with terrorists. You have a right to a normal life; you have a right to security; and I deeply believe that you need a reformed, responsible Palestinian partner to achieve that security.

I can understand the deep anger and despair of the Palestinian people. For decades you've been treated as pawns in the Middle East conflict. Your interests have been held hostage to a comprehensive peace agreement that never seems to come, as your lives get worse year by year. You deserve democracy and the rule of law. You deserve an open society and a thriving economy. You deserve a life of hope for your children. An end to occupation and a peaceful democratic Palestinian state may seem distant, but America and our partners throughout the world stand ready to help, help you make them possible as soon as possible.

If liberty can blossom in the rocky soil of the West Bank and Gaza, it will inspire millions of men and women around the globe who are equally weary of poverty and oppression, equally entitled to the benefits of democratic government.

I have a hope for the people of Muslim countries. Your commitments to morality, and learning, and tolerance led to great historical achievements. And those values are alive in the Islamic world today. You have a rich culture, and you share the aspirations of men and women in every culture. Prosperity and freedom and dignity are not just American hopes, or Western hopes. They are universal, human hopes. And even in the violence and turmoil of the Middle East, America believes those hopes have the power to transform lives and nations.

This moment is both an opportunity and a test for all parties in the Middle East: an opportunity to lay the foundations for future peace; a test to show who is serious about peace and who is not. The choice here is stark and simple. The Bible says, "I have set before you life and death; therefore, choose life." The time has arrived for everyone in this conflict to choose peace, and hope, and life.

Thank you very much.

(fonte: www.guardian.co.uk)

Annex VII

La voce del popolo La proposta Ayalon-Nusseibeh (People's Voice Statement of Principles)

(Signed by Ami Ayalon & Sari Nusseibeh on July 27, 2002)

Two states for two peoples: Both sides will declare that Palestine is the only state of the Palestinian people and Israel is the only state of the Jewish people.

Borders: Permanent borders between the two states will be agreed upon on the basis of the June 4, 1967 lines, UN resolutions, and the Arab peace initiative (known as the Saudi initiative).

Border modifications will be based on an equitable and agreed-upon territorial exchange (1:1) in accordance with the vital needs of both sides, including security, territorial contiguity, and demographic considerations.

The Palestinian State will have a connection between its two geographic areas, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

After establishment of the agreed borders, no settlers will remain in the Palestinian State.

Jerusalem: Jerusalem will be an open city, the capital of two states. Freedom of religion and full access to holy sites will be guaranteed to all.

Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem will come under Palestinian sovereignty, Jewish neighborhoods under Israeli sovereignty. Neither side will exercise sovereignty over the holy places. The State of Palestine will be designated Guardian of al-Haram al-Sharif for the benefit of Muslims. Israel will be the Guardian of the Western Wall for the benefit of the Jewish people. The status quo on Christian holy site will be maintained. No excavation will take place in or underneath the holy sites without mutual consent.

Right of return: Recognizing the suffering and the plight of the Palestinian refugees, the international community, Israel, and the Palestinian State will initiate and contribute to an international fund to compensate them.

Palestinian refugees will return only to the State of Palestine; Jews will return only to the State of Israel.

The international community will offer to compensate toward bettering the lot of those refugees willing to remain in their present country of residence, or who wish to immigrate to third-party countries. The Palestinian State will be demilitarized and the international community will guarantee its security and independence.

End of conflict: Upon the full implementation of these principles, all claims on both sides and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will end.

(fonte: <http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/ayalon.html>)

Annex VIII

La Road Map

(A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict)

Office of the Spokesman

Washington, DC, April 30, 2003

The following is a performance-based and goal-driven roadmap, with clear phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields, under the auspices of the Quartet [the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia]. The destination is a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005, as presented in President Bush's speech of 24 June, and welcomed by the EU, Russia and the UN in the 16 July and 17 September Quartet Ministerial statements.

A two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be achieved through an end to violence and terrorism, when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror and willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty, and through Israel's readiness to do what is necessary for a democratic Palestinian state to be established, and a clear, unambiguous acceptance by both parties of the goal of a negotiated settlement as described below. The Quartet will assist and facilitate implementation of the plan, starting in Phase I, including direct discussions between the parties as required. The plan establishes a realistic timeline for implementation. However, as a performance-based plan, progress will require and depend upon the good faith efforts of the parties, and their compliance with each of the obligations outlined below. Should the parties perform their obligations rapidly, progress within and through the phases may come sooner than indicated in the plan. Non-compliance with obligations will impede progress.

A settlement, negotiated between the parties, will result in the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbours. The settlement will resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end

the occupation that began in 1967, based on the foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace, UNSCRs 242, 338 and 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah – endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit – calling for acceptance of Israel as a neighbour living in peace and security, in the context of a comprehensive settlement. This initiative is a vital element of international efforts to promote a comprehensive peace on all tracks, including the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks.

The Quartet will meet regularly at senior levels to evaluate the parties' performance on implementation of the plan. In each phase, the parties are expected to perform their obligations in parallel, unless otherwise indicated.

Phase I: Ending Terror And Violence, Normalizing Palestinian Life, and Building Palestinian Institutions -- Present to May 2003

In Phase I, the Palestinians immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of violence according to the steps outlined below; such action should be accompanied by supportive measures undertaken by Israel. Palestinians and Israelis resume security cooperation based on the Tenet work plan to end violence, terrorism, and incitement through restructured and effective Palestinian security services. Palestinians undertake comprehensive political reform in preparation for statehood, including drafting a Palestinian constitution, and free, fair and open elections upon the basis of those measures. Israel takes all necessary steps to help normalize Palestinian life. Israel withdraws from Palestinian areas occupied from September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed at that time, as security performance and cooperation progress. Israel also freezes all settlement activity, consistent with the Mitchell report.

At the outset of Phase I:

- Palestinian leadership issues unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security and calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire to end armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere. All official Palestinian institutions end incitement against Israel.
- Israeli leadership issues unequivocal statement affirming its commitment to the two-state vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside Israel, as expressed by President Bush, and calling for an immediate end to violence against Palestinians everywhere. All official Israeli institutions end incitement against Palestinians.

Security

- Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism and undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere.

- Rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus begins sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association with terror and corruption.
- GOI takes no actions undermining trust, including deportations, attacks on civilians; confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction; destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; and other measures specified in the Tenet work plan.
- Relying on existing mechanisms and on-the-ground resources, Quartet representatives begin informal monitoring and consult with the parties on establishment of a formal monitoring mechanism and its implementation.
- Implementation, as previously agreed, of U.S. rebuilding, training and resumed security cooperation plan in collaboration with outside oversight board (U.S.–Egypt–Jordan). Quartet support for efforts to achieve a lasting, comprehensive cease-fire.
- All Palestinian security organizations are consolidated into three services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister.
- Restructured/retrained Palestinian security forces and IDF counterparts progressively resume security cooperation and other undertakings in implementation of the Tenet work plan, including regular senior-level meetings, with the participation of U.S. security officials.
- Arab states cut off public and private funding and all other forms of support for groups supporting and engaging in violence and terror.
- All donors providing budgetary support for the Palestinians channel these funds through the Palestinian Ministry of Finance's Single Treasury Account.
- As comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed prior to September 28, 2000. Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas vacated by IDF.

Palestinian Institution-Building

Immediate action on credible process to produce draft constitution for Palestinian statehood. As rapidly as possible, constitutional committee circulates draft Palestinian constitution, based on strong parliamentary democracy and cabinet with empowered prime minister, for public comment/debate. Constitutional committee proposes draft document for submission after elections for approval by appropriate Palestinian institutions.

- Appointment of interim prime minister or cabinet with empowered executive authority/decision-making body.
- GOI fully facilitates travel of Palestinian officials for PLC and Cabinet sessions, internationally supervised security retraining, electoral and other reform activity, and other supportive measures related to the reform efforts.
- Continued appointment of Palestinian ministers empowered to undertake fundamental reform. Completion of further steps to achieve genuine separation of powers, including any necessary Palestinian legal reforms for this purpose.

- Establishment of independent Palestinian election commission. PLC reviews and revises election law.
- Palestinian performance on judicial, administrative, and economic benchmarks, as established by the International Task Force on Palestinian Reform.
- As early as possible, and based upon the above measures and in the context of open debate and transparent candidate selection/electoral campaign based on a free, multi-party process, Palestinians hold free, open, and fair elections.
- GOI facilitates Task Force election assistance, registration of voters, movement of candidates and voting officials. Support for NGOs involved in the election process.
- GOI reopens Palestinian Chamber of Commerce and other closed Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem based on a commitment that these institutions operate strictly in accordance with prior agreements between the parties.

Humanitarian Response

- Israel takes measures to improve the humanitarian situation. Israel and Palestinians implement in full all recommendations of the Bertini report to improve humanitarian conditions, lifting curfews and easing restrictions on movement of persons and goods, and allowing full, safe, and unfettered access of international and humanitarian personnel.
- AHLC reviews the humanitarian situation and prospects for economic development in the West Bank and Gaza and launches a major donor assistance effort, including to the reform effort.
- GOI and PA continue revenue clearance process and transfer of funds, including arrears, in accordance with agreed, transparent monitoring mechanism.

Civil Society

- Continued donor support, including increased funding through PVOs/NGOs, for people to people programs, private sector development and civil society initiatives.

Settlements

- GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001.
- Consistent with the Mitchell Report, GOI freezes all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements).

Phase II: Transition -- June 2003-December 2003

In the second phase, efforts are focused on the option of creating an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, based on the new constitution, as a way station to a permanent status settlement. As has been noted, this goal can be achieved when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror, willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty. With such a leadership, reformed civil institutions and security structures, the Palestinians will have the active support of the Quartet

and the broader international community in establishing an independent, viable, state. Progress into Phase II will be based upon the consensus judgment of the Quartet of whether conditions are appropriate to proceed, taking into account performance of both parties. Furthering and sustaining efforts to normalize Palestinian lives and build Palestinian institutions, Phase II starts after Palestinian elections and ends with possible creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders in 2003. Its primary goals are continued comprehensive security performance and effective security cooperation, continued normalization of Palestinian life and institution-building, further building on and sustaining of the goals outlined in Phase I, ratification of a democratic Palestinian constitution, formal establishment of office of prime minister, consolidation of political reform, and the creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.

- **International Conference:** Convened by the Quartet, in consultation with the parties, immediately after the successful conclusion of Palestinian elections, to support Palestinian economic recovery and launch a process, leading to establishment of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders.
- Such a meeting would be inclusive, based on the goal of a comprehensive Middle East peace (including between Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon), and based on the principles described in the preamble to this document.
- Arab states restore pre-intifada links to Israel (trade offices, etc.).
- Revival of multilateral engagement on issues including regional water resources, environment, economic development, refugees, and arms control issues.
- New constitution for democratic, independent Palestinian state is finalized and approved by appropriate Palestinian institutions. Further elections, if required, should follow approval of the new constitution.
- Empowered reform cabinet with office of prime minister formally established, consistent with draft constitution.
- Continued comprehensive security performance, including effective security cooperation on the bases laid out in Phase I.
- Creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders through a process of Israeli-Palestinian engagement, launched by the international conference. As part of this process, implementation of prior agreements, to enhance maximum territorial contiguity, including further action on settlements in conjunction with establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.
- Enhanced international role in monitoring transition, with the active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet.
- Quartet members promote international recognition of Palestinian state, including possible UN membership.

Phase III: Permanent Status Agreement and End of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict -- 2004 – 2005

Progress into Phase III, based on consensus judgment of Quartet, and taking into account actions of both parties and Quartet monitoring. Phase III objectives are consolidation of reform and stabilization of Palestinian institutions, sustained, effective Palestinian security performance, and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a permanent status agreement in 2005.

·Second International Conference: Convened by Quartet, in consultation with the parties, at beginning of 2004 to endorse agreement reached on an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and formally to launch a process with the active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet, leading to a final, permanent status resolution in 2005, including on borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements; and, to support progress toward a comprehensive Middle East settlement between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and Syria, to be achieved as soon as possible.

- Continued comprehensive, effective progress on the reform agenda laid out by the Task Force in preparation for final status agreement.
- Continued sustained and effective security performance, and sustained, effective security cooperation on the bases laid out in Phase I.
- International efforts to facilitate reform and stabilize Palestinian institutions and the Palestinian economy, in preparation for final status agreement.
- Parties reach final and comprehensive permanent status agreement that ends the Israel-Palestinian conflict in 2005, through a settlement negotiated between the parties based on UNSCR 242, 338, and 1397, that ends the occupation that began in 1967, and includes an agreed, just, fair, and realistic solution to the refugee issue, and a negotiated resolution on the status of Jerusalem that takes into account the political and religious concerns of both sides, and protects the religious interests of Jews, Christians, and Muslims worldwide, and fulfills the vision of two states, Israel and sovereign, independent, democratic and viable Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security.
- Arab state acceptance of full normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of the region in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.

(fonte: US government website: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm>)

Annex IX

Dichiarazione del primo ministro Ariel Sharon dopo il summit di Aqaba (Statement by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon after the Aqaba Summit meeting)

Aqaba, Jordan - June 4, 2003

I would like to thank His Majesty King Abdallah for arranging this meeting, and express Israel's appreciation to President Bush for coming here to be with Prime Minister Abbas and me. Thank you.

As the Prime Minister of Israel, the land which is the cradle of the Jewish people, my paramount responsibility is the security of the people of Israel and of the State of Israel. There can be no compromise with terror and Israel, together with all free nations, will continue fighting terrorism until its final defeat.

Ultimately, permanent security requires peace and permanent peace can only be obtained through security, and there is now hope of a new opportunity for peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

Israel, like others, has lent its strong support for President Bush's vision, expressed on June 24, 2002, of two states - Israel and a Palestinian state - living side by side in peace and security. The Government and people of Israel welcome the opportunity to renew direct negotiations according to the steps of the roadmap as adopted by the Israeli government to achieve this vision.

It is in Israel's interest not to govern the Palestinians but for the Palestinians to govern themselves in their own state. A democratic Palestinian state fully at peace with Israel will promote the long-term security and well-being of Israel as a Jewish state.

There can be no peace, however, without the abandonment and elimination of terrorism, violence, and incitement. We will work alongside the Palestinians and other states to fight terrorism, violence and incitement of all kinds. As all parties perform their obligations, we will seek to restore normal Palestinian life, improve the humanitarian situation, rebuild trust, and promote progress toward the President's vision. We will act in a manner that respects the dignity as well as the human rights of all people.

We can also reassure our Palestinian partners that we understand the importance of territorial contiguity in the West Bank, for a viable, Palestinian state. Israeli policy in the territories that are subject to direct negotiations with the Palestinians will reflect this fact.

We accept the principle that no unilateral actions by any party can prejudice the outcome of our negotiations.

In regard to the unauthorized outposts, I want to reiterate that Israel is a society governed by the rule of law. Thus, we will immediately begin to remove unauthorized outposts.

Israel seeks peace with all its Arab neighbors. Israel is prepared to negotiate in good faith wherever there are partners. As normal relations are established, I am confident that they will find in Israel a neighbor and a people committed to comprehensive peace and prosperity for all the peoples of the region.

Thank you all.

(fonte: Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs web site:

<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2003/Statement+by+PM+Ariel+Sharon+after+the+Aqaba+Summi.htm>)

Annex X

L'Accordo di Ginevra (The Geneva Accord - A Model Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement)

Preamble

The State of Israel (hereinafter “Israel”) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereinafter “PLO”), the representative of the Palestinian people (hereinafter the “Parties”):

Reaffirming their determination to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, and to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security based on a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace and achieving historic reconciliation;

Recognizing that peace requires the transition from the logic of war and confrontation to the logic of peace and cooperation, and that acts and words characteristic of the state of war are neither appropriate nor acceptable in the era of peace;

Affirming their deep belief that the logic of peace requires compromise, and that the only viable solution is a two-state solution based on UNSC Resolution 242 and 338;

Affirming that this agreement marks the recognition of the right of the Jewish people to statehood and the recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to statehood, without prejudice to the equal rights of the Parties’ respective citizens;

Recognizing that after years of living in mutual fear and insecurity, both peoples need to enter an era of peace, security and stability, entailing all necessary actions by the parties to guarantee the realization of this era;

Recognizing each other’s right to peaceful and secure existence within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

Determined to establish relations based on cooperation and the commitment to live side by side as good neighbors aiming both separately and jointly to contribute to the well-being of their peoples;

Reaffirming their obligation to conduct themselves in conformity with the norms of international law and the Charter of the United Nations;

Confirming that this Agreement is concluded within the framework of the Middle East peace process initiated in Madrid in October 1991, the Declaration of Principles of September 13, 1993, the subsequent agreements including the Interim Agreement of September 1995, the Wye River Memorandum of October 1998 and the Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum of September 4, 1999, and the permanent status negotiations including the Camp David Summit of July 2000, the Clinton Ideas of December 2000, and the Taba Negotiations of January 2001;

Reiterating their commitment to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242, 338 and 1397 and confirming their understanding that this Agreement is based on, will lead to, and –by its fulfillment-- will constitute the full implementation of these resolutions and to the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in all its aspects;

Declaring that this Agreement constitutes the realization of the permanent status peace component envisaged in President Bush's speech of June 24, 2002 and in the Quartet Roadmap process.

Declaring that this Agreement marks the historic reconciliation between the Palestinians and Israelis, and paves the way to reconciliation between the Arab World and Israel and the establishment of normal, peaceful relations between the Arab states and Israel in accordance with the relevant clauses of the Beirut Arab League Resolution of March 28, 2002; and

Resolved to pursue the goal of attaining a comprehensive regional peace, thus contributing to stability, security, development and prosperity throughout the region;

Have agreed on the following:

Article 1 – Purpose of the Permanent Status Agreement

1. The Permanent Status Agreement (hereinafter “this Agreement”) ends the era of conflict and ushers in a new era based on peace, cooperation, and good neighborly relations between the Parties.
2. The implementation of this Agreement will settle all the claims of the Parties arising from events occurring prior to its signature. No further claims related to events prior to this Agreement may be raised by either Party.

Article 2 – Relations between the Parties

1. The state of Israel shall recognize the state of Palestine (hereinafter “Palestine”) upon its establishment. The state of Palestine shall immediately recognize the state of Israel.
2. The state of Palestine shall be the successor to the PLO with all its rights and obligations.
3. Israel and Palestine shall immediately establish full diplomatic and consular relations with each other and will exchange resident Ambassadors, within one month of their mutual recognition.
4. The Parties recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The Parties are committed not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs.
5. This Agreement supercedes all prior agreements between the Parties.
6. Without prejudice to the commitments undertaken by them in this Agreement, relations between Israel and Palestine shall be based upon the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
7. With a view to the advancement of the relations between the two States and peoples, Palestine and Israel shall cooperate in areas of common interest. These shall include, but are not limited to, dialogue between their legislatures and state institutions, cooperation between their appropriate local authorities, promotion of non-governmental civil society cooperation, and joint programs and exchange in the areas of culture, media, youth, science, education, environment, health, agriculture, tourism, and crime prevention. The Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Committee will oversee this cooperation in accordance with Article 8.
8. The Parties shall cooperate in areas of joint economic interest, to best realize the human potential of their respective peoples. In this regard, they will work bilaterally, regionally, and with the international community to maximize the benefit of peace to the broadest cross-section of their respective populations. Relevant standing bodies shall be established by the Parties to this effect.
9. The Parties shall establish robust modalities for security cooperation, and engage in a comprehensive and uninterrupted effort to end terrorism and violence directed against each others persons, property, institutions or territory. This effort shall continue at all times, and shall be insulated from any possible crises and other aspects of the Parties’ relations.
10. Israel and Palestine shall work together and separately with other parties in the region to enhance and promote regional cooperation and coordination in spheres of common interest.

11. The Parties shall establish a ministerial-level Palestinian-Israeli High Steering Committee to guide, monitor, and facilitate the process of implementation of this Agreement, both bilaterally and in accordance with the mechanisms in Article 3 hereunder.

Article 3 – Implementation and Verification Group

1. Establishment and Composition

I. An Implementation and Verification Group (IVG) shall hereby be established to facilitate, assist in, guarantee, monitor, and resolve disputes relating to the implementation of this Agreement.

II. The IVG shall include the US, the Russian Federation, the EU, the UN, and other parties, both regional and international, to be agreed on by the Parties.

III. The IVG shall work in coordination with the Palestinian-Israeli High Steering Committee established in Article 2/11 above and subsequent to that with the Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Committee (IPCC) established in Article 8 hereunder.

IV. The structure, procedures, and modalities of the IVG are set forth below and detailed in Annex X.

2. Structure

I. A senior political-level contact group (Contact Group), composed of all the IVG members, shall be the highest authority in the IVG.

II. The Contact Group shall appoint, in consultation with the Parties, a Special Representative who will be the principal executive of the IVG on the ground. The Special Representative shall manage the work of the IVG and maintain constant contact with the Parties, the Palestinian-Israeli High Steering Committee, and the Contact Group.

III. The IVG permanent headquarters and secretariat shall be based in an agreed upon location in Jerusalem.

IV. The IVG shall establish its bodies referred to in this Agreement and additional bodies as it deems necessary. These bodies shall be an integral part of and under the authority of the IVG.

V. The Multinational Force (MF) established under Article 5 shall be an integral part of the IVG. The Special Representative shall, subject to the approval of the Parties, appoint

the Commander of the MF who shall be responsible for the daily command of the MF. Details relating to the Special Representative and MF Force Commander are set forth in Annex X.

VI. The IVG shall establish a dispute settlement mechanism, in accordance with Article 16.

3. Coordination with the Parties

A Trilateral Committee composed of the Special Representative and the Palestinian-Israeli High Steering Committee shall be established and shall meet on at least a monthly basis to review the implementation of this Agreement. The Trilateral Committee will convene within 48 hours upon the request of any of the three parties represented.

4. Functions

In addition to the functions specified elsewhere in this Agreement, the IVG shall:

- I. Take appropriate measures based on the reports it receives from the MF,
- II. Assist the Parties in implementing the Agreement and preempt and promptly mediate disputes on the ground.

5. Termination

In accordance with the progress in the implementation of this Agreement, and with the fulfillment of the specific mandated functions, the IVG shall terminate its activities in the said spheres. The IVG shall continue to exist unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.

Article 4 – Territory

1. The International Borders between the States of Palestine and Israel

I. In accordance with UNSC Resolution 242 and 338, the border between the states of Palestine and Israel shall be based on the June 4th 1967 lines with reciprocal modifications on a 1:1 basis as set forth in attached Map 1.

II. The Parties recognize the border, as set out in attached Map 1, as the permanent, secure and recognized international boundary between them.

2. Sovereignty and Inviolability

I. The Parties recognize and respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, as well as the inviolability of each others territory, including territorial waters, and airspace. They shall respect this inviolability in accordance with this Agreement, the UN Charter, and other rules of international law.

II. The Parties recognize each other's rights in their exclusive economic zones in accordance with international law.

3. Israeli Withdrawal

I. Israel shall withdraw in accordance with Article 5.

II. Palestine shall assume responsibility for the areas from which Israel withdraws.

III. The transfer of authority from Israel to Palestine shall be in accordance with Annex X.

IV. The IVG shall monitor, verify, and facilitate the implementation of this Article.

4. Demarcation

I. A Joint Technical Border Commission (Commission) composed of the two Parties shall be established to conduct the technical demarcation of the border in accordance with this Article. The procedures governing the work of this Commission are set forth in Annex X.

II. Any disagreement in the Commission shall be referred to the IVG in accordance with Annex X

III. The physical demarcation of the international borders shall be completed by the Commission not later than nine months from the date of the entry into force of this Agreement.

5. Settlements

I. The state of Israel shall be responsible for resettling the Israelis residing in Palestinian sovereign territory outside this territory.

II. The resettlement shall be completed according to the schedule stipulated in Article 5.

III. Existing arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip regarding Israeli settlers and settlements, including security, shall remain in force in each of the settlements until the date prescribed in the timetable for the completion of the evacuation of the relevant settlement.

IV. Modalities for the assumption of authority over settlements by Palestine are set forth in Annex X. The IVG shall resolve any disputes that may arise during its implementation.

V. Israel shall keep intact the immovable property, infrastructure and facilities in Israeli settlements to be transferred to Palestinian sovereignty. An agreed inventory shall be drawn up by the Parties with the IVG in advance of the completion of the evacuation and in accordance with Annex X.

VI. The state of Palestine shall have exclusive title to all land and any buildings, facilities, infrastructure or other property remaining in any of the settlements on the date prescribed in the timetable for the completion of the evacuation of this settlement.

6. Corridor

I. The states of Palestine and Israel shall establish a corridor linking the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This corridor shall:

- a. Be under Israeli sovereignty.
- b. Be permanently open.
- c. Be under Palestinian administration in accordance with Annex X of this Agreement. Palestinian law shall apply to persons using and procedures appertaining to the corridor.
- d. Not disrupt Israeli transportation and other infrastructural networks, or endanger the environment, public safety or public health. Where necessary, engineering solutions will be sought to avoid such disruptions.
- e. Allow for the establishment of the necessary infrastructural facilities linking the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Infrastructural facilities shall be understood to include, inter alia, pipelines, electrical and communications cables, and associated equipment as detailed in Annex X.
- f. Not be used in contravention of this Agreement.

II. Defensive barriers shall be established along the corridor and Palestinians shall not enter Israel from this corridor, nor shall Israelis enter Palestine from the corridor.

III. The Parties shall seek the assistance of the international community in securing the financing for the corridor.

IV. The IVG shall guarantee the implementation of this Article in accordance with Annex X.

V. Any disputes arising between the Parties from the operation of the corridor shall be resolved in accordance with Article 16.

VI. The arrangements set forth in this clause may only be terminated or revised by agreement of both Parties.

Article 5 – Security

1. General Security Provisions

I. The Parties acknowledge that mutual understanding and co-operation in security-related matters will form a significant part of their bilateral relations and will further enhance regional security. Palestine and Israel shall base their security relations on cooperation, mutual trust, good neighborly relations, and the protection of their joint interests.

II. Palestine and Israel each shall:

- a. Recognize and respect the other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from the threat or acts of war, terrorism and violence;
- b. refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other and shall settle all disputes between them by peaceful means;
- c. refrain from joining, assisting, promoting or co-operating with any coalition, organization or alliance of a military or security character, the objectives or activities of which include launching aggression or other acts of hostility against the other;
- d. refrain from organizing, encouraging, or allowing the formation of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries and militias within their respective territory and prevent their establishment. In this respect, any existing irregular forces or armed bands shall be disbanded and prevented from reforming at any future date;
- e. refrain from organizing, assisting, allowing, or participating in acts of violence in or against the other or acquiescing in activities directed toward the commission of such acts.

III. To further security cooperation, the Parties shall establish a high level Joint Security Committee that shall meet on at least a monthly basis. The Joint Security Committee shall have a permanent joint office, and may establish such sub-committees as it deems necessary, including sub-committees to immediately resolve localized tensions.

2. Regional Security

I. Israel and Palestine shall work together with their neighbors and the international community to build a secure and stable Middle East, free from weapons of mass destruction, both conventional and non-conventional, in the context of a comprehensive, lasting, and stable peace, characterized by reconciliation, goodwill, and the renunciation of the use of force.

II. To this end, the Parties shall work together to establish a regional security regime.

3. Defense Characteristics of the Palestinian State

I. No armed forces, other than as specified in this Agreement, will be deployed or stationed in Palestine.

II. Palestine shall be a non-militarized state, with a strong security force. Accordingly, the limitations on the weapons that may be purchased, owned, or used by the Palestinian Security Force (PSF) or manufactured in Palestine shall be specified in Annex X. Any proposed changes to Annex X shall be considered by a trilateral committee composed of the two Parties and the MF. If no agreement is reached in the trilateral committee, the IVG may make its own recommendations.

a. No individuals or organizations in Palestine other than the PSF and the organs of the IVG, including the MF, may purchase, possess, carry or use weapons except as provided by law.

III. The PSF shall:

- a. Maintain border control;
- b. Maintain law-and-order and perform police functions;
- c. Perform intelligence and security functions;
- d. Prevent terrorism;
- e. Conduct rescue and emergency missions; and
- f. Supplement essential community services when necessary.

IV. The MF shall monitor and verify compliance with this clause.

4. Terrorism

I. The Parties reject and condemn terrorism and violence in all its forms and shall pursue public policies accordingly. In addition, the parties shall refrain from actions and policies that are liable to nurture extremism and create conditions conducive to terrorism on either side.

II. The Parties shall take joint and, in their respective territories, unilateral comprehensive and continuous efforts against all aspects of violence and terrorism. These efforts shall include the prevention and preemption of such acts, and the prosecution of their perpetrators.

III. To that end, the Parties shall maintain ongoing consultation, cooperation, and exchange of information between their respective security forces.

IV. A Trilateral Security Committee composed of the two Parties and the United States shall be formed to ensure the implementation of this Article. The Trilateral Security Committee shall develop comprehensive policies and guidelines to fight terrorism and violence.

5. Incitement

I. Without prejudice to freedom of expression and other internationally recognized human rights, Israel and Palestine shall promulgate laws to prevent incitement to irredentism, racism, terrorism and violence and vigorously enforce them.

II. The IVG shall assist the Parties in establishing guidelines for the implementation of this clause, and shall monitor the Parties' adherence thereto.

6. Multinational Force

I. A Multinational Force (MF) shall be established to provide security guarantees to the Parties, act as a deterrent, and oversee the implementation of the relevant provisions of this Agreement.

II. The composition, structure and size of the MF are set forth in Annex X.

III. To perform the functions specified in this Agreement, the MF shall be deployed in the state of Palestine.

The MF shall enter into the appropriate Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the state of Palestine.

IV. In accordance with this Agreement, and as detailed in Annex X, the MF shall:

- a. In light of the non-militarized nature of the Palestinian state, protect the territorial integrity of the state of Palestine.
- b. Serve as a deterrent against external attacks that could threaten either of the Parties.
- c. Deploy observers to areas adjacent to the lines of the Israeli withdrawal during the phases of this withdrawal, in accordance with Annex X.
- d. Deploy observers to monitor the territorial and maritime borders of the state of Palestine, as specified in clause 5/13.
- e. Perform the functions on the Palestinian international border crossings specified in clause 5/12.
- f. Perform the functions relating to the early warning stations as specified in clause 5/8.
- g. Perform the functions specified in clause 5/3.
- h. Perform the functions specified in clause 5/7.
- i. Perform the functions specified in Article 10.
- j. Help in the enforcement of anti-terrorism measures.
- k. Help in the training of the PSF.

V. In relation to the above, the MF shall report to and update the IVG in accordance with Annex X.

VI. The MF shall only be withdrawn or have its mandate changed by agreement of the Parties.

7. Evacuation

I. Israel shall withdraw all its military and security personnel and equipment, including landmines, and all persons employed to support them, and all military installations from the territory of the state of Palestine, except as otherwise agreed in Annex X, in stages.

II. The staged withdrawals shall commence immediately upon entry into force of this Agreement and shall be made in accordance with the timetable and modalities set forth in Annex X.

III. The stages shall be designed subject to the following principles:

- a. The need to create immediate clear contiguity and facilitate the early implementation of Palestinian development plans.
- b. Israel's capacity to relocate, house and absorb settlers. While costs and inconveniences are inherent in such a process, these shall not be unduly disruptive.
- c. The need to construct and operationalize the border between the two states.
- d. The introduction and effective functioning of the MF, in particular on the eastern border of the state of Palestine.

IV. Accordingly, the withdrawal shall be implemented in the following stages:

- a. The first stage shall include the areas of the state of Palestine, as defined in Map X, and shall be completed within 9 months.
- b. The second and third stages shall include the remainder of the territory of the state of Palestine and shall be completed within 21 months of the end of the first stage.

V. Israel shall complete its withdrawal from the territory of the state of Palestine within 30 months of the entry into force of this Agreement, and in accordance with this Agreement.

VI. Israel will maintain a small military presence in the Jordan Valley under the authority of the MF and subject to the MF SOFA as detailed in Annex X for an additional 36 months. The stipulated period may be reviewed by the Parties in the event of relevant regional developments, and may be altered by the Parties' consent.

VII. In accordance with Annex X, the MF shall monitor and verify compliance with this clause.

8. Early Warning Stations

I. Israel may maintain two EWS in the northern, and central West Bank at the locations set forth in Annex X.

II. The EWS shall be staffed by the minimal required number of Israeli personnel and shall occupy the minimal amount of land necessary for their operation as set forth in Annex X.

III. Access to the EWS will be guaranteed and escorted by the MF.

IV. Internal security of the EWS shall be the responsibility of Israel. The perimeter security of the EWS shall be the responsibility of the MF.

V. The MF and the PSF shall maintain a liaison presence in the EWS. The MF shall moni-

tor and verify that the EWS is being used for purposes recognized by this Agreement as detailed in Annex X.

VI. The arrangements set forth in this Article shall be subject to review in ten years, with any changes to be mutually agreed. Thereafter, there will be five-yearly reviews whereby the arrangements set forth in this Article may be extended by mutual consent.

VII. If at any point during the period specified above a regional security regime is established, then the IVG may request that the Parties review whether to continue or revise operational uses for the EWS in light of these developments. Any such change will require the mutual consent of the Parties.

9. Airspace

I. Civil Aviation

a. The Parties recognize as applicable to each other the rights, privileges and obligations provided for by the multilateral aviation agreements to which they are both party, particularly by the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (The Chicago Convention) and the 1944 International Air Services Transit Agreement.

b. In addition, the Parties shall, upon entry into force of this Agreement, establish a trilateral committee composed of the two Parties and the IVG to design the most efficient management system for civil aviation, including those relevant aspects of the air traffic control system. In the absence of consensus the IVG may make its own recommendations.

II. Training

a. The Israeli Air Force shall be entitled to use the Palestinian sovereign airspace for training purposes in accordance with Annex X, which shall be based on rules pertaining to IAF use of Israeli airspace.

b. The IVG shall monitor and verify compliance with this clause. Either Party may submit a complaint to the IVG whose decision shall be conclusive.

c. The arrangements set forth in this clause shall be subject to review every ten years, and may be altered or terminated by the agreement of both Parties.

10. Electromagnetic Sphere

I. Neither Party's use of the electromagnetic sphere may interfere with the other Party's use.

II. Annex X shall detail arrangements relating to the use of the electromagnetic sphere.

III. The IVG shall monitor and verify the implementation of this clause and Annex X.

IV. Any Party may submit a complaint to the IVG whose decision shall be conclusive.

11. Law Enforcement

The Israeli and Palestinian law enforcement agencies shall cooperate in combating illicit drug trafficking, illegal trafficking in archaeological artifacts and objects of arts, cross-border crime, including theft and fraud, organized crime, trafficking in women and minors, counterfeiting, pirate TV and radio stations, and other illegal activity.

12. International Border Crossings

I. The following arrangements shall apply to borders crossing between the state of Palestine and Jordan, the state of Palestine and Egypt, as well as airport and seaport entry points to the state of Palestine.

II. All border crossings shall be monitored by joint teams composed of members of the PSF and the MF. These teams shall prevent the entry into Palestine of any weapons, materials or equipment that are in contravention of the provisions of this Agreement.

III. The MF representatives and the PSF will have, jointly and separately, the authority to block the entry into Palestine of any such items. If at any time a disagreement regarding the entrance of goods or materials arises between the PSF and the MF representatives, the PSF may bring the matter to the IVG, whose binding conclusions shall be rendered within 24 hours.

IV. This arrangement shall be reviewed by the IVG after 5 years to determine its continuation, modification or termination. Thereafter, the Palestinian party may request such a review on an annual basis.

V. In passenger terminals, for thirty months, Israel may maintain an unseen presence in a designated on-site facility, to be staffed by members of the MF and Israelis, utilizing appropriate technology. The Israeli side may request that the MF-PSF conduct further inspections and take appropriate action.

VI. For the following two years, these arrangements will continue in a specially designated facility in Israel, utilizing appropriate technology. This shall not cause delays beyond the procedures outlined in this clause.

VII. In cargo terminals, for thirty months, Israel may maintain an unseen presence in a designated on-site facility, to be staffed by members of the MF and Israelis, utilizing appropriate technology.

The Israeli side may request that the MF-PSF conduct further inspections and take appropriate action. If the Israeli side is not satisfied by the MF-PSF action, it may demand that the cargo be detained pending a decision by an MF inspector.

The MF inspector's decision shall be binding and final, and shall be rendered within 12 hours of the Israeli complaint.

VIII. . For the following three years, these arrangements will continue from a specially designated facility in Israel, utilizing appropriate technology. This shall not cause delays beyond the timelines outlined in this clause.

IX. A high level trilateral committee composed of representatives of Palestine, Israel, and the IVG shall meet regularly to monitor the application of these procedures and correct any irregularities, and may be convened on request.

X. The details of the above are set forth in Annex X.

13. Border Control

I. The PSF shall maintain border control as detailed in Annex X.

II. The MF shall monitor and verify the maintenance of border control by the PSF.

Article 6 – Jerusalem

1. Religious and Cultural Significance:

I. The Parties recognize the universal historic, religious, spiritual, and cultural significance of Jerusalem and its holiness enshrined in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. In recognition of this status, the Parties reaffirm their commitment to safeguard the character, holiness, and freedom of worship in the city and to respect the existing division of administrative functions and traditional practices between different denominations.

II. The Parties shall establish an inter-faith body consisting of representatives of the three monotheistic faiths, to act as a consultative body to the Parties on matters related to the city's religious significance and to promote inter-religious understanding and dialogue. The composition, procedures, and modalities for this body are set forth in Annex X.

2. Capital of Two States

The Parties shall have their mutually recognized capitals in the areas of Jerusalem under their respective sovereignty.

3. Sovereignty

Sovereignty in Jerusalem shall be in accordance with attached Map 2. This shall not prejudice nor be prejudiced by the arrangements set forth below.

4. Border Regime:

The border regime shall be designed according to the provisions of Article 11, and taking into account the specific needs of Jerusalem (e.g., movement of tourists and intensity of border crossing use including provisions for Jerusalemites) and the provisions of this Article.

5. al-Haram al-Sharif / Temple Mount (Compound)

I. International Group

- a. An International Group, composed of the IVG and other parties to be agreed upon by the Parties, including members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), shall hereby be established to monitor, verify, and assist in the implementation of this clause.
- b. For this purpose, the International Group shall establish a Multinational Presence on the Compound, the composition, structure, mandate and functions of which are set forth in Annex X.
- c. The Multinational Presence shall have specialized detachments dealing with security and conservation. The Multinational Presence shall make periodic conservation and security reports to the International Group. These reports shall be made public.
- d. The Multinational Presence shall strive to immediately resolve any problems arising and may refer any unresolved disputes to the International Group that will function in accordance with Article 16.
- e. The Parties may at any time request clarifications or submit complaints to the International Group which shall be promptly investigated and acted upon.
- f. The International Group shall draw up rules and regulations to maintain security on and conservation of the Compound. These shall include lists of the weapons and equipment permitted on the site.

II. Regulations Regarding the Compound

- a. In view of the sanctity of the Compound, and in light of the unique religious and cultural significance of the site to the Jewish people, there shall be no digging, excavation, or construction on the Compound, unless approved by the two Parties. Procedures for regular maintenance and emergency repairs on the Compound shall be established by the IG after consultation with the Parties.
- b. The state of Palestine shall be responsible for maintaining the security of the Compound and for ensuring that it will not be used for any hostile acts against Israelis or Israeli areas. The only arms permitted on the Compound shall be those carried by the Palestinian security personnel and the security detachment of the Multinational Presence.
- c. In light of the universal significance of the Compound, and subject to security considerations and to the need not to disrupt religious worship or decorum on the site as determined by the Waqf, visitors shall be allowed access to the site. This shall be without any discrimination and generally be in accordance with past practice.

III. Transfer of Authority

- a. At the end of the withdrawal period stipulated in Article 5/7, the state of Palestine shall assert sovereignty over the Compound.
- b. The International Group and its subsidiary organs shall continue to exist and fulfill all the functions stipulated in this Article unless otherwise agreed by the two Parties.

6. The Wailing Wall

The Wailing Wall shall be under Israeli sovereignty.

7. The Old City:

I. Significance of the Old City

- a. The Parties view the Old City as one whole enjoying a unique character. The Parties agree that the preservation of this unique character together with safeguarding and promoting the welfare of the inhabitants should guide the administration of the Old City.
- b. The Parties shall act in accordance with the UNESCO World Cultural Heritage List regulations, in which the Old City is a registered site.

II. IVG Role in the Old City

- a. Cultural Heritage
 1. The IVG shall monitor and verify the preservation of cultural heritage in the Old City in accordance with the UNESCO World Cultural Heritage List rules. For this purpose, the IVG shall have free and unimpeded access to sites, documents, and information related to the performance of this function.
 2. The IVG shall work in close coordination with the Old City Committee of the Jerusalem Coordination and Development Committee (JCDC), including in devising a restoration and preservation plan for the Old City.
- b. Policing
 1. The IVG shall establish an Old City Policing Unit (PU) to liaise with, coordinate between, and assist the Palestinian and Israeli police forces in the Old City, to defuse localized tensions and help resolve disputes, and to perform policing duties in locations specified in and according to operational procedures detailed in Annex X.
 2. The PU shall periodically report to the IVG.
- c. Either Party may submit complaints in relation to this clause to the IVG, which shall promptly act upon them in accordance with Article 16.

III. Free Movement within the Old City

Movement within the Old City shall be free and unimpeded subject to the provisions of this article and rules and regulations pertaining to the various holy sites.

IV. Entry into and Exit from the Old City

- a. Entry and exit points into and from the Old City will be staffed by the authorities

of the state under whose sovereignty the point falls, with the presence of PU members, unless otherwise specified.

b. With a view to facilitating movement into the Old City, each Party shall take such measures at the entry points in its territory as to ensure the preservation of security in the Old City. The PU shall monitor the operation of the entry points.

c. Citizens of either Party may not exit the Old City into the territory of the other Party unless they are in possession of the relevant documentation that entitles them to. Tourists may only exit the Old City into the territory of the Party which they possess valid authorization to enter.

V. Suspension, Termination, and Expansion

a. Either Party may suspend the arrangements set forth in Article 6.7.iii in cases of emergency for one week. The extension of such suspension for longer than a week shall be pursuant to consultation with the other Party and the IVG at the Trilateral Committee established in Article 3/3.

b. This clause shall not apply to the arrangements set forth in Article 6/7/vi.

c. Three years after the transfer of authority over the Old City, the Parties shall review these arrangements. These arrangements may only be terminated by agreement of the Parties.

d. The Parties shall examine the possibility of expanding these arrangements beyond the Old City and may agree to such an expansion.

VI. Special Arrangements

a. Along the way outlined in Map X (from the Jaffa Gate to the Zion Gate) there will be permanent and guaranteed arrangements for Israelis regarding access, freedom of movement, and security, as set forth in Annex X.

1. The IVG shall be responsible for the implementation of these arrangements.

b. Without prejudice to Palestinian sovereignty, Israeli administration of the Citadel will be as outlined in Annex X.

VII. Color-Coding of the Old City

A visible color-coding scheme shall be used in the Old City to denote the sovereign areas of the respective Parties.

VIII. Policing

a. An agreed number of Israeli police shall constitute the Israeli Old City police detachment and shall exercise responsibility for maintaining order and day-to-day policing functions in the area under Israeli sovereignty.

b. An agreed number of Palestinian police shall constitute the Palestinian Old City police detachment and shall exercise responsibility for maintaining order and day-to-day policing functions in the area under Palestinian sovereignty.

c. All members of the respective Israeli and Palestinian Old City police detachments shall undergo special training, including joint training exercises, to be administered by the PU.

d. A special Joint Situation Room, under the direction of the PU and incorporating

members of the Israeli and Palestinian Old City police detachments, shall facilitate liaison on all relevant matters of policing and security in the Old City.

IX. Arms

No person shall be allowed to carry or possess arms in the Old City, with the exception of the Police Forces provided for in this agreement.

In addition, each Party may grant special written permission to carry or possess arms in areas under its sovereignty.

X. Intelligence and Security

a. The Parties shall establish intensive intelligence cooperation regarding the Old City, including the immediate sharing of threat information.

b. A trilateral committee composed of the two Parties and representatives of the United States shall be established to facilitate this cooperation.

8. Mount of Olives Cemetery

I. The area outlined in Map X (the Jewish Cemetery on the Mount of Olives) shall be under Israeli administration; Israeli law shall apply to persons using and procedures appertaining to this area in accordance with Annex X.

a. There shall be a designated road to provide free, unlimited, and unimpeded access to the Cemetery.

b. The IVG shall monitor the implementation of this clause.

c. This arrangement may only be terminated by the agreement of both Parties.

9. Special Cemetery Arrangements

Arrangements shall be established in the two cemeteries designated in Map X (Mount Zion Cemetery and the German Colony Cemetery), to facilitate and ensure the continuation of the current burial and visitation practices, including the facilitation of access.

10. The Western Wall Tunnel

I. The Western Wall Tunnel designated in Map X shall be under Israeli administration, including:

a. Unrestricted Israeli access and right to worship and conduct religious practices.

b. Responsibility for the preservation and maintenance of the site in accordance with this Agreement and without damaging structures above, under IVG supervision.

c. Israeli policing.

d. IVG monitoring

e. The Northern Exit of the Tunnel shall only be used for exit and may only be closed in case of emergency as stipulated in Article 6/7.

II. This arrangement may only be terminated by the agreement of both Parties.

11. Municipal Coordination

I. The two Jerusalem municipalities shall form a Jerusalem Co-ordination and Development Committee (“JCDC”) to oversee the cooperation and coordination between the Palestinian Jerusalem municipality and the Israeli Jerusalem municipality. The JCDC and its sub-committees shall be composed of an equal number of representatives from Palestine and Israel. Each side will appoint members of the JCDC and its subcommittees in accordance with its own modalities.

II. The JCDC shall ensure that the coordination of infrastructure and services best serves the residents of Jerusalem, and shall promote the economic development of the city to the benefit of all. The JCDC will act to encourage cross-community dialogue and reconciliation.

III. The JCDC shall have the following subcommittees:

- a. A Planning and Zoning Committee: to ensure agreed planning and zoning regulations in areas designated in Annex X.
- b. A Hydro Infrastructure Committee: to handle matters relating to drinking water delivery, drainage, and wastewater collection and treatment.
- c. A Transport Committee: to coordinate relevant connectedness and compatibility of the two road systems and other issues pertaining to transport.
- d. An Environmental Committee: to deal with environmental issues affecting the quality of life in the city, including solid waste management.
- e. An Economic and Development Committee: to formulate plans for economic development in areas of joint interest, including in the areas of transportation, seam line commercial cooperation, and tourism,
- f. A Police and Emergency Services Committee: to coordinate measures for the maintenance of public order and crime prevention and the provision of emergency services;
- g. An Old City Committee: to plan and closely coordinate the joint provision of the relevant municipal services, and other functions stipulated in Article 6/7.
- h. Other Committees as agreed in the JCDC.

12. Israeli Residency of Palestinian Jerusalemites

Palestinian Jerusalemites who currently are permanent residents of Israel shall lose this status upon the transfer of authority to Palestine of those areas in which they reside.

13. Transfer of authority

The Parties will apply in certain socio-economic spheres interim measures to ensure the agreed, expeditious, and orderly transfer of powers and obligations from Israel to Palestine. This shall be done in a manner that preserves the accumulated socio-economic rights of the residents of East Jerusalem.

Article 7 – Refugees

1. Significance of the Refugee Problem

I. The Parties recognize that, in the context of two independent states, Palestine and Israel, living side by side in peace, an agreed resolution of the refugee problem is necessary for achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace between them.

II. Such a resolution will also be central to stability building and development in the region.

2. UNGAR 194, UNSC Resolution 242, and the Arab Peace Initiative

I. The Parties recognize that UNGAR 194, UNSC Resolution 242, and the Arab Peace Initiative (Article 2.ii.) concerning the rights of the Palestinian refugees represent the basis for resolving the refugee issue, and agree that these rights are fulfilled according to Article 7 of this Agreement.

3. Compensation

I. Refugees shall be entitled to compensation for their refugeehood and for loss of property. This shall not prejudice or be prejudiced by the refugee's permanent place of residence.

II. The Parties recognize the right of states that have hosted Palestinian refugees to remuneration.

4. Choice of Permanent Place of Residence (PPR)

The solution to the PPR aspect of the refugee problem shall entail an act of informed choice on the part of the refugee to be exercised in accordance with the options and modalities set forth in this agreement. PPR options from which the refugees may choose shall be as follows;

I. The state of Palestine, in accordance with clause a below.

II. Areas in Israel being transferred to Palestine in the land swap, following assumption of Palestinian sovereignty, in accordance with clause a below.

III. Third Countries, in accordance with clause b below.

IV. The state of Israel, in accordance with clause c below.

V. Present Host countries, in accordance with clause d below.

a. PPR options i and ii shall be the right of all Palestinian refugees and shall be in accordance with the laws of the State of Palestine.

b. Option iii shall be at the sovereign discretion of third countries and shall be in accordance with numbers that each third country will submit to the International Commission. These numbers shall represent the total number of Palestinian refugees that each third country shall accept.

c. Option iv shall be at the sovereign discretion of Israel and will be in accordance with a number that Israel will submit to the International Commission. This number shall represent the total number of Palestinian refugees that Israel shall accept. As a basis, Israel will consider the average of the total numbers submitted by the different third countries to the International Commission.

d. Option v shall be in accordance with the sovereign discretion of present host countries. Where exercised this shall be in the context of prompt and extensive development and rehabilitation programs for the refugee communities

Priority in all the above shall be accorded to the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon.

5. Free and Informed Choice

The process by which Palestinian refugees shall express their PPR choice shall be on the basis of a free and informed decision. The Parties themselves are committed and will encourage third parties to facilitate the refugees' free choice in expressing their preferences, and to counteracting any attempts at interference or organized pressure on the process of choice. This will not prejudice the recognition of Palestine as the realization of Palestinian self-determination and statehood.

6. End of Refugee Status

Palestinian refugee status shall be terminated upon the realization of an individual refugee's permanent place of residence (PPR) as determined by the International Commission.

7. End of Claims

This agreement provides for the permanent and complete resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem. No claims may be raised except for those related to the implementation of this agreement.

8. International Role

The Parties call upon the international community to participate fully in the comprehensive resolution of the refugee problem in accordance with this Agreement, including, inter alia, the establishment of an International Commission and an International Fund.

9. Property Compensation

I. Refugees shall be compensated for the loss of property resulting from their displacement.

- II. The aggregate sum of property compensation shall be calculated as follows:
- a. The Parties shall request the International Commission to appoint a Panel of Experts to estimate the value of Palestinians' property at the time of displacement.
 - b. The Panel of Experts shall base its assessment on the UNCCP records, the records of the Custodian for Absentee Property, and any other records it deems relevant. The Parties shall make these records available to the Panel.
 - c. The Parties shall appoint experts to advise and assist the Panel in its work.
 - d. Within 6 months, the Panel shall submit its estimates to the Parties.
 - e. The Parties shall agree on an economic multiplier, to be applied to the estimates, to reach a fair aggregate value of the property.

III. The aggregate value agreed to by the Parties shall constitute the Israeli "lump sum" contribution to the International Fund. No other financial claims arising from the Palestinian refugee problem may be raised against Israel.

IV. Israel's contribution shall be made in installments in accordance with Schedule X.

V. The value of the Israeli fixed assets that shall remain intact in former settlements and transferred to the state of Palestine will be deducted from Israel's contribution to the International Fund. An estimation of this value shall be made by the International Fund, taking into account assessment of damage caused by the settlements.

10. Compensation for Refugeehood

I. A "Refugeehood Fund" shall be established in recognition of each individual's refugeehood. The Fund, to which Israel shall be a contributing party, shall be overseen by the International Commission. The structure and financing of the Fund is set forth in Annex X.

II. Funds will be disbursed to refugee communities in the former areas of UNRWA operation, and will be at their disposal for communal development and commemoration of the refugee experience. Appropriate mechanisms will be devised by the International Commission whereby the beneficiary refugee communities are empowered to determine and administer the use of this Fund.

11. The International Commission (Commission)

I. Mandate and Composition

- a. An International Commission shall be established and shall have full and exclusive responsibility for implementing all aspects of this Agreement pertaining to refugees.
- b. In addition to themselves, the Parties call upon the United Nations, the United States, UNRWA, the Arab host countries, the EU, Switzerland, Canada, Norway, Japan, the World Bank, the Russian Federation, and others to be the members of the Commission.
- c. The Commission shall:

1. Oversee and manage the process whereby the status and PPR of Palestinian refugees is determined and realized.
 2. Oversee and manage, in close cooperation with the host states, the rehabilitation and development programs.
 3. Raise and disburse funds as appropriate.
- d. The Parties shall make available to the Commission all relevant documentary records and archival materials in their possession that it deems necessary for the functioning of the Commission and its organs. The Commission may request such materials from all other relevant parties and bodies, including, inter alia, UNCCP and UNRWA.

II. Structure

- a. The Commission shall be governed by an Executive Board (Board) composed of representatives of its members.
- b. The Board shall be the highest authority in the Commission and shall make the relevant policy decisions in accordance with this Agreement.
- c. The Board shall draw up the procedures governing the work of the Commission in accordance with this Agreement.
- d. The Board shall oversee the conduct of the various Committees of the Commission. The said Committees shall periodically report to the Board in accordance with procedures set forth thereby.
- e. The Board shall create a Secretariat and appoint a Chair thereof. The Chair and the Secretariat shall conduct the day-to-day operation of the Commission.

III. Specific Committees

- a. The Commission shall establish the Technical Committees specified below.
- b. Unless otherwise specified in this Agreement, the Board shall determine the structure and procedures of the Committees.
- c. The Parties may make submissions to the Committees as deemed necessary.
- d. The Committees shall establish mechanisms for resolution of disputes arising from the interpretation or implementation of the provisions of this Agreement relating to refugees.
- e. The Committees shall function in accordance with this Agreement, and shall render binding decisions accordingly.
- f. Refugees shall have the right to appeal decisions affecting them according to mechanisms established by this Agreement and detailed in Annex X.

IV. Status-determination Committee:

- a. The Status-determination Committee shall be responsible for verifying refugee status.
- b. UNRWA registration shall be considered as rebuttable presumption (*prima facie* proof) of refugee status.

V. Compensation Committee :

- a. The Compensation Committee shall be responsible for administering the implementation of the compensation provisions.

b. The Committee shall disburse compensation for individual property pursuant to the following modalities:

1. Either a fixed per capita award for property claims below a specified value. This will require the claimant to only prove title, and shall be processed according to a fast-track procedure, or

2. A claims-based award for property claims exceeding a specified value for immovables and other assets. This will require the claimant to prove both title and the value of the losses.

c. Annex X shall elaborate the details of the above including, but not limited to, evidentiary issues and the use of UNCCP, “Custodian for Absentees’ Property”, and UNRWA records, along with any other relevant records.

VI. Host State Remuneration Committee:

There shall be remuneration for host states.

VII. Permanent Place of Residence Committee (PPR Committee):

The PPR Committee shall,

a. Develop with all the relevant parties detailed programs regarding the implementation of the PPR options pursuant to Article 7/4 above.

b. Assist the applicants in making an informed choice regarding PPR options.

c. Receive applications from refugees regarding PPR. The applicants must indicate a number of preferences in accordance with article 7/4 above. The applications shall be received no later than two years after the start of the International Commission’s operations. Refugees who do not submit such applications within the two-year period shall lose their refugee status.

d. Determine, in accordance with sub-Article (a) above, the PPR of the applicants, taking into account individual preferences and maintenance of family unity. Applicants who do not avail themselves of the Committee’s PPR determination shall lose their refugee status.

e. Provide the applicants with the appropriate technical and legal assistance.

f. The PPR of Palestinian refugees shall be realized within 5 years of the start of the International Commission’s operations.

VIII. Refugeehood Fund Committee

The Refugeehood Fund Committee shall implement Article 7/10 as detailed in Annex X.

IX. Rehabilitation and Development Committee

In accordance with the aims of this Agreement and noting the above PPR programs, the Rehabilitation and Development Committee shall work closely with Palestine, Host Countries and other relevant third countries and parties in pursuing the goal of refugee rehabilitation and community development. This shall include devising programs and plans to provide the former refugees with opportunities for personal and communal development, housing, education, healthcare, re-training and other needs. This shall be integrated in the general development plans for the region.

12. The International Fund

I. An International Fund (the Fund) shall be established to receive contributions outlined in this Article and additional contributions from the international community. The Fund shall disburse monies to the Commission to enable it to carry out its functions. The Fund shall audit the Commission's work.

II. The structure, composition and operation of the Fund are set forth in Annex X.

13. UNRWA

I. UNRWA should be phased out in each country in which it operates, based on the end of refugee status in that country.

II. UNRWA should cease to exist five years after the start of the Commission's operations. The Commission shall draw up a plan for the phasing out of UNRWA and shall facilitate the transfer of UNRWA functions to host states.

14. Reconciliation Programs

I. The Parties will encourage and promote the development of cooperation between their relevant institutions and civil societies in creating forums for exchanging historical narratives and enhancing mutual understanding regarding the past.

II. The Parties shall encourage and facilitate exchanges in order to disseminate a richer appreciation of these respective narratives, in the fields of formal and informal education, by providing conditions for direct contacts between schools, educational institutions and civil society.

III. The Parties may consider cross-community cultural programs in order to promote the goals of conciliation in relation to their respective histories.

IV. These programs may include developing appropriate ways of commemorating those villages and communities that existed prior to 1949.

Article 8 – Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Committee (IPCC)

1. The Parties shall establish an Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Committee immediately upon the entry into force of this agreement. The IPCC shall be a ministerial-level body with ministerial-level Co-Chairs.

2. The IPCC shall develop and assist in the implementation of policies for cooperation in areas of common interest including, but not limited to, infrastructure needs, sustainable development and environmental issues, cross-border municipal cooperation, border area industrial parks, exchange programs, human resource development, sports and youth, science, agriculture and culture.

3. The IPCC shall strive to broaden the spheres and scope of cooperation between the Parties.

Article 9 – Designated Road Use Arrangements:

1. The following arrangements for Israeli civilian use will apply to the designated roads in Palestine as detailed in Map X (Road 443, Jerusalem to Tiberias via Jordan Valley, and Jerusalem –Ein Gedi).

2. These arrangements shall not prejudice Palestinian jurisdiction over these roads, including PSF patrols.

3. The procedures for designated road use arrangements will be further detailed in Annex X.

4. Israelis may be granted permits for use of designated roads. Proof of authorization may be presented at entry points to the designated roads. The sides will review options for establishing a road use system based on smart card technology.

5. The designated roads will be patrolled by the MF at all times. The MF will establish with the states of Israel and Palestine agreed arrangements for cooperation in emergency medical evacuation of Israelis.

6. In the event of any incidents involving Israeli citizens and requiring criminal or legal proceedings, there will be full cooperation between the Israeli and Palestinian authorities according to arrangements to be agreed upon as part of the legal cooperation between the two states. The Parties may call on the IVG to assist in this respect.

7. Israelis shall not use the designated roads as a means of entering Palestine without the relevant documentation and authorization.

8. In the event of regional peace, arrangements for Palestinian civilian use of designated roads in Israel shall be agreed and come into effect.

Article 10 – Sites of Religious Significance:

1. The Parties shall establish special arrangements to guarantee access to agreed sites of religious significance, as will be detailed in Annex X. These arrangements will apply, inter alia, to the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron and Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem, and Nabi Samuel.
2. Access to and from the sites will be by way of designated shuttle facilities from the relevant border crossing to the sites.
3. The Parties shall agree on requirements and procedures for granting licenses to authorized private shuttle operators.
4. The shuttles and passengers will be subject to MF inspection.
5. The shuttles will be escorted on their route between the border crossing and the sites by the MF.
6. The shuttles shall be under the traffic regulations and jurisdiction of the Party in whose territory they are traveling.
7. Arrangements for access to the sites on special days and holidays are detailed in Annex X.
8. The Palestinian Tourist Police and the MF will be present at these sites.
9. The Parties shall establish a joint body for the religious administration of these sites.
10. In the event of any incidents involving Israeli citizens and requiring criminal or legal proceedings, there will be full cooperation between the Israeli and Palestinian authorities according to arrangements to be agreed upon. The Parties may call on the IVG to assist in this respect.
11. Israelis shall not use the shuttles as a means of entering Palestine without the relevant documentation and authorization.
12. The Parties shall protect and preserve the sites of religious significance listed in Annex X and shall facilitate visitation to the cemeteries listed in Annex X.

Article 11 – Border Regime

1. There shall be a border regime between the two states, with movement between them subject to the domestic legal requirements of each and to the provisions of this Agreement as detailed in Annex X.

2. Movement across the border shall only be through designated border crossings.
3. Procedures in border crossings shall be designed to facilitate strong trade and economic ties, including labor movement between the Parties.
4. Each Party shall each, in its respective territory, take the measures it deems necessary to ensure that no persons, vehicles, or goods enter the territory of the other illegally.
5. Special border arrangements in Jerusalem shall be in accordance with Article 6 above.

Article 12 – Water

Article 13 – Economic Relations

Article 14 – Legal Cooperation

These articles relate to professional matters that are being dealt with by teams of experts, upon completion of the work of these teams, they will be presented to the public.

Article 15 – Palestinian Prisoners and Detainees

1. In the context of this Permanent Status Agreement between Israel and Palestine, the end of conflict, cessation of all violence, and the robust security arrangements set forth in this Agreement, all the Palestinian and Arab prisoners detained in the framework of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict prior to the date of signature of this Agreement, DD/MM/2003, shall be released in accordance with the categories set forth below and detailed in Annex X.

I. Category A: all persons imprisoned prior to the start of the implementation of the Declaration of Principles on May 4, 1994, administrative detainees, and minors, as well as women, and prisoners in ill health shall be released immediately upon the entry into force of this Agreement.

II. Category B: all persons imprisoned after May 4, 1994 and prior to the signature of this Agreement shall be released no later than eighteen months from the entry into force of this Agreement, except those specified in Category C.

III. Category C: Exceptional cases – persons whose names are set forth in Annex X – shall be released in thirty months at the end of the full implementation of the territorial aspects of this Agreement set forth in Article 5/7/v.

Article 16 – Dispute Settlement Mechanism


1. Disputes related to the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be resolved by negotiations within a bilateral framework to be convened by the High Steering Committee.
2. If a dispute is not settled promptly by the above, either Party may submit it to mediation and conciliation by the IVG mechanism in accordance with Article 3.
3. Disputes which cannot be settled by bilateral negotiation and/or the IVG mechanism shall be settled by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the Parties.
4. Disputes which have not been resolved by the above may be submitted by either Party to an arbitration panel. Each Party shall nominate one member of the three-member arbitration panel. The Parties shall select a third arbiter from the agreed list of arbiters set forth in Annex X either by consensus or, in the case of disagreement, by rotation.

Article 17 – Final Clauses

Including a final clause providing for a UNSCR/UNGAR resolution endorsing the agreement and superceding the previous UN resolutions.





The English version of this text will be considered authoritative.




(fonte: <http://www.geneva-accord.org/Accord.aspx?FolderID=33&lang=en>)



Jerusalem - The Old City



-  Areas annexed to Palestine in land swap
-  Areas annexed to Israel in land swap
-  Palestinian State
-  Israeli State

-  Jordan River
-  International Border
-  Armistice Line 1967

Annex XI

Scambio di lettere tra il primo ministro israeliano Ariel Sharon e il presidente americano George W. Bush

A) Lettera del primo ministro Ariel Sharon al presidente George W. Bush

April 14, 2004

Dear Mr. President,

The vision that you articulated in your 24 June, 2002 address constitutes one of the most significant contributions toward ensuring a bright future for the Middle East. Accordingly, the State of Israel has accepted the Roadmap, as adopted by our Government. For the first time, a practical and just formula was presented for the achievement of peace, opening a genuine window of opportunity for progress toward a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, involving two states living side-by-side in peace and security.

This formula sets forth the correct sequence and principles for the attainment of peace. Its full implementation represents the sole means to make genuine progress. As you have stated, a Palestinian state will never be created by terror, and Palestinians must engage in a sustained fight against the terrorists and dismantle their infrastructure. Moreover, there must be serious efforts to institute true reform and real democracy and liberty, including new leaders not compromised by terror. We are committed to this formula as the only avenue through which an agreement can be reached. We believe that this formula is the only viable one.

The Palestinian Authority under its current leadership has taken no action to meet its responsibilities under the Roadmap. Terror has not ceased, reform of the Palestinian security services

has not been undertaken, and real institutional reforms have not taken place. The State of Israel continues to pay the heavy cost of constant terror. Israel must preserve its capability to protect itself and deter its enemies, and we thus retain our right to defend ourselves against terrorism and to take actions against terrorist organizations.

Having reached the conclusion that, for the time being, there exists no Palestinian partner with whom to advance peacefully toward a settlement and since the current impasse is unhelpful to the achievement of our shared goals, I have decided to initiate a process of gradual disengagement with the hope of reducing friction between Israelis and Palestinians. The Disengagement Plan is designed to improve security for Israel and stabilize our political and economic situation. It will enable us to deploy our forces more effectively until such time that conditions in the Palestinian Authority allow for the full implementation of the Roadmap to resume.

I attach, for your review, the main principles of the Disengagement Plan. This initiative, which we are not undertaking under the Roadmap, represents an independent Israeli plan, yet is not inconsistent with the roadmap. According to this plan, the State of Israel intends to relocate military installations and all Israeli villages and towns in the Gaza Strip, as well as other military installations and a small number of villages in Samaria.

In this context, we also plan to accelerate construction of the Security Fence, whose completion is essential in order to ensure the security of the citizens of Israel. The fence is a security rather than political barrier, temporary rather than permanent, and therefore will not prejudice any final status issues including final borders. The route of the Fence, as approved by our Government's decisions, will take into account, consistent with security needs, its impact on Palestinians not engaged in terrorist activities.

Upon my return from Washington, I expect to submit this Plan for the approval of the Cabinet and the Knesset, and I firmly believe that it will win such approval.

The Disengagement Plan will create a new and better reality for the State of Israel, enhance its security and economy, and strengthen the fortitude of its people. In this context, I believe it is important to bring new opportunities to the Negev and the Galilee. Additionally, the Plan will entail a series of measures with the inherent potential to improve the lot of the Palestinian Authority, providing that it demonstrates the wisdom to take advantage of this opportunity. The execution of the Disengagement Plan holds the prospect of stimulating positive changes within the Palestinian Authority that might create the necessary conditions for the resumption of direct negotiations.

We view the achievement of a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians as our central focus and are committed to realizing this objective. Progress toward this goal must be anchored exclusively in the Roadmap and we will oppose any other plan.

In this regard, we are fully aware of the responsibilities facing the State of Israel. These include limitations on the growth of settlements; removal of unauthorized outposts; and steps to

increase, to the extent permitted by security needs, freedom of movement for Palestinians not engaged in terrorism. Under separate cover we are sending to you a full description of the steps the State of Israel is taking to meet all its responsibilities.

The Government of Israel supports the United States' efforts to reform the Palestinian security services to meet their Roadmap obligations to fight terror. Israel also supports the American's efforts, working with the international community, to promote the reform process, build institutions and improve the economy of the Palestinian Authority and to enhance the welfare of its people, in the hope that a new Palestinian leadership will prove able to fulfill its obligations under the Roadmap.

I want to again express my appreciation for your courageous leadership in the war against global terror, your important initiative to revitalize the Middle East as a more fitting home for its people and, primarily, your personal friendship and profound support for the State of Israel.

Sincerely,

Ariel Sharon

(fonte: Israeli prime Minister office website:
www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/DisengagemePlan/bush1404.htm)

B) Lettera del presidente George W. Bush al primo ministro Ariel Sharon

April 14, 2004

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter setting out your disengagement plan. The United States remains hopeful and determined to find a way forward toward a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. I remain committed to my June 24, 2002 vision of two states living side by side in peace and security as the key to peace, and to the roadmap as the route to get there.

We welcome the disengagement plan you have prepared, under which Israel would withdraw certain military installations and all settlements from Gaza, and withdraw certain military installations and settlements in the West Bank. These steps described in the plan will mark

real progress toward realizing my June 24, 2002 vision, and make a real contribution towards peace. We also understand that, in this context, Israel believes it is important to bring new opportunities to the Negev and the Galilee. We are hopeful that steps pursuant to this plan, consistent with my vision, will remind all states and parties of their own obligations under the roadmap.

The United States appreciates the risks such an undertaking represents. I therefore want to reassure you on several points.

First, the United States remains committed to my vision and to its implementation as described in the roadmap. The United States will do its utmost to prevent any attempt by anyone to impose any other plan. Under the roadmap, Palestinians must undertake an immediate cessation of armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere, and all official Palestinian institutions must end incitement against Israel. The Palestinian leadership must act decisively against terror, including sustained, targeted, and effective operations to stop terrorism and dismantle terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. Palestinians must undertake a comprehensive and fundamental political reform that includes a strong parliamentary democracy and an empowered prime minister.

Second, there will be no security for Israelis or Palestinians until they and all states, in the region and beyond, join together to fight terrorism and dismantle terrorist organizations. The United States reiterates its steadfast commitment to Israel's security, including secure, defensible borders, and to preserve and strengthen Israel's capability to deter and defend itself, by itself, against any threat or possible combination of threats.

Third, Israel will retain its right to defend itself against terrorism, including to take actions against terrorist organizations. The United States will lead efforts, working together with Jordan, Egypt, and others in the international community, to build the capacity and will of Palestinian institutions to fight terrorism, dismantle terrorist organizations, and prevent the areas from which Israel has withdrawn from posing a threat that would have to be addressed by any other means. The United States understands that after Israel withdraws from Gaza and/or parts of the West Bank, and pending agreements on other arrangements, existing arrangements regarding control of airspace, territorial waters, and land passages of the West Bank and Gaza will continue. The United States is strongly committed to Israel's security and well-being as a Jewish state. It seems clear that an agreed, just, fair, and realistic framework for a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue as part of any final status agreement will need to be found through the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the settling of Palestinian refugees there, rather than in Israel.

As part of a final peace settlement, Israel must have secure and recognized borders, which should emerge from negotiations between the parties in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to

negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities.

I know that, as you state in your letter, you are aware that certain responsibilities face the State of Israel. Among these, your government has stated that the barrier being erected by Israel should be a security rather than political barrier, should be temporary rather than permanent, and therefore not prejudice any final status issues including final borders, and its route should take into account, consistent with security needs, its impact on Palestinians not engaged in terrorist activities.

As you know, the United States supports the establishment of a Palestinian state that is viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent, so that the Palestinian people can build their own future in accordance with my vision set forth in June 2002 and with the path set forth in the roadmap. The United States will join with others in the international community to foster the development of democratic political institutions and new leadership committed to those institutions, the reconstruction of civic institutions, the growth of a free and prosperous economy, and the building of capable security institutions dedicated to maintaining law and order and dismantling terrorist organizations.

A peace settlement negotiated between Israelis and Palestinians would be a great boon not only to those peoples but to the peoples of the entire region. Accordingly, the United States believes that all states in the region have special responsibilities: to support the building of the institutions of a Palestinian state; to fight terrorism, and cut off all forms of assistance to individuals and groups engaged in terrorism; and to begin now to move toward more normal relations with the State of Israel. These actions would be true contributions to building peace in the region.

Mr. Prime Minister, you have described a bold and historic initiative that can make an important contribution to peace. I commend your efforts and your courageous decision which I support. As a close friend and ally, the United States intends to work closely with you to help make it a success.

Sincerely,

George W. Bush

(fonte: US department of State- USINFO website:
<http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2004/Apr/14-125421.html>)

Annex XII

Il piano di ritiro dalla Striscia di Gaza (Overall concept of the Disengagement Plan)

April 15, 2004

1. General

Israel is committed to the peace process and aspires to reach an agreed resolution of the conflict on the basis of the principle of two states for two peoples, the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and a Palestinian state for the Palestinian people, as part of the implementation of President Bush's vision.

Israel is concerned to advance and improve the current situation. Israel has come to the conclusion that there is currently no reliable Palestinian partner with which it can make progress in a bilateral peace process. Accordingly, it has developed a plan of unilateral disengagement, based on the following considerations:

I. The stalemate dictated by the current situation is harmful. In order to break out of this stalemate, Israel is required to initiate moves not dependent on Palestinian cooperation.

II. The plan will lead to a better security situation, at least in the long term.

III. The assumption that, in any future permanent status arrangement, there will be no Israeli towns and villages in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, it is clear that in the West Bank, there are areas which will be part of the State of Israel, including cities, towns and villages, security areas and installations, and other places of special interest to Israel.

IV. The relocation from the Gaza Strip and from Northern Samaria (as delineated on Map) will reduce friction with the Palestinian population, and carries with it the potential for improvement in the Palestinian economy and living conditions.

V. The hope is that the Palestinians will take advantage of the opportunity created by the disengagement in order to break out of the cycle of violence and to reengage in a process of dialogue.

VI. The process of disengagement will serve to dispel claims regarding Israel's responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.

VII. The process of disengagement is without prejudice to the Israeli-Palestinian agreements. Relevant arrangements shall continue to apply.

When there is evidence from the Palestinian side of its willingness, capability and implementation in practice of the fight against terrorism and the institution of reform as required by the Road Map, it will be possible to return to the track of negotiation and dialogue.

2. Main elements

I. Gaza Strip:

- 1) Israel will evacuate the Gaza Strip, including all existing Israeli towns and villages, and will redeploy outside the Strip. This will not include military deployment in the area of the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt ("the Philadelphi Route") as detailed below.
- 2) Upon completion of this process, there shall no longer be any permanent presence of Israeli security forces or Israeli civilians in the areas of Gaza Strip territory which have been evacuated.
- 3) As a result, there will be no basis for claiming that the Gaza Strip is occupied territory.

II. West Bank:

- 1) Israel will evacuate an Area in the Northern Samaria Area (see Map), including 4 villages and all military installations, and will redeploy outside the vacated area.
- 2) Upon completion of this process, there shall no longer be any permanent presence of Israeli security forces or Israeli civilians in the Northern Samaria Area.
- 3) The move will enable territorial contiguity for Palestinians in the Northern Samaria Area.
- 4) Israel will improve the transportation infrastructure in the West Bank in order to facilitate the contiguity of Palestinian transportation.

5) The process will facilitate Palestinian economic and commercial activity in the West Bank.

6) The Security fence: Israel will continue to build the security fence, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the government. The route will take into account humanitarian considerations.

3. Security situation following the disengagement

I. The Gaza Strip:

1) Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip.

2) The Gaza Strip shall be demilitarized and shall be devoid of weaponry, the presence of which does not accord with the Israeli-Palestinian agreements.

3) Israel reserves its inherent right of self defense, both preventive and reactive, including where necessary the use of force, in respect of threats emanating from the Gaza Strip.

II. The West Bank:

1) Upon completion of the evacuation of the Northern Samaria Area, no permanent Israeli military presence will remain in this area.

2) Israel reserves its inherent right of self defense, both preventive and reactive, including where necessary the use of force, in respect of threats emanating from the Northern Samaria Area.

3) In other areas of the West Bank, current security activity will continue. However, as circumstances permit, Israel will consider reducing such activity in Palestinian cities.

4) Israel will work to reduce the number of internal checkpoints throughout the West Bank.

4. Military Installations and Infrastructure in the Gaza Strip and Northern Samaria

In general, these will be dismantled and removed, with the exception of those which Israel decides to leave and transfer to another party.

5. Security assistance to the Palestinians

Israel agrees that by coordination with it, advice, assistance and training will be provided to the Palestinian security forces for the implementation of their obligations to combat terrorism and maintain public order, by American, British, Egyptian, Jordanian or other experts, as agreed with Israel.

No foreign security presence may enter the Gaza Strip or the West Bank without being coordinated with and approved by Israel.

6. The border area between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (Philadelphi Route)

Initially, Israel will continue to maintain a military presence along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (Philadelphi route). This presence is an essential security requirement. At certain locations security considerations may require some widening of the area in which the military activity is conducted.

Subsequently, the evacuation of this area will be considered. Evacuation of the area will be dependent, inter alia, on the security situation and the extent of cooperation with Egypt in establishing a reliable alternative arrangement.

If and when conditions permit the evacuation of this area, Israel will be willing to consider the possibility of the establishment of a seaport and airport in the Gaza Strip, in accordance with arrangements to be agreed with Israel.

7. Israeli towns and villages

Israel will strive to leave the immovable property relating to Israeli towns and villages intact. The transfer of Israeli economic activity to Palestinians carries with it the potential for a significant improvement in the Palestinian economy.

Israel proposes that an international body be established (along the lines of the AHLC), with the agreement of the United States and Israel, which shall take possession from Israel of property which remains, and which will estimate the value of all such assets.

Israel reserves the right to request that the economic value of the assets left in the evacuated areas be taken into consideration.

8. Civil Infrastructure and Arrangements

Infrastructure relating to water, electricity, sewage and telecommunications serving the Palestinians will remain in place.

Israel will strive to leave in place the infrastructure relating to water, electricity and sewage currently serving the Israeli towns and villages.

In general, Israel will enable the continued supply of electricity, water, gas and petrol to the Palestinians, in accordance with current arrangements.

Other existing arrangements, such as those relating to water and the electro-magnetic sphere shall remain in force.

9. Activity of International Organizations

Israel recognizes the great importance of the continued activity of international humanitarian organizations assisting the Palestinian population.

Israel will coordinate with these organizations arrangements to facilitate this activity.

10. Economic arrangements

In general, the economic arrangements currently in operation between Israel and the Palestinians shall, in the meantime, remain in force.

These arrangements include, inter alia:

- I. the entry of workers into Israel in accordance with the existing criteria.
- II. the entry and exit of goods between the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Israel and abroad.
- III. the monetary regime.
- IV. tax and customs envelope arrangements.
- V. postal and telecommunications arrangements.

In the longer term, and in line with Israel's interest in encouraging greater Palestinian economic independence, Israel expects to reduce the number of Palestinian workers entering Israel. Israel supports the development of sources of employment in the Gaza Strip and in Palestinian areas of the West Bank.

11. Erez Industrial Zone

The Erez industrial zone, situated in the Gaza Strip, employs some 4000 Palestinian workers. The continued operation of the zone is primarily a clear Palestinian interest.

Israel will consider the continued operation of the zone on the current basis, on two conditions:

I. The existence of appropriate security arrangements.

II. The express recognition of the international community that the continued operation of the zone on the current basis shall not be considered continued Israel control of the area.

Alternatively, the industrial zone shall be transferred to the responsibility of an agreed Palestinian or international entity.

Israel will seek to examine, together with Egypt, the possibility of establishing a joint industrial area in the area between the Gaza Strip, Egypt and Israel.

12. International passages

I. The international passage between the Gaza Strip and Egypt

1) The existing arrangements shall continue.

2) Israel is interested in moving the passage to the “three borders” area, approximately two kilometers south of its current location. This would need to be effected in coordination with Egypt. This move would enable the hours of operation of the passage to be extended.

II. The international passages between the West Bank and Jordan:

The existing arrangements shall continue.

13. Erez Crossing Point

The Israeli part of Erez crossing point will be moved to a location within Israel in a time frame to be determined separately.

14. Timetable

The process of evacuation is planned to be completed by the end of 2005.

The stages of evacuation and the detailed timetable will be notified to the United States.

15. Conclusion

Israel looks to the international community for widespread support for the disengagement plan. This support is essential in order to bring the Palestinians to implement in practice their obligations to combat terrorism and effect reforms, thus enabling the parties to return to the path of negotiation.

U.S. obligations as part of the disengagement plan

1. On April 14, 2004, the United States, through a presidential letter, made the following commitments:

- Preserving the Government's fundamental principle, according to which no political process with the Palestinians will take place before the dismantling of terror organizations, as requested by the roadmap.
- American commitment that no political pressure will be exerted on Israel to adopt any political plan, other than the roadmap, and that there will be no political negotiations with the Palestinians as long as they do not fulfill their commitments under the roadmap (full cessation of terror, violence and incitement; dismantling terror organizations; leadership change and carrying out comprehensive reforms in the Palestinian Authority).
- Unequivocal American recognition of Israel's right to secure and recognized borders, including defensible borders.
- American recognition of Israel's right to defend itself, by itself, anywhere, and preserve its deterrence power against any threat.
- American recognition in Israel's right to defend itself against terror activities and terror organizations wherever they may be, including in areas from which Israel has withdrawn.
- Unequivocal American stand regarding the refugees, according to which there will be no return of refugees to Israel.
- American stand that there will be no return to the 1967 borders, for two primary considerations: major Israeli population centers and the implementation of the term "defensible borders".
- American stand, according to which the major Israeli population centers will be part of Israel, in any event. All the remaining areas in Judea & Samaria will be open for negotiation.
- The United States sets clear conditions for the establishment of a future Palestinian state and declares that the Palestinian state will not be created as long as the terror organizations have not been dismantled, as long as the leadership has not been replaced and no comprehensive reforms have been completed in the Palestinian Authority.

2. President Bush's letter to the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister's letter to President Bush constitute part of the overall disengagement plan, and these understandings with the United States will only be valid if the disengagement plan is approved by Israel. The exchange of letters between President Bush and the Prime Minister, as well as the letter by the Chief of the Prime Minister's Bureau to the U.S. National Security Adviser, are attached to this plan as an integral part of it.

3. According to the roadmap adopted by the Government of Israel, Israel has undertaken a number of commitments regarding the dismantling of unauthorized outposts, limitations on settlement growth, etc. In the framework of the negotiations with the Americans, all of Israel's past commitments on these issues vis-à-vis the American administration, have been included in

the letter by the Chief of the Prime Minister's Bureau to the U.S. National Security Adviser.

(fonte: Israeli Prime Minister's office website:

<http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/DisengagemePlan/DisengagementPlan.htm>)

Annex XIII

Dichiarazioni finali dei summit arabi di Tunisi, di Algeri e di Khartoum

A) Dichiarazione di Tunisi (Tunis Declaration)

issued at the 16th session of the Arab Summit,
held in Tunis on May 22-23, 2004

We, the Leaders of the Arab States, meeting at the Summit Conference of the Arab League Council in its 16th ordinary session held in Tunis, the capital of the Republic of Tunisia, on May 22-23, 2004:

- *Committed* as we are to the principles upon which the League of Arab States was founded and to the objectives enunciated in its Charter, as well as to the noble universal values spelled out in the United Nations Charter and to all the instruments of international legality;
- *Taking* into account the new world changes and the challenges and stakes they generate;
- *Determined* to pursue efforts in order to strengthen the solidarity and cohesion of the Arab Nation, and to consolidate the Arab ranks, in the service of our primordial causes.

Declare the following:

1.1 - The commitment of all international parties to materialize the principles of international legality and the UN resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, without excluding any of the legal references of the peace process, constitutes the basis for a just, comprehensive and durable settlement to this conflict, in accordance with the Arab peace initiative and in implementation of the "Roadmap".

The international community should join its efforts so as to provide the necessary protection for the Palestinian people against the continuing acts of killing and deportation they are enduring, and also to put an end to the policy of assassination perpetrated by Israel against the Palestinian political leaders, to the siege imposed on the Palestinian people and their leadership, as well as to the aggressions targeting civilians without distinction. Joining these efforts would pave the way for the resumption of peace talks and would enable the brotherly Palestinian people to recover their legitimate rights, in the forefront of which the establishment of their independent state with East El-Quds as its capital, as well as the evacuation of all the Arab occupied territories, including the occupied Syrian Golan and the Lebanese Chabâa Farms.

1.2 - Achieving these legitimate objectives would provide propitious conditions for building confidence and for establishing a just, durable and comprehensive peace in the region, by convening an international conference aimed at ridding the Middle-East region, including Israel, of the weapons of mass destruction,. This will lay the foundations for a new era of entente, based on a mutual commitment to peace as a strategic choice, and will enable the Arab Nation and all countries in the region to focus their efforts on taking up the challenges confronting them and on pursuing the development action.

1.3 - The Arab community is committed to support the Iraqi territorial integrity and to respect the sovereignty, independence and national unity of sisterly Iraq, and exhorts the Security Council to give a central and active role to the United Nations in Iraq in order to put an end to the occupation and prepare the ground for the transfer of power to the Iraqi people. This will make it possible to establish peace and stability and to launch the process of reconstruction in Iraq.

Entrusting an Arab troika (the current chairmanship, the previous chairmanship and the next chairmanship of the summit, along with the Arab League Secretary-General) with making the necessary contacts and following up the evolution of the situation in Iraq.

1.4 - Reaffirming the Arab solidarity with sisterly Syria in the face of the American sanctions, and underlining the necessity to favor the logic of dialogue and mutual understanding in settling conflicts among states, so as to spare the region at this critical juncture further tension and instability.

1.5 - Reaffirming the sovereignty of sisterly United Arab Emirates on its three islands and supporting all peaceful steps and initiatives that lead it to recover this sovereignty.

1.6 - Reaffirming the Arab states' solidarity with the sisterly Republic of Sudan, and their de-

termination to preserve its unity and territorial integrity and to reinforce all peace endeavors undertaken by the Sudanese government in conjunction with the international and regional parties.

1.7 - Reaffirming the unity and sovereignty of the sisterly Republic of Somalia, and supporting the efforts aimed at achieving national conciliation, peace and stability in this country.

1.8 - reaffirming the determination to consecrate the national unity of the sisterly United Republic of Comoros, to preserve its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and to support all peace efforts in this country.

We also assert our firm determination:

2.1 - To materialize our common will to develop the system of joint Arab action, through the Tunis Summit resolution to amend the Arab League Charter and to modernize its work methods and its specialized institutions, based on the various Arab initiatives and ideas included in the proposals put forward by the Secretary General as well as on a consensual and coherent vision and on a gradual and balanced approach.

2.2 - To reaffirm our states' commitment to the humanitarian principles and the noble values of human rights in their comprehensive and interdependent dimensions, to the provisions of the various international conventions and charters, and to the Arab Human Rights Charter adopted by the Tunis Summit, as well as to the reinforcement of the freedom of expression, thought and belief and to the guarantee of the independence of the judiciary.

2.3 - Endeavor, based on the Declaration on the process of reform and modernization in the Arab world, to pursue reform and modernization in our countries, and to keep pace with the rapid world changes, by consolidating the democratic practice, by enlarging participation in political and public life, by fostering the role of all components of the civil society, including NGOs, in conceiving of the guidelines of the society of tomorrow, by widening women's participation in the political, economic, social, cultural and educational fields and reinforcing their rights and status in society, and by pursuing the promotion of the family and the protection of Arab youth.

2.4 - To consolidate the comprehensive development programs and intensify efforts aimed at promoting the educational systems, at disseminating knowledge and encouraging its acquisition, and at fighting illiteracy in order to ensure a better future for the Arab young generations.

2.5 - To achieve economic complementarity among Arab States on the basis of the exchange of benefits and the interdependence of interests, and to endeavor to pursue the upgrading of the Arab economies by entrusting the Economic and Social Council with establishing a joint Arab economic and social action strategy, in such a way as to consolidate the competitiveness

of the Arab economy and empower it to establish a solidarity-based partnership with the various economic groupings in the world.

2.6 - To consecrate the values of solidarity and mutual assistance among the Arab states, as part of the Arab anti-poverty strategy adopted by the Tunis Summit, to mobilize all human potentialities in the Arab countries in support of the development efforts, and to endeavor to upgrade the economy of the least developed Arab countries and promote their development programs.

2.7 - Be prepared, as best as possible, to actively participate, at the level of governments, civil society and the private sector, in the World Summit on the Information Society whose second phase will be hosted by Tunisia in November 2005, so that this event will constitute an important opportunity to further promote the position of information and communication technologies in the Arab development plans, and reinforce the capacity of Arab countries to keep up with and contribute to the evolution witnessed in this sector which is one of the basic foundations of development.

2.8 - To take appropriate measures to enable the Arab Organization for Information and Communication Technologies to play its role in consolidating inter-Arab cooperation in this vital sector.

2.9 - To strengthen the bonds of friendship between Arab countries and other countries of the world, and to establish a new approach for solidarity-based cooperation and partnership with them, based on our determination to consecrate dialogue among religions and cultures and to highlight the civilisational and humanist mission of Islam which calls for disseminating the values of tolerance, concord and peaceful coexistence among peoples and nations, and rejects hatred and discrimination.

2.10 - To reaffirm the commitment of Arab States to pursue their contribution to the international efforts exerted to stand against and combat all forms of terrorism, avoid confusing Islam with terrorism and differentiate between legitimate resistance and terrorism.

2.11 - To call for the holding of an international conference, under the auspices of the United Nations, in order to establish an international code of ethics for the fight against terrorism, while working to tackle the root causes of this phenomenon.

3 - We express our deep thanks and high consideration to His Excellency President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, President of the Republic of Tunisia, for his experience, insightfulness, and open-mindedness in managing our Summit proceedings. We are convinced that under his chairmanship of the Summit, the process of joint Arab action will witness further progress, and that the status of the Arab Nation among the nations of the world will be further reinforced.

Our thanks and appreciation also go to the Republic of Tunisia for having hosted the Summit

Conference of the Arab League Council in its 16th ordinary session and for its meticulous preparation, in consultation with the Arab countries, in order to ensure optimum conditions for the organization of the Summit. We also commend the efforts exerted by the Arab League Secretary General in this regard.

(Fonte: <http://www.arabsummit.tn/en/tunis-declaration.htm>)

B) Testo integrale della Dichiarazione di Algeri (Texte intégral de la “Déclaration d’Alger”)

Alger, 22-23 Mars 2005

Le 17ème sommet ordinaire de la Ligue des états arabes, tenu à Alger les 22 et 23 mars 2005, a été sanctionné par l’adoption de la “Déclaration d’Alger” dont voici le texte:

“Nous, dirigeants des Etats arabes, réunis dans le cadre de la 17ème session ordinaire du conseil de la Ligue des Etats arabes, au niveau du sommet à Alger, capitale de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, les 12 et 13 Safar de l’an 1426 de l’Hégire, correspondant aux 22 et 23 mars 2005,

- Dans le cadre de la commémoration du 60ème anniversaire de la création de la Ligue des Etats arabes, la valorisation de ses réalisations, l’attachement aux principes et dispositions de sa Charte et la poursuite de l’action pour réaliser ses objectifs, élargir ses missions et consolider son rôle,

- Partant de notre engagement au respect des valeurs humaines nobles, consacrées par la Charte des Nations Unies et les dispositions de la légalité internationale,

- Oeuvrant à la consolidation de la solidarité arabe et à l’attachement aux liens du nationalisme et aux relations de fraternité qui unissent les enfants de la nation arabe et la communauté de l’objectif entre ses peuples,

- Partant de nos responsabilités arabes dans la promotion des relations arabes, le raffermissement des liens, la consécration de ses fondements au sens de la consolidation des objectifs suprêmes de la nation, la concrétisation des aspirations de ses peuples et la préservation de sa sécurité nationale, sa dignité et sa fierté,

- En concrétisation de notre volonté commune de promouvoir le système de l'action arabe commune,

Et après une évaluation globale de la situation arabe et des circonstances qui marquent son environnement, les relations arabes et les défis auxquels nos patries et notre nation se trouvent confrontés et qui portent en eux des risques qui impliquent de notre part une action commune efficace et une volonté efficiente pour faire face à leurs menaces.

Annonçons:

- Notre attachement à la solidarité arabe tant au plan de la pratique que de la stratégie, au sens de la préservation de la sécurité nationale arabe, le respect de l'intégrité, la souveraineté et le droit de chaque Etat arabe à défendre ses ressources, ses potentialités et ses droits, et le rejet de l'ingérence dans les affaires internes ou le recours à l'usage ou à la menace d'usage de la force,

- La poursuite des efforts tendant à développer et à moderniser la Ligue des Etats arabes, dynamiser ses mécanismes en vue de s'adapter aux évolutions mondiales accélérées, poursuivre l'édification d'une société arabe complémentaire de par ses ressources et potentialités, la réalisation du développement global durable, et permettre à la Ligue arabe et à l'ensemble de ses instances et structures de développer les méthodes de travail, promouvoir ses performances et assumer les exigences et les aspirations des peuples arabes à une plus grande interdépendance des intérêts et à l'adaptation aux développements sur les scènes arabe et internationale.

- La valorisation des acquis réalisés dans le cadre de la réforme de notre organisation arabe, notamment la création d'un parlement arabe transitoire, d'une instance de suivi de l'application des décisions, l'amendement des règles de prise de décisions et du mode de vote, d'association de la société civile aux activités de la Ligue arabe et de ses institutions, l'adoption du document de "la stratégie relative à la famille arabe", le lancement d'un satellite arabe scientifique pour le contrôle de la planète, sur le plan de l'environnement et de la prévention des catastrophes naturelles, ainsi que la poursuite graduelle du processus de la réforme du système de l'action arabe commune et de ses méthodes de travail.

La poursuite du processus de développement et de modernisation dans le monde arabe pour le renforcement de l'exercice démocratique, l'élargissement de la participation politique, la consécration des valeurs de citoyenneté et de la culture démocratique, la promotion des droits de l'homme, l'ouverture de la voie devant la société civile et le renforcement du rôle de la femme dans tous les domaines de la vie publique.

- L'affirmation de notre démarche pour la réalisation de la complémentarité arabe, à travers la réactivation des mécanismes de l'action arabe commune, la mise en oeuvre des projets communs dans le domaine économique, en particulier la grande zone arabe de libre échange, le développement du partenariat et de l'investissement en vue de consolider les économies et le

commerce arabes et leur permettre de faire face aux dysfonctionnements actuels des systèmes du commerce international.

- Le lancement d'initiatives, de stratégies et de plans d'action visant la réalisation de l'égalité, la consolidation de la prise de conscience quant à l'importance des principes et des valeurs arabo-islamiques à même de garantir les droits de la femme et lui conférer un rôle important au sein de la société, la promulgation des lois nécessaires à sa protection, le rejet de toutes formes de discrimination contre la femme et la garantie de sa participation dans la prise de décisions, sur un même pied d'égalité avec l'homme, dans toutes les activités sociales, politiques et économiques.

-La réaffirmation de l'attachement à une paix juste et globale dans la région du Moyen-Orient en tant que choix stratégique pour le règlement du conflit israélo-arabe, soulignant dans ce contexte, l'initiative arabe de paix adoptée par le sommet arabe de Beyrouth en 2002, l'attachement aux décisions de la légalité internationale, à la référence de Madrid qui repose sur le principe de "la terre contre la paix" et à la +feuille de route+, l'exploitation du nouveau climat qui a fait renaître l'espoir quant à la relance et à l'impulsion du processus de paix en vue d'aboutir à une paix juste et globale, qui ne peut se réaliser sans un retrait total d'Israël des territoires arabes occupés en Palestine, du Golan syrien et des fermes de Chebaa, à la frontière du 4 juin 1967, l'instauration d'un Etat palestinien indépendant avec El-Qods pour capitale, la recherche d'une solution juste et consensuelle au problème des réfugiés palestiniens, conformément à la résolution 194 de 1948 de l'Assemblée Générale de l'ONU, le rejet de toute forme de naturalisation des palestiniens, qui est contraire aux principes du droit international et aux statuts des pays arabes d'accueil.

- La consécration du principe affirmant que le processus de paix est un tout indivisible et que la paix juste et globale à laquelle aspirent les peuples de la région ne saurait se réaliser sans le recouvrement de tous les droits arabes, sans exception aucune.

- La proclamation du plein soutien et appui au peuple palestinien pour le renforcement de son unité nationale et la solidité de son front interne, et le témoignage du soutien aux efforts du dialogue national palestinien et sa résistance face aux pratiques des autorités de l'occupation israélienne.

- La valorisation du rôle des fonds d'El Aqsa et de l'Intifidha d'El Aqsa dans le soutien de l'économie palestinienne et l'assistance des différentes catégories du peuple palestinien ainsi que l'appel à l'élargissement de leurs ressources et l'invitation des membres de la Banque Islamique du Développement, à adhérer aux deux fonds et l'ouverture du champs aux institutions volontaires pour le financement des programmes et projets répondant aux besoins prioritaires du peuple palestinien.

- La satisfaction quant au climat dans lequel se sont déroulées les élections présidentielles palestiniennes, qui reflètent le choix démocratique et réitérons la poursuite du soutien à l'Autorité nationale palestinienne et la solidarité absolue avec le peuple palestinien pour le recouvrement

de ses droits légitimes, dans le cadre des constantes et principes consacrés par les sommets arabes.

- Le témoignage de notre solidarité absolue avec la Syrie, pays frère à l'égard de ce qui est appelé "Syria accountability act", que nous considérons un dépassement des principes du droit international et des décisions des Nations-Unies, l'affirmation de la nécessité de faire prévaloir la logique du dialogue et de l'entente pour le règlement des différends entre les pays.

- Réaffirmation de l'intégrité territoriale de l'Irak et du respect de sa souveraineté et de son indépendance et l'appel à l'application de la décision du Conseil de Sécurité no 1546 (2004), permettant à l'Irak le recouvrement de toute sa souveraineté et la fin de la présence militaire étrangère sur ses terres.

- Appel au gouvernement iranien, pour la préservation, la consolidation et le développement des relations fraternelles entre les pays arabes et l'Iran, à répondre favorablement à la position de l'Etat des Emirats Arabes Unis (EAU), appelant au respect des procédures légales et des moyens pacifiques pour le recouvrement de ses trois îles.

- Saluons la signature de l'accord de paix au sud du Soudan et affirmons notre solidarité avec ce pays et notre soutien aux efforts déployés par le gouvernement soudanais pour le traitement de la situation dans la région du Darfour et l'appel de toutes les parties régionales et internationales concernées à oeuvrer pour un règlement pacifique urgent de cette question, en vue de consacrer l'unité du Soudan et préserver sa souveraineté et son intégrité, loin de toutes pressions étrangères.

-Satisfaction quant aux développements positifs survenus en Somalie, en l'occurrence l'élection d'un Président de la République et d'un parlement fédéral transitoire, en tant qu'étape importante sur la voie du recouvrement de l'unité, de la stabilité et de la sécurité de la Somalie et l'octroi d'une aide financière urgente au gouvernement somalien, à travers le fonds de soutien de la Somalie, pour faire face aux besoins urgents.

- La réaffirmation de l'unité nationale de la République Unie des Comores, son intégrité territoriale et sa souveraineté territoriale.

- Réaffirmation de la nécessité de la réforme de l'ordre international pour permettre aux Nations Unies de renforcer leur efficacité, leur compétence et leur capacité, la revendication de l'élargissement de la qualité de membres permanents du Conseil de Sécurité international pour permettre aux différents ensembles et cultures de par le monde, de participer à la gestion de l'ordre mondial conformément au principe de partenariat international, de l'équilibre, de la justice et de l'égalité du système international.

- La ferme condamnation du terrorisme, sous toutes ses formes et aspects, la dénonciation des crimes commis par les groupes terroristes qui constituent de grandes violations des droits fondamentaux de l'Homme et qui représentent une menace pour l'intégrité nationale des Etats

arabes, leur sécurité et leur stabilité, la convocation d'une conférence internationale sous l'égide des Nations Unies, l'établissement d'une définition du terrorisme et la distinction entre l'Islam et le terrorisme et celui-ci et le droit des peuples à la résistance face à l'occupation.

- L'accueil favorable de la tenue du premier sommet entre les Etats arabes et les Etats d'Amerique du Sud pour l'instauration d'un cadre de coopération, de solidarité et de dialogue constructif entre les deux communautés.

- la poursuite des efforts pour le renforcement et la dynamisation de la coopération arabo-africaine y compris la tenue de la réunion de la commission ministérielle permanente en prélude à la tenue de la deuxième conférence au sommet de la coopération arabo-africaine.

- La reprise du dialogue arabo-européen et l'intensification des contacts pour la redynamisation des relations entre les deux communautés.

- L'établissement de passerelles de coopération et de partenariat entre les Etats arabes et les Etats influents dans le monde.

- Valorisation des efforts consentis par la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire pour soutenir l'action arabe commune, notamment en abritant et en apportant un appui soutenu à l'institut arabe supérieur de la traduction au projet de l'encyclopédie arabe, au centre arabe de prévention des séismes et des autres catastrophes naturelles outre l'institut arabe de la culture ouvrière et des recherches de travail.

- Notre profonde gratitude à l'Algérie, terre du combat et de l'émancipation, à son Excellence le Président de la République, M. Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA, au gouvernement et au peuple algériens pour avoir accueilli le 17ème sommet ordinaire du Conseil de la Ligue Arabe ainsi que notre plus haute considération à l'Algérie pour l'intérêt particulier accordé au sommet arabe et son assiduité et son sérieux dans sa préparation en concertation avec les autres Etats arabes et le Secrétariat Général de la Ligue Arabe.

- Notre haute considération aux efforts remarquables consentis par le Président de la République, M. Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA, dans la direction des travaux de notre sommet ainsi qu'à la sagesse et la clairvoyance dont il a fait preuve pour la réussite du sommet, notre confiance totale en la sage direction de M. BOUTEFLIKA à la tête du sommet arabe pour la relance de l'action arabe commune en vue d'accomplir davantage de réalisations et de renouer avec l'esprit d'initiative collective à même de renforcer la solidarité et l'entraide entre les pays arabes et préserver leurs intérêts communs ainsi que notre reconnaissance des efforts déployés par M. Amr Moussa, Secrétaire Général de la Ligue Arabe pour la relance de l'action arabe commune.

(fonte: Ministero degli Affari Esteri d'Algeria,
http://193.194.78.233/ma_fr/stories.php?story=05/03/23/9409901)

C) Dichiarazione di Khartoum (Khartoum Declaration)

Council of Arab League, at the summit level (the 18th ordinary session)

Khartoum - Sudan

28-29 Safar 1427 corresponding 28-29 March 2006 KHARTOUM DECLARATION (Sudan Online) Translated by Khalid Salih & El Moiz Hamad ElNil. We, the Kings, Presidents and Princes of Arab States, assembling in Khartoum as the council of Arab League, at the summit level (the 18th ordinary session) held in Khartoum the capital of the Republic of Sudan on 28-29 Safar 1427 corresponding 28-29 March 2006.

Inspired by the resolutions issued by the Arab Summit held in Khartoum in the year 1967, and the summits that preceded and followed it later, the latest of them was Algeria summit, which emphasize the unity of Arab States, and the unity of its combined efforts, beside organizing and cleansing it from what ever faults or defects.

After conducting a comprehensive and detailed evaluation, of the circumstances engulfing the Arab states, the Arab relations, and the threat facing the Arab states and disturbing the security and the stability in the Middle East. Keeping in mind the changes that took place in the international order and its outcomes that represent huge challenges to the Arab regional and national orders.

Confirming our commitments to the principles and goals of the Arab League and the charter of the United Nation and our national responsibility to elevate the Arab relation and strengthening their ties. We pay attributes to the positive atmosphere in which the summit is held, that plays a positive role in supporting the Arab unity and push forward the joint Arab efforts.

We Declare The Following:

- Our utmost obligation towards the unity and goals of the Arab Nation, and we are proud of its values and deep-rooted traditions in freedom and independence. We will defend its national sovereignty and national security and our persistence to the Arab solidarity as goal, mean and end.
- Renew our commitments to the Arab League covenant, Arab Agreement aims at reinforcing the ties between Arab states and Arab nations and solving of disputes pacifically.
- We praise the effort aiming at developing the joint Arab efforts, and what been achieved in this regard, activation of its mechanisms in order to enable it to deal with the developments of Arab societies and keeping track of the rapid changes throughout the world.
- We appreciate, the idea proposed by his Excellency Mohammad Husni Mubarak President

of Egypt, We decide to assign the Arab League at ministerial level to study the proposal of holding a consultative session between the two ordinary sessions of the Arab League, to review the upcoming issues and coordinate the policies of the Arab states.

- We confirmed our support to the Arab integration, through activating of the Arab joint efforts mechanism, and the implementation of the integration of economic projects, especially the Arab commercial; free zones.
- We call to increase the Arab investments especially in the sectors of agriculture and animal resources and the utilization of Sudan resources to achieve Arab food security.
- We affirmed the need for cooperation, dialogue and mutual respect between people and cultures, building a peaceful and tolerant world, and remind that respecting religious sanctities and beliefs is the decisive factor in building confidence and bridges of friendship between nations. We express our absolute rejection and condemnation of any insult to Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) as well as any religion or its symbols and call on the countries of the world to forward laws that ban such practices. We affirmed the respect of freedom of expressions without insulting the beliefs of the people.
- We affirmed on the necessity of adopting dialogue and alliance between cultures and religions to stabilize the tolerance values and peaceful co-existence, working with the governments and international as well as regional organizations to enhance the efficient mechanism that makes people acquainted with the cultures of each others.
- We affirmed that Palestine is a central issue, and the Arab principle objective to achieve a comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East. We renew our commitment to the 2002 Arab peace initiative issued by the Arab League in Beirut, to solve the Arab-Israel conflict based on the related international resolutions.
- We reaffirm that a comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved without the total withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinians and occupied Arab lands. Including Jolan height of Syria to the line of 4th June 1967, and the occupied lands in southern Lebanon and the establishment of the Palestinian state and its capital in East Jerusalem. Likewise crystallizing a just solution for the Palestinian refugees according to the United Nations resolution of 1994.
- We praise the Palestinian democratic practice and the transparency of its legislative election; we announce our entire support to the national Palestinian authority and its efforts to safeguard its national security. We call upon the international community to respect the will of the Palestinian people in choosing their leaders and not to interfere in their internal affairs and our rejection of the Israeli one-sided measures.
- We demand the implementation of the international court verdict, regarding the newly established laws to construct the racial barrier in the occupied Palestinian land.

- We affirm to continue our financing to the Palestine authority, as per the mechanism adopted in Beirut Summit (2002) and continue financing the sources of ALAGSA and ALGUDS UPRISING funds, in order to fortify the Palestine economy and its resources and freeing it from the clutches of the Israeli economy.
- We express our solidarity with Syria in the face of U.S. sanctions, we consider what been called the law to punish Syria is over stepping the principle of the international law and the U.N resolutions, and we appreciate the Syrian stance in resolving the problems through dialogues and diplomacy.
- We express our solidarity with Lebanon and its sovereignty within its constitutional organizations, and we declare our optimum support to national Lebanon's dialogues, and its rights to reclaims its land occupied by the Israeli.
- We appeal to uncover and punish the criminals who committed the assassination, which claim the life of the martyr Rafeeq Al-Hariri, the former Lebanese Prime Minister and his companions.
- We renew our co-operation with the Iraqi people, and Call to respect the sovereignty, unity, freedom and independence of Iraq, and stop interference in its internal affairs. We respect its will in deciding its future and democratic choices, and we call to speed up the forming of its government, we condemned the destructive work that targets shrines and tombs in Samira and mosques and worship places. We call upon the Iraqi people to hold on the national integrity and disallow the destruction of its peace and stability. We announce our satisfaction about the exerted effort of the Secretary General of the Arab League to achieve the national reconciliation in Iraq, and request him to carry on with the effort to hold the national reconciliation conference in Baghdad.
- To keep the Arab-Iran relations, its support and development, we call the Iranian government to withdraw from the three Arabian Islands, Tanab Alkubra, Tanab Alsugra and Abo-Mosa and hand it over to The United Arab Emirates. We value the stance of United Arab Emirates in following the peaceful procedure and ways in odder to retain them.
- We again welcome the signing of peace accord in the Republic of Sudan and the steps taken to implement it. we call all the concerned regional and international sides to work towards retaining peace and stability in Sudan, and offer back up and support to rebuilds the Southern part and war affected areas, we encourage the international community and the donors to honor their pledges to enhance the comprehensive development in Sudan.
- We appeal to all Sudanese parties participating in Darfur peace talk, to double their efforts to reach a final and comprehensive solution to the crises. We reaffirm our continuous support and co-operation with African Union in its efforts to solve the crises, and monitor the cease-fire situation. Sending any other troops to the region is a matter requires a prior agreement from the government of Sudan. We assert to increase the Arabian African troops

participating with African Union, and offer all financial and logistic support required to continue its mission.

- We welcome the positive development achieved by the national Somali conciliation, and we call the Somali brothers to complete the state organization and support the conciliation efforts, and lay a foundation of peace. We call to offer a quick financial help to Somali government to enable it to carry out its tasks.
- We announce our support to the progress achieved in the conciliation process in the Republic of Comoros; we support the continuation of the political process and the conduct of the presidential election and its efforts for development. We welcome the positive result of the donors' conference towards development process in the Republic of Comoros; and we call them to honor their pledges announced in the conference.
- We request the member states and the joint efforts Arab work organizations and the donors countries to provide humanitarian aids to the inhabitants of the affected areas that face the crises of drought and famine like, Somalia, Republic of Niger, Kenya, Ethiopia and other affected parts of Africa.
- We affirm on the Arab-African mutual co-operation and the necessity to activate its structure and restoration of its organizations and the removal of all the obstacles that block its way, to contribute positively towards the enhancement of the Arab-African relations, and the development in the Arab-African states. We direct to maximize the efforts between the General Secretariat of the Arab League and the African Union commission to hold the second Arab-African summit as soon as possible.
- We express our concern to continue the Arab-European dialogue and its activation and boost the ties with the Asian countries.
- We emphasize on the urgency to reform the international order, to enable the U.N to increase its efficiency and ability to counter the challenges facing the world, in order to achieve global peace and security. We demand the expansion of the permanent membership of the Security Council, to allow all geographical regions and cultures of the whole world to participate actively in global administration system.
- We announce our condemned on terror in all forms, and we consider the crimes committed by terror groups a violation to the basic human rights and continuous threat to the national safety of the states and their security and stability. We call to hold an international conference under the sponsorship of the United Nations to define terrorism, and avoid mixing between Islam and terror and distinguish between terror and nations right in resisting occupation.
- We express our gratification towards the continuous economic development in Arab states. We affirm on the importance of raising the level of development and the attraction of na-

tional and foreign investment and carry on with the reformation policy keeping in mind the social aspects of the development.

- We confirm our desire to enhance the economical relation with different economic groups through out the globe, and carry on with the positive policies that stabilize the international oil markets.
- We call the member states in the International Trade Organization to stop forcing tough conditions in order to accept the membership of Arab states, moreover backup the Arab League request to gain the distinction of a supervisor.
- We affirm that more effort should be exerted to the development in the International Trade, keeping in mind the need of the developing countries.
- We express our positive feeling about the result of the summit between the Arab states and South American countries held in May 2005, and we welcome the joint meeting between the Economic Ministers from both sides scheduled to be held in Quito -Ecuador on April 2006.
- We value the continuous efforts exerted by the Arab states in order to strengthen the democratic exercise and supporting the administrative system. We declare our support to all national efforts in this regard, and expanding the participation of the civil society and its organizations in the modernization, development and reform efforts.
- We call the International community to co-operate in supporting the efforts to achieve the millennium development goals and poverty eradication. And the necessity to facilitate resources and distributing it equally to insure the achievements of all goals agreed upon globally, development and poverty eradication and doubling the financial support specially for the underdeveloped countries, and the activation of debt cancellation or reduction policy. Moreover, close the gap in the economic and social development standards between rich and poor countries.
- We call to support the International Fund for co-operation and poverty eradication, and locate the required resources in order to help it carry out its plans.
- We affirm the continuation of the efforts to eradicate gender base violence, and introduction of initiative to insure women rights and its role in the society, and enacting new laws to protect women.
- We call to take the necessary measures to insure that handicapped enjoys all rights like others and the activation of the Arab contracts of the handicapped people.
- We direct to implement Arab plans and strategy concerning the joint social Arab work, especially the Arab strategy for poverty eradication and the treaty of the Arab child rights

and the Arab strategy of Arab family, beside charter of ethics and rules of social work and other charters in order to achieve social progress in the Arab society.

- We call to increase the co-operation to fight epidemic diseases especially bird flue.
- We confirm on the right of education based on equal chances and no discrimination.
- We confirm our efforts to develop education in the Arab world, and establish higher Arab council to oversee the status of education in all standards and aspects, and hand its report and recommendations to the (19th) ordinary session of the Arab League at the summit level.
- We decide to finance scientific and technological researches and locate the required financial fund and increase the current resources and co-operation between the research and scientific institutions in Arab states. We call to speed up the process to develop the scientific research in order to increase the production efficiency and capacity building to establish the information society and bridging the digital gap and work towards developing the program to use the nuclear power in peaceful ways.
- We adhere to provide all kinds of supports to the cultural organizations, the talented people and Arab authors to elevate the status of the Arab culture in arts fields, and give a chance to the Arab culture to contribute and enrich the human culture.
- We call to enable youth to participate effectively in the society through contribution in the economic, social, cultural and political development.
- We value the exerted efforts to strengthen the relations between the expatriate Arab communities and the necessity to communicate with it and the support of its organizations. And call to the active participation in Huston board and other boards which organized in collaboration with the expatriate Arab.
- We offer our deep gratitude to his Excellency President of Algerian Republic Abdul Aziz Boutaflika for his efforts and valuable contributions when he head the previous session, which resulted in pushing forward the joint Arab work.
- We offer our deep gratitude to his Excellency President of Republic of Sudan Omer Hassan Ahmad Albashir for directing the summit the right way and foresight in directing the discussion rounds. We express our complete trust that the joint Arab work will witness under his leadership more achievements and developments for the betterment of the Arab nations, because he is known to be wise, efficient and experience. We decide to approve the opening speech of his Excellency as official documents of the summit.
- We express our deep gratitude to the Republic of Sudan and its hospitable people f or the warm welcome, and the efficient organization for the Arab League meetings at the level of

the summit in its 18th ordinary session.

- We express that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will host the Arab League meetings at the level of the summit in its 19th ordinary session.
- We express our pride for the tireless efforts exerted by the Secretary General of the Arab League Mr. Amro Mosa for propounding Arab issues. We believe he will continue these valuable efforts during his second tenure, moreover follow up with development of the joint Arab Work.

Khartoum 28-29 Safar 1427

Corresponding 28-29 March 2006

(fonte: Sol-Sudan On line:

www.sol-sd.com/politics/pdf/KHARTOUM%20DECLARATION.pdf)

Annex XIV

Sondaggi

A) Preferenze e comportamento dei rifugiati nel caso di un accordo permanente israelo-palestinese sui rifugiati (On refugees' preferences and behavior in a Palestinian Israeli permanent refugee agreement)

January-June, 2003

1. Introduction:

PSR conducted three major surveys among Palestinian refugees in three areas: the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (WBGS), Jordan and Lebanon. Based on several previous surveys showing that the overwhelming majority of the refugees (more than 95%) insist on maintaining the “right of return” as a sacred right that can never be given up, PSR surveys sought to find out how refugees would behave once they have obtained that right and how they would react under various likely conditions and circumstances of the permanent settlement. The three surveys have been funded by the Japanese government (through the United Nations Development Program), the (German) Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and the (Canadian) International Development Research Center. One survey among non-refugees in the WBGS has also been conducted to examine the views of non-refugees on some of the same issues raised in the refugees' surveys. The WBGS refugee survey was conducted by PSR in January 2003, and the WBGS non-refugee survey in April 2003. The Jordan survey was conducted in May 2003 by the Center for Strategic Studies at Jordan University with full PSR supervision. The Lebanon survey was conducted in June 2003 by Statistics Lebanon Company.

Sample size for the three refugees' surveys was 4506 distributed at the three areas almost equally, averaging 1500 interviews with refugee families in each area. A random sample was selected taking into consideration refugee distribution (inside-outside refugee camps) in each area. Rejection rate was less than 1% and the margin of error was 3%.

2. Objectives of the surveys:

The surveys had two main objectives:

1. To help the process of peace negotiations, the surveys sought to find out refugees' preferences in the permanent agreement with Israel. For this purpose, the refugees were asked about their attitude toward various political solutions and about their likely behavior under a specific solution that was discussed at the Taba Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in January 2001. To insure maximum benefits, the questionnaire was prepared in consultation with official Palestinian institutions in charge of negotiations and refugee affairs in the PLO and the Palestinian Authority.
2. To help the planning and absorption process by making estimates of the number and socio-economic and demographic profile of refugees who may prefer to live in the Palestinian state. To insure maximum benefits, the questionnaire was prepared in consultation with official Palestinian institutions responsible for planning in the Palestinian Authority.

PSR consulted also with researchers and NGOs dealing with refugee issues to benefit from their experience and insights. While we are grateful for the advice we have received, PSR is responsible for all aspects of this work: the preparation of questions, the selection of the sample, the conduct of the fieldwork, and the analysis of the results.

3. Main Findings

Three kinds of data have been collected: information about the refugees and their socio-economic conditions in the three areas examined, views and attitudes of refugees regarding peace settlement issues, and expected refugees' behavior under a specific peace solution and under various conditions and circumstances of a refugee settlement.

1. Selected Information on refugees

- The surveys show that the overwhelming majority of the refugees are registered with UNRWA, the UN agency that cares for the Palestinian refugees. The WBGS came first with 98% registration followed by Lebanon (94%) and Jordan (91%).
- Average family size in the WBGS sample was 7.55 (individuals per family), followed by

Jordan with 6.16, and Lebanon with 4.59. With regard to age groups, WBGS had the largest percentage of young people, less than 18 years old, with 48% followed by Jordan with 37% and Lebanon with 35%. Lebanon had the highest percentage for the old, more than 52 years old, with 17%, followed by Jordan with 12% and WBGS with 9%.

- With regard to education, Lebanon had the lowest illiteracy rate. Lebanon also had the highest rate of those with elementary and preparatory education (62%). Jordan had the highest rate secondary education (16%). WBGS had the highest illiteracy rate with 35% followed by Jordan (24%) and Lebanon (11%).

- With regard to income, Jordan had the highest percentage of income in the middle brackets (45%) followed by Lebanon (42%) and the WBGS (27%). For those with low income level, Lebanon came first (36%) followed by WBGS (32%) and Jordan (17%). The WBGS had the largest percentage of those in the high income brackets (41%) followed by Jordan (38%) and Lebanon (22%). Of course these income levels are relative and reflect arbitrary distribution selected for analytical purposes only.

- Refugees in Lebanon had the largest percentage of relatives living in Israel (39%) followed by Jordan's (24%) and Palestine (21%). With regard to relatives who immigrated to foreign countries, Lebanon came on top here as well with 64% followed by Jordan and WBGS (24% each). As for those with relatives in the WBGS, Jordan came first (56%) followed by Lebanon (21%).

- 97% of those interviewed in Jordan and 15% of those interviewed in the WBGS carries the Jordanian passport. In Lebanon, 74% had Lebanese travel documents for Palestinian refugees, and in Palestine 42% carried Palestinian passports while 6% carried Egyptian travel documents or passports.

- 63% of refugees in Lebanon own a house in the refugee camps while those owning land in Lebanon did not exceed 1%. In Jordan, 48% own a house outside the camps and 11% own land in the country. In the WBGS, 47% own a house inside the camps and 48% own a house outside the camps while 17% own land. The highest percentage of private car ownership was found in Lebanon (31%) followed by Jordan (25%) and WBGS (15%).

2. Selected Views

A proposed solution of the refugee issue was presented to respondents who were then asked how they would view it and how they would behave if given the right to choose among the options made available by the solution. The following is the full text of the solution presented:

“We will now read you a proposed solution to the refugee problem that was published in Palestinian papers in the light of the Taba negotiations in January 2000. We will then ask you few questions:

“The establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and Israeli recognition of UN resolution 194 or the right of return. But the two sides would agree on the return of a small number of refugees to Israel in accordance with a timetable that extends for several years. Each refugee family will be able to choose one of the following options:

1. Return to Israel in accordance with an annual quota and become an Israeli citizen
2. Stay in the Palestinian state that will be established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and receive a fair compensation for the property taken over by Israel and for other losses and suffering
3. Receive Palestinian citizenship and return to designated areas inside Israel that would be swapped later on with Palestinian areas as part of a territorial exchange and receive compensation
4. Receive fair compensation for the property, losses, and suffering and stay in the host country receiving its citizenship or Palestinian citizenship
5. Receive fair compensation for the property, losses, and suffering and immigrate to a European country or the US, Australia, or Canada and obtain citizenship of that country or Palestinian citizenship.

A majority of refugees in the three areas expressed the belief that Israel would reject the proposed solution to the refugee problem. But a majority of 55% in Jordan, 63% in Palestine, and 67% in Lebanon believed the PLO would accept the solution. However, the respondents were split in their evaluation of the likely response of the majority of the refugees with WBGS refugees split right in the middle, Jordan’s refugees tilting toward acceptance, and Lebanon’s toward rejection. When asked how they themselves feel about the proposal, the respondents in Palestine and Lebanon were divided into two equal groups, rejecting or accepting it, while in Jordan it was accepted by 50% and rejected by 37% with the rest expressing no opinion. When asked how they would react to a Palestinian-Israeli agreement embracing the proposal, the overwhelming majority tended to approve such agreement even if most felt they would do so for the lack of better alternative. A small percentage (15%, 9%, and 8% in WBGS, Lebanon, and Jordan respectively) said that it would not only oppose such solution but would also resist it.

While a majority of Lebanon’s refugees believe that the WBGS is unable to absorb refugees from other countries, the percentage drops to 27% in the WBGS and 26% in Jordan.

When asked if they would like to play a role in building the Palestinian state, the percentage of those wishing to do so was very high among refugees in WBGS (84%) going down to 61% in Lebanon and 52% in Jordan.

While a two-third majority of refugees in WBGS supported the reference in the roadmap to “an agreed, fair, and realistic” solution to the refugee problem, the level of support dropped to 46% among refugees in Jordan and 45% in Lebanon.

A second possible political settlement was proposed to respondents. In this settlement, the issue of refugees would remain unresolved and postponed while all other issues would be permanently settled. A majority of refugees in WBGS supported such settlement, but the

majority of refugees in Lebanon and Jordan did not support it. However, the level of support for this “permanent-minus” settlement increased when refugees were told that refugees would be provided housing projects while waiting for a resolution of their problem. When asked whether they would like to move to the Palestinian state under such settlement and wait there for a permanent resolution of the refugee issue, two-thirds of refugees in Lebanon and Jordan preferred to stay in Lebanon and Jordan. But 25% of Jordan’s refugees and 31% of Lebanon’s refugees expressed willingness to move temporarily to the Palestinian state and wait there for a solution.

- Refugees were asked about the side they would choose to represent them in negotiations over the refugee problem. The overwhelming majority of refugees in Lebanon and WBGS chose the PLO (86% and 73% in Lebanon and WBGS respectively). But in Jordan, only 40% chose the PLO while 28% selected the government of Jordan and 16% did not express an opinion. However, the confidence in the PLO drops when it comes to the management of the compensation process. The largest percentage (42%) in WBGS favored a joint team from the PLO, the UN, and representatives of refugees. But in Lebanon, the largest percentage (45%) favored the PLO, and in Jordan, the joint team received 28%, the PLO 22%, and the Jordanian government 23%. It should be mentioned that the questions regarding compensation were asked only to those whose choice for the exercise of the right of return involved compensation.

- No significant differences were found between the attitudes of refugees and non-refugees in WBGS.

3. Expected Behavior

After reading the proposed solution to the refugee problem (full text above), respondents were asked to choose the option or options they preferred or reject all options and describe, in their own words, what would constitute an acceptable solution.

The following represents the answers of the refugees in the three areas:

<i>Refugees' First Choice (for the exercise of the right of the right of return)</i>				
	WBGS%	Jordan%	Lebanon%	Total (% of total population in the three areas)
1. Return to Israel and become (or not become) an Israeli citizen	12	5	23	10

2. Stay in the Palestinian state that will be established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and receive a fair compensation for the property taken over by Israel and for other losses and suffering	38	27	19	31
3. Receive Palestinian citizenship and return to designated areas inside Israel that would be swapped later on with Palestinian areas as part of a territorial exchange and receive any deserved compensation	37	10	21	23
4. Receive fair compensation for the property, losses, and suffering and stay in host country receiving its citizenship or Palestinian citizenship	0	33	11	17
5. Receive fair compensation for the property, losses, and suffering and immigrate to a European country or the US, Australia, or Canada and obtain citizenship of that country or Palestinian citizenship	1	2	9	2
6. Refuse all options	9	16	17	13
7. No opinion	2	8	0	5

Based on the percentages listed above, the number of refugees wishing to move from Lebanon and Jordan to the Palestinian state in an exercise of the right of return would be 784, 049. The number of those wishing to exercise the same right of by returning to Israel from the three areas under examination would be 373,673. The numbers in these two categories of the exercise of return would vary however depending on several considerations related to the conditions and circumstances of return and residency. For example, the surveys found that 45% of Lebanon's refugees, 52% of Jordan's, and 47% of WBGS would change their choice and exercise the right of return in the swapped areas of the Palestinian state if their homes and villages were demolished. The overwhelming majority of the refugees wishing to exercise the right of return in Israel refuse to become Israeli citizenship and prefer to stay refugees or select other options if carrying Israeli citizenship is mandatory.

Those who opted for an option entailing compensation were asked to make their own estimates of what they thought would be paid to each refugee family and what they thought would be a fair compensation. The estimates for a fair compensation were much higher than the estimates of what would actually be paid. For example, 66% in WBGS believed that what would be paid

would be \$ 100,000 or less, while 65% believed that a fair compensation should be between \$100,000 and \$ 500,000.

The surveys also showed that more than one third of refugees in Lebanon and Jordan (from among those who would accept to have their compensation in the form of land or houses) would accept land and houses located in evacuated settlements. But this percentage rises to 48% among the refugees in WBGS.

With regard to immigration to third countries, an option selected by a small minority, the most popular third country in Lebanon was a European one while the US was the most popular among refugees in Jordan and the least popular in WBGS.

4. Driving forces

When formulating the questions for the surveys, we sought to understand the motivation and driving forces behind the attitudes and behavior of the refugees. PSR researchers had four hypotheses regarding these drivers:

Hypothesis one: in selecting places of residence and absorption, in the exercise of the right of return, refugees would be motivated by the degree of their attachment to, and perception of, Palestinian national identity.

Hypothesis two: refugees in host countries in particular will also be motivated by their perception of the nature of the relationship they have with those countries and the extent of the civil and political equality they enjoy in them.

Hypothesis three: refugees will also be motivated by family considerations; i.e., depending on where relative lived: in Israel, the Palestinian state, or third countries.

Hypothesis four: selection of choices would also be dependent on socio-economic considerations in their current place of residence (what area, inside or outside refugee camps, etc.) and on the extent of refugee ownership in those areas of residence.

Findings clearly show the significance of national identity leading the majority to choose to exercise the right of return in the Palestinian state. The findings also show that the perception of relative equality enjoyed by refugees in Jordan (compared to those in Lebanon) increased the percentage of those selecting Jordan as the place where they would permanently reside while only a small minority opted to stay in Lebanon. In Lebanon, in particular, the results showed the significance of family links leading to the highest percentages of demand on immigration to third countries as well as the demand to live in Israel as these are the areas in which Lebanon's refugees have relatives more than other refugee groups in Jordan and WBGS. Finally, the findings show that the percentage of those who opted to stay in host countries increases among refugees living outside refugee camps and that those wishing to go the Palestinian state

increases among those with lower and middle levels of income compared to those who a higher level of income. Moreover, those who own homes and land in their place of residence tend to want to stay in that place.

B) Il documento di Ginevra (On Geneva document)

While a majority opposes the Geneva document, Palestinian attitudes vary regarding its core components: a large majority opposes the refugee solution and the restrictions on Palestinian sovereignty, but a majority endorses equal territorial swaps and the deployment of a multinational force.

04-09 December 2003

These are the results of opinion poll # 10, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) between 04-09 December 2003. The poll deals with Geneva Document, the peace process, Abu Ala's government, the popularity of Arafat and the political factions. The total sample size of this poll is 1319 from Palestinians 18 years and older, interviewed face-to-face in West Bank (835) and in Gaza Strip (484), in 120 locations. The margin of error is 3%.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS:

The poll shows significant opposition to the Geneva document among those Palestinians familiar with it and that support for the document is lukewarm. But it also shows that only a very small minority is fully aware of the content of the document and that when respondents become aware of its main components, both support and opposition increase significantly. A majority of the Palestinians sees red lines in two components: the refugee solution and the limits imposed on sovereignty. On the other hand, a majority welcomes the proposed deployment of a multinational force in the Palestinian state and the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the basis of the 1967 lines, with equal territorial exchange.

The poll also shows a Palestinian hesitation between the desire to see armed confrontations continuing (with a majority seeing such confrontations contributing to the achievement of national rights) and the desire for a mutual cessation of violence, including readiness to support the PA in taking measures to prevent armed attacks on Israelis when a mutual ceasefire is achieved. As for the long term vision, Palestinian readiness to support reconciliation between the two peoples has never been stronger.

Finally, the findings show that the Palestinian public is willing to give Abu Ala's government a very limited vote of confidence especially in terms of its ability to implement political reforms. Arafat's popularity drops significantly while Fateh's decreases slightly. Support for Islamist and nationalist opposition continues to rise.

Main Results

1. Geneva Document

- 73% have heard of the Geneva document and the rest has not. But only 4% say they have full knowledge of it.
- Only 7% have learned about Geneva from the pamphlet containing the document that were distributed with al Quds and al Ayyam newspapers while 79% have heard about it from the media.
- Support for the document among those who have heard of it (i.e., among 73% of the public) reaches 25% (19% of all the public), opposition 61% (44% of all the public), and the undecided 14%. 37% of all the public are either undecided or have not heard of it.
- Upon reading a summary of the main points of the document, support for the full package proposed by the document (among 100% of the public) increases from 19% to 39%, opposition increases from 44% to 58%, and the undecided and uninformed decreases from 37% to 3%. All the figures below referring to the Geneva document have been obtained after informing our respondents in detail about the various components of the Geneva document.
- A majority supports two main components of the document: security arrangements involving the deployment a multinational force (58%) and the Israeli withdrawal based on the 1967 borders with mutual 1:1 territorial exchange (57%). A map showing borders and territorial exchange was presented to respondents. The percentage of opposition to the deployment of a multinational force reaches 40% and to territorial exchange 41%.
- The Jerusalem component of the document received the support of 46% with 52% opposing; end of conflict received 42% support with 55% opposing; and the establishment of a state without an army received 36% support with 63% opposing.
- A minority not exceeding a quarter gives support to the components of a refugee solution (25%) and the limitations on the sovereignty of the Palestinian state (23%). The percentage of opposition to the refugee component reaches 72% and to the limitation on sovereignty 76%. No difference between refugees and non-refugees exists when it comes to the Geneva refugee solution. Both segments of the society oppose it equally.

- In the eyes of the Palestinian public, the best component of the Geneva document is the one that deals with the territorial exchange and Israeli army withdrawal and the worst is the one that deals with refugees.

In this poll, we have asked respondents to express their attitudes toward the Geneva document based on what they have heard or read about it so far. We then provided them with a summary of seven core elements of the document and asked them to express attitudes regarding each element. We have finally asked them for their opinion on the whole document as a package. The findings show that the Palestinian public is lukewarm on the Geneva document and in fact has significant reservations about two of its components. On the other hand, the public is supportive of two other components while showing limited opposition to the remaining three components.

The poll found that the 73% of the public have heard of or read about the Geneva document and that among those who have heard of or read about it, support reaches 25% and opposition is 61%. Among the whole public these figures translate into 19% support and 44% opposition while the percentage of the undecided and those who have not read, or heard of, it is 37%. After informing the respondents of seven core elements of the document, support increased from 19% to 39%, opposition from 44% to 58%, and the undecided (and those who did not read or hear of it) decreased from 37% to 3%. From among the seven components read to respondents, support is given to two only: the one dealing with the deployment of a multinational force (58%) and the one dealing with the Israeli withdrawal based on the 1967 borders with an equal territorial exchange (57%). Two components received the biggest opposition: the one dealing with refugees, opposed by 72%, and the one dealing with limitations on Palestinian sovereignty, opposed by 76%. Support for the other three components vary with Jerusalem receiving 46%, end of conflict 42%, and the de-militarization of the Palestinian state 36%. From among those who have been previously informed of the document (i.e., 73% of the public), support increases among Fateh supporters (36%) compared to Hamas' (26%). Support for the Geneva document as a package after being informed about its main components increases among women (42%) compared to men (35%), among non refugees (41%) compared to refugees (36%), among those with preparatory education (47%) compared to those holding a BA degree (29), among housewives (44%) and farmers (40%) compared to students (32%), and among Fateh supporters (55%) compared to Hamas' (33%).

The following table shows refugee and non refugee attitudes toward seven main components of the Geneva documents:

	Total		Refugees		Non refugees	
	Support	Opposition	Supp.	Opp.	Supp.	Opp.
Attitude towards the Geneva document among those who have heard of it (73% of the public)	25	61	23	65	28	57

Attitude towards the Geneva document among all respondents (100% of the public)	19	44	17	49	20	40
Attitude towards each element of the Geneva document after it was read to respondents:						
1. An Israeli withdrawal from all of the Gaza Strip and the evacuation of its settlements. But in the West Bank, Israel withdraws and evacuates settlements from most of it, with the exception of few settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be exchanged with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with the attached map {show map}.	57	41	58	40	56	42
2. An independent Palestinian state would be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the Palestinian state will have no army, but it will have a strong security force. Both sides will be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other.	36	63	33	66	38	60
3. East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israel sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that will come under Israeli sovereignty.	46	52	43	56	49	49

<p>4. With regard to the refugee question, both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242 and on the Arab peace initiative. The refugees will be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of the states in those areas. The number of refugees returning to Israel will be based on the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees will be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of properties.</p>	25	72	25	73	26	72
<p>5. When the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples</p>	42	55	40	58	44	52
<p>6. A multinational force will be established to monitor the implementation of the agreement, to ensure the security of the Palestinian state, to give both sides security guarantees, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including its international crossings.</p>	58	40	58	40	57	40

7. The Palestinian state will have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace. But Israeli will be allowed to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. The multinational force will remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time.	23	76	22	77	24	74
Attitude towards the Geneva document as a package after reading its components	39	58	36	61	41	56

(fonte: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research website: www.pcpsr.org)

C) Sondaggio congiunto sull'opinione pubblica israelo-palestinese (Joint Palestinian-Israeli public opinion survey)

January 15, 2005

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS:

The joint poll aimed at examining possible changes in Palestinian and Israeli public attitudes in the post Arafat era regarding six basic elements of Israeli-Palestinian permanent status negotiations: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange, (2) Refugees, (3) Jerusalem, (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state, (5) Security arrangements, and (6) End of conflict. Questions regarding similar and identical elements were asked in December 2003. While the 2003 elements were presented as constituting the main components of the Geneva Initiative, this poll made no mention of the Geneva initiative and the elements were presented as constituting a possible permanent status agreement. The poll also sought to revisit a question asked in June 2003 regarding public willingness to accept a settlement that would contain a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people.

The findings indicate a significant increase toward more dovish views among both Israelis the Palestinians compared to the situation 12 and 18 months ago.

The poll was conducted between December 30, 2004 and January 10, 2005. Total Palestinian sample size was 1319 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample included 501 adult Israelis interviewed by phone with a margin of error of 4.5%.

Here are the main findings:

1. Final Borders and Territorial Exchange

Among Palestinians 63% support or strongly support and 35% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2003. At that time, support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 57% and opposition at 41%. Among Israelis 55% support and 43% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of Judea Samaria and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel. The Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In December 2003, 47% of the Israelis supported this component while 50% opposed it.

2. Refugees

Among Palestinians, 46% support and 50% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their "refugeehood" and loss of property. In December 2003, only 25% agreed with an identical compromise while 72% opposed it.

Among Israelis 44% support such an arrangement compared to 35% who supported it in December 2003.

3. Jerusalem

In the Palestinian public 44% support and 54% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israel sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty.

In December 2003, an identical compromise had a similar reception with 46% supporting

it and 52% opposing it. Among Israelis however, only 39% agree and 60% disagree to this arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty, East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In December 2003 41% supported this arrangement and 57% opposed it.

4. Demilitarized Palestinian state

Among Palestinians 27% support and 61% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise that contained all these elements with the exception of the part on the deployment of a multinational force received in December 2003 the support of 36% and the opposition of 63%. Among Israelis 68% agree and 30% disagree to this arrangement compared to 61% who agreed and 58% who disagreed to it a year ago in December 2003.

5. Security Arrangements

In the Palestinian public 53% support and 45% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel will have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In December 2003, a similar compromise that contained these same elements with the exception of the part on the multinational force received the support of 23% and the opposition of 76%.

In the Israeli public 61% support and 37% oppose this arrangement compared to 50% who supported it and 46% who opposed it a year ago in December 2003.

6. End of Conflict

In the Palestinian public 69% support and 29% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. An identical question received in December 2003 the support of 42% and the opposition of 55%. In the Israeli public 76% support and 23% oppose this component in the final status framework.

In December 2003, 66% of the Israelis supported it while 33% opposed it.

The Whole Package

Among Palestinians 54% support and 44% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. In December 2003, 39% supported and 58% opposed an identical overall combined package presented in the context of the Geneva Initiative. Among Israelis 64% support and 33% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined

package. A year ago only 47% of the Israelis supported and 49% opposed a similar overall package presented in the context of the Geneva initiative. The main difference between the December 2003 and the December 2004 versions presented to both Israelis and Palestinians is that while the first version stated that the package was that of the Geneva initiative, the second did not. In addition, in presenting the elements of the compromise in December 2004, we merged the parts dealing with the multinational force (presented in 2003 as a separate element) into the two elements of the demilitarized state and the security arrangements.

Mutual Recognition of Identity

Among Palestinians 63% support and 35% oppose the proposal that after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute, including the refugees and Jerusalem issues, there would be a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people. In June 2003, only 52% of the Palestinians supported this proposal and 46% opposed it.

Among Israelis 70% support and 16% oppose the mutual recognition of identity proposal. In June 2003, 65% of the Israelis supported it and 33% opposed it. It should be emphasized that these figures have been obtained after a prolonged period of reduced violence between the two sides and during the Palestinian election campaign. In addition as mentioned above the current survey has been detached from the Geneva initiative context within which the December 2003 questions were asked.

SUMMARY TABLE OF THE FINDINGS				
Changes in Support for Clinton's Permanent Settlement Framework Among Israelis and Palestinians in the last year				
	Israelis Dec. 2003	Israeli Jan. 2005	Palestinians Dec. 2003	Palestinians Dec. 2004
1) Borders and Territorial Exchange	47%	55%	57%	63%
2) Refugees	35%	44%	25%	46%
3) Jerusalem	41%	39%	46%	44%
4) Demilitarized Palestinian State	61%	68%	36%	27%
5) Security Arrangements	50%	61%	23%	53%
6) End of Conflict	66%	76%	42%	69%
Overall Package	47%	64%	39%	54%
Mutual Recognition of Identity	65%	70%	52%	63%

(fonte: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research website: www.pcpsr.org)

Annex XV

Documento dei Prigionieri (The full text of the National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners)

May 11, 2006

In the name of God, the Compassionate and the Merciful,
“Abide by the decree of God and never disperse” (a verse from the Holy Quran)
Based on the high sense of national and historical responsibility and due to the dangers facing our people and for the sake of reinforcing and consolidating the Palestinian internal front and protection of national unity and the unity of our people in the homeland and in the Diaspora, and in order to confront the Israeli scheme that aims to impose the Israeli solution which blows up the dream of our people and the right of our people in establishing their independent Palestinian state with full sovereignty; this scheme that the Israeli government intends to implement in the next phase as establishment of the erection and completion of the apartheid wall and the Judaization of the Jerusalem and the expansion of the Israeli settlements and the seizure of the Jordan Valley and the annexation of vast areas of the West Bank and blocking the path in front of our people to exercise their right in return.
In order to maintain the accomplishments of our people achieved in long struggle path and in loyalty to the martyrs of our great people and the pains of their prisoners and the agony of their injured, and based on the fact that we are still passing through a liberation phase with nationalism and democracy as the basic features, and this imposes a political struggle strategy that meets with these features and in order to make the Palestinian comprehensive national dialogue succeed, and based on the Cairo Declaration and the urgent need for unity and solidarity, we present this document (the national conciliation document) to our great steadfast people and to President Mahmoud Abbas Abu Mazen and to the PLO Leadership and to the PM Ismail Hanieh and to the Council of Ministers and to the Speaker of the PNC and to the members of the PNC and to the Speaker and members of the PLC and to all Palestinian forces and factions and to all nongovernmental and popular organizations and institutions and to leadership of Palestinian public opinion in the homeland and in the Diaspora.

Hoping to consider this document as one whole package and with the hope to see this document get the support and approval of everybody and that it can contribute to reach a Palestinian national conciliation document.

1- the Palestinian people in the homeland and in the Diaspora seek to liberate their land and to achieve their right in freedom, return and independence and to exercise their right in self determination, including the right to establish their independent state with al-Quds al-Shareef as its capital on all territories occupied in 1967 and to secure the right of return for the refugees and to liberate all prisoners and detainees based on the historical right of our people on the land of the fathers and grandfathers and based on the UN Charter and the international law and international legitimacy.

2- to work quickly on achieving what has been agreed upon in Cairo in March 2005 pertaining to the development and activation of the PLO and the joining of Hamas and Islamic Jihad Movements to the PLO which is the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people wherever they are located and in a manner that meets with changes on the Palestinian arena according to democratic principles and to consolidate the fact that the PLO is the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people in a manner that reinforces the capacity of the PLO to assume its responsibilities in leading our people in the homeland and in the Diaspora and in mobilizing the people and in defending their national, political and humanitarian rights in the various fora and circles and in the international and regional arenas and based on the fact that the national interest stipulates the formation of a new Palestinian National Council before the end of 2006 in a manner that secures the representation of all Palestinian national and Islamic forces, factions and parties and all concentrations of our people everywhere and the various sectors and the figures on proportional basis in representation and presence and struggle and political, social and popular effectiveness and to maintain the PLO as a broad front and framework and a comprehensive national coalition and a gathering framework for all the Palestinians in the homeland and in the Diaspora and to be the higher political reference.

3- the right of the Palestinian people in resistance and clinging to the option of resistance with the various means and focusing the resistance in the occupied territories of 1967 alongside with the political action and negotiations and diplomatic action and continuation of popular and mass resistance against the occupation in its various forms and policies and making sure there is broad participation by all sectors and masses in the popular resistance.

4- To set up a Palestinian plan towards comprehensive political action and to unify the Palestinian political rhetoric on the basis of the Palestinian national consensus program and Arab legitimacy and the international legitimacy resolutions that grant justice to the Palestinian people who are represented by the PLO and the PNA as president and government, and the national and Islamic factions and the civil society organizations and the public figures in order to mobilize Arab, Islamic and international political and financial and economic and humanitarian support and solidarity to our people and to our PNA and to support the right of our people in self determination and freedom and return and independence and to confront the plan of Israel in imposing the

Israeli solution on our people and to confront the oppressive siege on the Palestinian people.

5- To protect and reinforce the PNA since it is the nucleus of the future state; this PNA which was established by the struggle and sacrifices, blood and pain of the Palestinian people and to stress on the fact the higher national interests stipulates respecting the temporary constitution of the PNA and the effective laws and respecting the responsibilities and authorities of the president elected according to the will of the Palestinian people through free, honest and democratic elections and to respect the responsibilities and authorities of the government that was granted the confidence vote by the PLC.

And the importance and the need for creative cooperation between the presidency and the government and joint work and hold regular meetings between them to settle any disputes that might arise through brotherly dialogue based on the temporary constitution and for the sake of the higher interests and the need to hold a comprehensive reform in the PNA institutions, especially the judicial apparatus and the respect of the judiciary authority at all levels and to implement its decisions and to reinforce the rule of the law.

6- to form a national unity government on a basis that secures the participation of all parliament blocs, especially Fatah and Hamas and the political forces that desire to participate on the basis of this document and the joint program to upgrade the Palestinian situation at the local, Arab, regional and international levels and to confront the challenges through having a strong national government that enjoys Palestinian popular and political support from all forces and to present the best possible care for the sectors that carried the burden of steadfastness and resistance and the Intifada and who were the victims of the Israeli criminal aggression, especially the families of the martyrs, prisoners and injured and the owners of the demolished homes and properties which were destroyed by the occupation, in addition to the care to the unemployed and the graduates.

7- Administration of the negotiations is the jurisdiction of the PLO and the President of the PNA on the basis of clinging to the Palestinian national goals and to achieve these goals on condition that any final agreement must be presented to the new PNC for ratification or to hold a general referendum wherever it is possible.

8- To liberate the prisoners and detainees is a sacred national duty that must be assumed by all Palestinian national and Islamic forces and factions and the PLO and the PNA as President and government and the PLC and all resistance forces.

9- The need to double efforts to support and care for the refugees and defend their rights and work on holding a popular conference representing the refugees which should come up with commissions to follow up its duties and to stress on the right of return and to cling to this right and to call on the international community to implement Resolution 194 which stipulates the right of the refugees to return and to be compensated.

10- to work on forming a unified resistance front under the name "Palestinian resistance front" to lead and engage in resistance against the occupation and to unify and coordinate action and resistance and to form a unified political reference for the front.

11- to cling to the democratic trend and to hold regular general free and honest and democratic elections according to the law for the president and the PLC and the local and municipal councils and to respect the principle of peaceful and smooth transfer of authority and to promise to protect the Palestinian democratic experience and respect the democratic choice and its results and respect the rule of the law and the public and basic freedoms and freedom of the press and equality among the citizens in rights and duties without any discrimination and to protect the achievements of women and develop and reinforce them.

12- to reject and denounce the oppressive siege against the Palestinian people which is being led by the US and Israel and call on the Arabs at the popular and official levels to support the Palestinian people and the PLO and the PNA and to call on the Arab governments to implement the political, financial, economic, and media decisions of the Arab summits that support the Palestinian people and their steadfastness and their national cause and to stress that the PNA is committed to the Arab consensus and to joint Arab action.

13- to call on the Palestinian people for unity and solidarity and unifying the ranks and support the PLO and the PNA as president and government and to reinforce steadfastness and resistance in face of the aggression and siege and to reject intervention in the Palestinian internal affairs.

14- to denounce all forms of split that can lead to internal conflicts and to condemn the use of weapons regardless of the reasons in settling internal disputes and to ban the use of weapons among the members of the Palestinian people and to stress on the sanctity of the Palestinian blood and to abide by dialogue as the sole means to solve disagreements and freedom of expression through all media, including the opposition to the authority and its decisions on the basis of the law and the right of peaceful protest and to organize marches and demonstrations and sit ins on condition that they be peaceful and without any arms and not to attack the properties of citizens and public property.

15- The national interest stipulates the need to look for the best means towards the continuation of participation of the Palestinian people and their political forces in Gaza Strip in their new situation in the battle for freedom, return and independence and to liberate the West Bank and Jerusalem in a manner that makes the steadfast Gaza Strip a real support force to steadfastness and resistance of our people in the West Bank and Jerusalem as the national interest stipulates reassessing the struggle methods to seek the best methods to resist occupation.

16- the need to reform the develop the Palestinian security institution with all its branches on a modern basis and in a manner that makes them capable of assuming their tasks in defending the homeland and the citizens and in confronting the aggression and the occupation and to maintain security and public order and implement the laws and end the state of chaos and security chaos and end the forms of public armed presence and parades and confiscation of the chaotic weapons that harm the resistance and distort its image and that threaten the unity of the Palestinian society and the need to coordinate and organize the relation with the forces of resistance and organize and protect their weapons.

17- to call on the PLC to continue to issue laws that organize the work of the security institution and apparatuses with their various branches and work on issuing a law that bans exercise of political and partisan action by the members of the security services and to abide by the elected political reference as defined by the law.

18- to work on expanding the role and presence of the international solidarity committees and the peace loving groups that support our people in their just struggle against the occupation, settlements, the apartheid wall politically and locally and to work towards the implementation of the International Court of Justice decision at The Hague pertaining to the removal of the wall and settlements and their illegitimate presence.

Signed by:

Fatah – PLC member Marwan Barghouti, Fatah Secretary.

Hamas – Sheikh Abdul Khaleq al-Natsheh – Higher Leading Commission

Islamic Jihad Movement – Sheikh Bassam al-Sa'di

PFLP – Abdul Rahim Mallouh – member of PLO Executive Committee and

Deputy

General Secretary of the PFLP

DFLP – Mustafa Badarneh

Note: Islamic Jihad expressed reservations on the item pertaining to the negotiations

Source: Al-Quds newspaper – May 11, 2005

CRONOLOGIA

- 1917 2 novembre **Dichiarazione di Balfour:** comunicazione del ministro degli Esteri britannico Arthur Balfour alla federazione sionista britannica, sostenuta e approvata dalla Società delle Nazioni, con cui la Gran Bretagna si esprime a favore della costituzione di un “focolare nazionale per il popolo ebraico” in Palestina.
- 1947 29 novembre **Risoluzione 181:** viene approvato il piano di spartizione delle Nazioni Unite sulla Palestina in due Stati, uno arabo e uno ebraico. La risoluzione passò con 33 voti a favore, 13 contrari e 10 astenuti.
- 1948 11 dicembre **Risoluzione 194:** l'Assemblea Generale dell'ONU chiede che ai circa 700.000 profughi palestinesi venga concesso il diritto al ritorno nelle proprie case e il pagamento di un compenso a coloro che non vogliono tornare.
- 1967 22 novembre **Risoluzione 242:** per stabilire nella Regione una pace “giusta e duratura”, il Consiglio di Sicurezza dell'ONU chiede a Israele il ritiro dai territori occupati (nella versione inglese, il ritiro israeliano “da” zone occupate, in quella francese “dalle” zone occupate, cioè tutte); fissa il diritto di tutti gli Stati dell'area a essere riconosciuti come sovrani, indipendenti e integri all'interno di frontiere sicure, e afferma la necessità di trovare una soluzione al problema umano dei rifugiati.

- 1973 22 settembre **Risoluzione 338:** il Consiglio di Sicurezza dell'ONU chiede il cessate il fuoco e riafferma, all'indomani della guerra del Kippur, i principi della Risoluzione 242.
- 1978 17 settembre **Accordi di Camp David:** il presidente egiziano Anwar Sadat e il premier israeliano Menachem Begin, con la mediazione del presidente americano Jimmy Carter, firmano a Camp David un accordo che mette fine allo stato di guerra trentennale tra i due Paesi. In cambio del riconoscimento egiziano del diritto all'esistenza di Israele, gli israeliani restituiscono la penisola del Sinai. I due Paesi stabiliscono formali relazioni diplomatiche. La Lega araba espelle l'Egitto per aver firmato la pace con Israele.
- 1981 25 novembre **Piano Fahad:** proposta avanzata dal principe ereditario saudita Fahad, che chiede il ritiro di Israele da tutti i territori arabi occupati nel 1967 e lo smantellamento degli insediamenti israeliani costruiti dopo il '67; rivendica il diritto al ritorno degli arabo-palestinesi e postula la costituzione di uno Stato palestinese in Cisgiordania e Gaza, con Gerusalemme come capitale, dopo un periodo transitorio di alcuni mesi sotto il controllo delle Nazioni Unite.
- 1991 30 ott.-1 nov. **Conferenza di Pace a Madrid:** vi partecipano, come co-sponsor, Stati Uniti e Unione Sovietica; come Paese ospitante, la Spagna; in qualità di parti, Israele, Siria, Libano e una delegazione congiunta giordano-palestinese; l'Egitto viene invitato come partecipante. In veste di osservatori, sono presenti le Nazioni Unite, il Consiglio di Cooperazione del Golfo e l'Unione del Maghreb arabo. Da un punto di vista politico-diplomatico, la conferenza rappresenta l'inizio del vero cammino verso la pace e ha il merito di aver riunito attorno allo stesso tavolo antichi nemici, ma, a causa delle resistenze israeliane, non ottiene risultati.
- 1993 13 settembre **Dichiarazione dei Principi:** firmata a Washington e denominata anche **Oslo "1"**, ratifica gli accordi presi tra governo israeliano e OLP durante gli incontri segreti iniziati nella capitale svedese nel gennaio dello stesso anno. Prevede mutuo riconoscimento, cinque anni di transizione per il passaggio della Striscia di Gaza e di Gerico all'Autorità Palestinese, la creazione di una polizia palestinese, elezioni.

- 1995 28 settembre **Accordi di Oslo “2”**: firmati da Arafat e da Rabin a Washington, alla presenza di Clinton, di Mubarak e di re Hussein, prevedono la suddivisione di Cisgiordania e Gaza in tre zone: A (controllata dall'ANP), B (a controllo misto), C (a controllo israeliano). La sicurezza è nelle mani israeliane, ma si prevede il trasferimento di poteri da Israele alla Palestina, una serie di progetti di cooperazione economica tra le due parti e il rilascio dei prigionieri palestinesi dalle carceri israeliane.
- 1999 4-5 settembre **Accordi di Sharm el-Sheik**: denominati anche “**Wye II**”, vengono firmati da Arafat e da Barak, e definiscono il calendario del ridispiegamento israeliano con nuovi ritiri dell'esercito, pari a un ulteriore 11% dei territori occupati nel 1967; vengono aperti due collegamenti sicuri tra Cisgiordania e Gaza, stabilito il rilascio di altri prigionieri e fissato l'impegno delle due parti a riprendere il “negoziato finale” il 13 settembre e a terminarlo nel giro di dodici mesi.
- 2000 11-25 luglio **Summit di Camp David (2)**: Barak e Arafat negoziano con la mediazione del presidente Clinton, ma non viene raggiunto nessun accordo. Sul tavolo delle trattative, cinque questioni cruciali: la nascita di uno Stato palestinese; la gestione dei confini di Gerusalemme; la regolamentazione degli insediamenti nei territori occupati; la questione del controllo delle risorse idriche; il futuro dei profughi palestinesi.
- 2001 21-28 gennaio **Negoziati a Taba**: si svolgono nella località egiziana tra palestinesi e israeliani. Assenti gli americani, a causa della nuova agenda di politica estera di George W. Bush; presente l'Unione europea, con il suo inviato speciale per il Vicino Oriente, Moratinos. Le trattative si arenano sul problema dei rifugiati palestinesi. I colloqui terminano con una dichiarazione congiunta di Abu Ala e Ben Ami, in cui si ammette di non essere giunti a un accordo, ma al contempo si afferma che: “sono stati fatti significativi passi in avanti e l'accordo non è mai stato così vicino”.

- 2001 14 giugno **Piano Tenet:** elaborato dal direttore della CIA, George Tenet, propone la cessazione immediata delle ostilità, l'arresto dei militanti terroristi e la fine della campagna mediatica palestinese anti-israeliana. Il piano chiede anche a Israele la fine delle restrizioni di viaggio imposte ai palestinesi e il ritiro delle proprie truppe dai territori sotto controllo palestinese nella Striscia di Gaza e in Cisgiordania. Viene inoltre previsto un periodo di "raffreddamento" prima dell'attuazione delle indicazioni della commissione internazionale presieduta dall'ex senatore USA Mitchell.
- 2002 17 febbraio **Piano Abdallah:** iniziativa di pace araba per il Medio Oriente che, avanzata dal principe ereditario saudita Abdallah, offre a Israele una garanzia collettiva araba di piena normalizzazione dei rapporti, in cambio del ritiro alle frontiere del '67 e della creazione di uno Stato palestinese.
- 2002 27-28 marzo **Vertice della Lega araba a Beirut:** viene approvato all'unanimità il piano di pace proposto dall'Arabia Saudita.
- 2003 30 aprile **Road Map:** lanciata dagli USA, a nome del Quartetto, prevede, in cambio della cessazione della resistenza palestinese e della rinuncia al diritto al ritorno degli esuli, riconoscimenti territoriali che sfocerebbero nella creazione di uno Stato palestinese entro il 2005.
- 2003 1 dicembre **Accordo di Ginevra:** firmato da personalità israeliane e palestinesi, è considerato un accordo virtuale; prevede: la creazione di uno Stato palestinese indipendente sui territori occupati da Israele a partire dal 1967, con l'esclusione delle "zone densamente popolate" da coloni ebrei (larga parte della Cisgiordania), che verrebbero definitivamente annesse a Israele; la spartizione di Gerusalemme in due parti, entrambe capitali dei rispettivi Stati; la monetizzazione della rinuncia al ritorno o l'accoglimento dei profughi palestinesi da parte di altri Paesi e, solo per una piccola parte di essi, il ritorno in Palestina.
- 2004 26 ottobre **Piano di ritiro da Gaza:** avanzato dal premier israeliano Ariel Sharon e approvato dalla Knesset, pone fine a 37 anni di occupazione e di colonizzazione nella Striscia, conquistata dallo Stato ebraico nel 1967 durante la guerra dei Sei giorni.

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www.L-studio.it



Il CIPMO è tra le più importanti organizzazioni italiane impegnate sulle tematiche del conflitto israelo-palestinese-arabo e sullo sviluppo delle più diverse forme di cooperazione a livello euromediterraneo.

Fondato nel 1989 da Janiki Cingoli, tuttora Direttore, il Centro, riconosciuto come Ente Internazionalistico di interesse nazionale dal Ministero degli Affari Esteri, è sostenuto dalla Regione Lombardia, dal Comune di Milano, e dalla Provincia di Milano, che ne hanno promosso la nascita, e dall'Unione Europea nella realizzazione dei suoi più importanti progetti.

Nel 2000 è stato insignito del Premio per la Pace della Regione Lombardia.

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- Organizzazione di grandi Conferenze e avvenimenti internazionali a sostegno del Processo di pace e per favorire il dialogo e la crescita politica, culturale e sociale di tutti coloro che sono interessati all'approfondimento delle tematiche mediorientali e mediterranee;
- Organizzazione di seminari riservati con la partecipazione di esponenti politici, esperti e personalità dei Paesi interessati;
- Sviluppo di progetti finanziati dall'Unione Europea;
- Coordinamento iniziative del Comitato Italiano di Appoggio all'Iniziativa di Ginevra e al suo modello di Accordo di pace tra Israele e Palestina;
- Realizzazione di ricerche sulla realtà mediorientale e mediterranea;
- Svolgimento di attività formative specifiche, pre e post lauream;
- Analisi: realizzazione di editoriali, sito Internet, newsletter bimestrale.

Janiki Cingoli

Direttore del CIPMO, si occupa di questioni internazionali dal 1976. Si è impegnato sulle questioni mediorientali a partire dall'81, promuovendo le prime occasioni di dialogo, in Italia, tra israeliani e palestinesi. È analista dei problemi mediorientali per alcuni quotidiani.

Federica Cardelli

Responsabile Ufficio progetti del CIPMO.